IMPORTANT BLOG ANNOUNCEMENT

PLEASE CHANGE YOUR BOOKMARKS AND FEEDS TO THE NEW URL, YANKEEANALYSTS.COM. TYU IS IN NO WAY AFFILIATED WITH THE NEW YORK YANKEES OR YANKEES UNIVERSE.

Entering the 6th inning of yesterday’s 5-3 loss to the Angels, it looked as if Javier Vazquez was going to turn in an outing good enough to silence some of his critics, as he had allowed just two runs to that point despite not having his best stuff. Three batters later, Javy was getting booed off the mound following doubles by Torii Hunter and Kendry Morales. Let’s take a look at those two at-bats, with screengrabs from Gameday, to see what went wrong (Mike at RAB also looked at the Morales at bat).

The Hunter at-bat was fairly straightforward. Vazquez started with 2 fastballs to go 0-2, and then went with two sliders and a fastball down and away to push the count to 3-2. This is representative of the trouble Javy had putting hitters away yesterday, as he could not seem to find the right pitch to finish hitters off with two strikes. I understand the goal of getting a free swinger type like Hunter to flail at something, but none of the 3 pitches was at all close to the zone and did not tempt Hunter at all.

The final pitch of the at-bat was a fastball that was belt-high and on the outer half. While I have no problem with going to the heater there, I do take issue with the location. When backing up a fastball with a second heater, it is imperative that you do something to change the hitter’s eye level or catch him protecting the wrong portion of the plate, unless you have enough velocity to simply blow it by the hitter in the same location. Vazquez did attempt to do so, bringing the pitch up from below the knees to the belt area. However, changing the eye-level of a fastball hitter like Hunter means bringing that pitch all the way up, letter high, particularly when he knows that the pitch is likely coming into the zone due to the full count. Essentially, there is a good chance that Hunter was sitting on a fastball there, and it needed to get further up the ladder or further inside in order to fool him. Instead, it was an 89 MPH pitch right where the first two fastballs were, and Hunter did not miss it. I am not sure if the problem was the pitch call or the execution, but I thought that it was an incredibly poor pitch that put Vazquez in a bind. After a wild pitch and a strikeout of Matsui, Javy faced Morales and had a similarly poor at-bat.

The issue in the Morales at-bat was not so much location as it was pitch sequencing and selection. Morales fell behind 1-2 on the strength of two changeups that he swung and missed on. Javy followed with two more changeups out of the zone that Morales did not bite on, and suddenly it was 3-2. However, Morales is a left handed hitter and first base was open, so Vazquez did not have to throw a strike and could play for the double play with Juan Rivera coming up. He had the ability to attack Morales in a number of ways.

The only thing that would not make any sense in this spot would be to throw a changeup in the strikezone due to the count. Morales had already seen the pitch 4 times in the at-bat, and had likely timed it at that point. While doubling up changeups is actually a pretty solid pitch combination, four in a row is pushing it. To throw that same pitch but to make it more hittable by throwing it higher than any of the previous ones is simply poor strategy (Mike’s post showed that Jorge set-up lower, and Javy missed the spot. Even so, the pitch would have been in the same spot as pitches 1 and 3). A fastball up or a breaking ball in the dirt would have been vastly preferable. Instead, Javy threw the changeup belt high, and Morales drove it into the gap to end Javy’s afternoon. Those two at-bats, particularly the final pitch of each, were the difference between a good outing and getting boo’ed off the mound.

The photo above is the Gameday illustration of Curtis Granderson’s brief at-bat against Jonathan Papelbon the other night. Papelbon threw two pitches to Curtis, the second one being a fastball middle-up at 94 MPH. As I am sure you know, Granderson turned on that pitch and sent it into the seats in right to give the Yankees a 2-1 lead. What was interesting about Papelbon’s performance Wednesday night was that although he has been encouraged to rediscover his splitter, he is still not confident enough to use it as an out pitch. According to Fangraphs, Papelbon threw his splitter less frequently in 2009, maddening Red Sox fans as he consistently reverted to a fastball-only philosophy in tight situations, while occasionally mixing in a slider. Here is Papelbon’s pitch type graph from his blown save in Game 3 of the ALDS, courtesy of Brooks Baseball (FF is fastball, FT is splitter):

As you can see, all but one of his 28 pitches were fastballs. I’m not sure why it is that he has eschewed the splitter, but there was much talk this spring about recapturing that pitch as the devastating out pitch it once was. Against the Yankees, he threw 26 pitches, with 8 of them being splitters. However, he only threw one slider, rendering him a two pitch pitcher once again. Furthermore, as the following graph shows, he refrained from using the splitter deep into counts, with 6 out of 8 coming in the first 2 pitches of an at-bat. Here is his pitch selection chart based on pitch number in the AB:

I am certainly not suggesting that Papelbon cannot succeed with just two pitches. He was very good in 2009, and I expect him to be excellent again in 2010. That said, when I brought this point up on Twitter, Ben Kabak of RAB astutely pointed out its relevance to Joba Chamberlain. I think the Yankees and Joba can learn a valuable lesson from Papelbon. Working in the bullpen often leads a pitcher to pare down his repertoire, removing pitches that can be effective but are simply not needed when facing just a handful of hitters one time. If Brian Cashman really still sees Joba as “a starter in the bullpen,” it will be important to have him mix in his changeup and curveball on occasion in order to maintain the quality of those pitches. Even if he is destined for the bullpen, having extra pitches at his disposal will leave him less prone to blow-ups when one of his primary pitches is not working. No matter what the future holds for Chamberlain, maintaining his entire repertoire of pitches will help him maximize his value.

Watching Alfredo Aceves throw in the bullpen would lead one to wonder how he has had moderate success as a major leaguer. He primarily throws 4 pitches, with none being particularly impressive or noteworthy. Yet, he consistently gets positive results out of the bullpen, and was an integral part of both last night’s victory and the 2009 World Championship club. So how is he doing it?

The answer is simple: Aceves effectively mixes his four pitches, and locates all of them consistently. He walked just 1.71 batters per 9 innings last season, which allowed him to post a sterling 4.31 K/BB. Let’s take a look at his outing last night to see how he attacked hitters in his 2 inning stint.

The table, coming courtesy of Brooks Baseball, shows that Aceves threw his fastball about 48 percent of the time, while using his 3 breaking pitches, cutter, curveball, and changeup 3, 4, and 5 times respectively. Other than the curveball, he was locating all of his pitches well, throwing at least 70% for strikes. As you can see, the velocity on the various pitches varied enough to keep hitters off balance. These attributes are not specific to this game, as he maintained similar ratios and velocities over the 2009 season. A look at the individual at bats shows how he used his ability to locate four pitches and change speeds to attack hitters.

Batter #1: Adrian Beltre
Beltre is a notorious first pitch fastball hitter. Aceves threw him a cutter down and away, baiting Beltre into swinging at what he thought was a fastball and Beltre lined out to Jeter.

Batter #2: JD Drew
Aceves started Drew out with a fastball on the low and outside corner, a perfect pitch. He then lowered Drew’s eye angle with a curveball down for a ball, and then came up and away with back to back changeups, with the second one inducing a groundout. This screengrab from Gameday illustrates how well Aceves locates to the edges of the zone:

Batter#3: Mike Cameron
Aceves threw Camron a cutter on the outer half that he fouled off, and then busted him inside with a FB. Cameron grounded to short, but Jeter threw it away.

Batter #4: Marco Scutaro
The scouting report on Scutaro must be to throw him fastballs, because Aceves threw him 4, to four different portions of the plate. Scutaro grounded out on a 2-1 count.

Batter #5: Jacoby Ellsbury
Aceves started Ellsbury with two curveballs down, one inside and one outside, bringing the count to 1-1. He then added some velocity with a changeup up, nipped the outside corner with a fastball that brought the velocity even higher while dropping the location a bit, and then induced a groundout by returning to the changeup at the bottom of the zone. This is another prime example of how Aceves gets outs.

Batter #6: Dustin Pedroia
Pedroia took a fastball down the middle for a called strike. Aceves then threw the same pitch but dropped it a few inches, and Dustin lifted a harmless flyout to center.

Batter #7: Victor Martinez
A curveball down and a fastball away put Aceves in a 2-0 hole, but he got a cutter over that got Martinez to foul it off. At 2-1, Aceves perfectly placed a fastball on the outside corner that evened the count. He then followed that with a changeup even further outside that Martinez chased and lofted to left for an easy out.

Aceves needed just 23 pitches to get through two innings despite Jeter’s error, and threw 16 strikes. He located well, as few of his pitches caught the middle of the plate, and he effectively mixed his pitches to keep hitters off balance. This formula served him well in his strong 2009, and continued to do so in his first outing of 2010.

From Ben Shpigel:

By the end of Vazquez’s two-inning outing, it was practically forgotten because of another pitch – a changeup that Chase Utley flailed at for Strike 3. That pitch is what Manager Joe Girardi will take away from Vazquez’s debut, a game the Yankees won, 7-5.

“That was as good a changeup as I’ve seen all spring,” Girardi said, adding, “It’s early for the hitters, too, but it was an outstanding changeup.”

Vazquez has thrown a curveball and a changeup for many years, but he returns to the Yankees armed with a slider. All three pitches are vital to Vazquez’s success now that he no longer relies on his fastball. “I’ve been a little stubborn in the past,” said Vazquez, who added that he still has a lot of confidence in his fastball.

This touches upon the change in Javy’s style that we discussed a few days ago:

The percentage of pitches that Vazquez throws as fastballs has been trending downward for his entire career, and dipped below 50% for the first time in 2009. Being that his fastball got knocked around in his one season in NY (wFB/C, which is fastball runs above average per 100 FB, of -.84), this is a positive development. Vazquez did throw plenty of changeups in 2004, but Jorge is right in suggesting that the pitch improved in 2009, as Javy posted his best wCH/C of his career. Finally, as Jorge noted, Vazquez has added an effective slider, a pitch he barely used in New York and now uses as his primary breaking pitch.

Some Yankees fans have suggested that Vazquez is simply not cut out for New York, and point to his rough second half in 2004 as evidence. However, it has become clear that Javy is not the same pitcher that he was then, as he attacks hitters in an entirely different manner than he used to. While he used to work almost exclusively with his fastball and changeup, he now frequently mixes in the slider and the curve. He is a more complete pitcher, and that should bode well for him as he ages. Hopefully, his first spring outing is a sign of things to come.


From Mark Feinsand:

Posada said Vazquez has matured as a pitcher since they played together in 2004, giving the Yankees a much stronger rotation than the one that captured the World Series crown last November. While Vazquez was primarily a fastball-curveball pitcher six years ago, Posada now feels that the changeup and slider are on the same level, making it much more difficult for hitters to find a comfortable approach.

“It’s easy for me to call his game,” Posada said. “He has four outstanding pitches, so you can’t go wrong with any of them when you call it.”

A look at the data at Fangraphs confirms that Vazquez has in fact changed his approach since 2004.

The percentage of pitches that Vazquez throws as fastballs has been trending downward for his entire career, and dipped below 50% for the first time in 2009. Being that his fastball got knocked around in his one season in NY (wFB/C, which is fastball runs above average per 100 FB, of -.84), this is a positive development. Vazquez did throw plenty of changeups in 2004, but Jorge is right in suggesting that the pitch improved in 2009, as Javy posted his best wCH/C of his career. Finally, as Jorge noted, Vazquez has added an effective slider, a pitch he barely used in New York and now uses as his primary breaking pitch.

Another area that might be interesting to track is Javy’s pitch selection when runners are on base. As Jay at Fack Youk chronicled earlier in the offseason, Vazquez has a lot of trouble pitching from the stretch, and seems to have innings snowball on him due to his failure to pitch well with runners on. It may be interesting to see whether Vazquez gets fastball-happy once runners are on, thereby becoming more predictable and more hittable. If that was in fact the case, the Yankees could help Javy fix the issue by forcing him to use all of his pitches in all situations.

Jorge Posada is accurate in stating that Javier Vazquez is a more complete pitcher now than he was in 2004. Hopefully he can help Javy utilize his improved repertoire to keep hitters off balance, and Javy can come closer to repeating 2009 than 2004.

The following table is a breakdown of the 2009 Yankees’ collective numbers for their starting pitching staff with regards to overall pitch selection and pitch effectiveness. The numbers are then ranked in relation to the rest of the American League. All data – pitch type and pitch type value – was provided by FanGraphs.

Fastball — The Yankees have a staff of guys who throw the fastball hard – 2nd in the AL – and, therefore, in 2009, they chose to throw the fastball frequently (4th in the AL). However, Joba Chamberlain (-21.0), Chien-Ming Wang (-16.5), and A.J. Burnett (-13.0) really hurt the team’s collective fastball effectiveness, as their offerings were well below average. In fact, of the Yankees’ staff of starting pitchers, only CC Sabathia posted a positive number (13.6 runs above average).

Best — CC Sabathia (+13.6)
Worst — Joba Chamberlain (-21.0)

Changeup — The Yankees didn’t throw the changeup much this past season – 12th in the AL – however, when they did, the average velocity was 84.5 mph – 1st in the AL – and it proved to be an effective pitch for them (2nd in the AL). Still, the positive rating/ranking was mainly the result of Sabathia, who had the most effective changeup in the AL (+22.5) and the second most effective changeup in baseball behind Tim Lincecum (+35.0). Outside of that, none of Sabathia’s rotation-mates had a very impressive change.

Best — CC Sabathia (+22.5)
Worst — Andy Pettitte (-4.4)

Curveball — Like the fastball, the Yankees utilized the curveball fairly frequently – 4th in the AL – and the team’s average velocity (79.5 mph) with the offering was tops in the AL. The pitch proved to be a dangerous weapon for the Yankee staff – 18.7 runs above average – as the team was first in the league with regards to curveball effectiveness. This was primarily due to A.J. Burnett’s curve (+15.4), although Andy Pettitte’s bender was also notably above average (+4.4).

Best — A.J. Burnett (+15.4)
Worst — Phil Hughes (-1.7)

Splitter — Not much to write for the split-finger fastball. Chien-Ming Wang, according to FanGraphs’ data, was the only starter to employ the pitch and it accounted for only 4.0% of his pitch selection (0.2% of the staff’s overall selection). The splitter, which he threw relatively hard – 84.3 mph, 4th in the AL – was an average offering for Wang in terms of its effectiveness (-0.1) and it was fairly average, league-wise, as the team’s splitter effectiveness (i.e., Wang’s splitter effectiveness) ranked 6th in the AL .

Best — Chien-Ming Wang (-0.1)
Worst — na

Cutter — Collectively, the Yankees didn’t use the cutter as often as other teams – 7th in the AL – and the pitches’ average velocity of 85.0 mph was pretty low – 11th in the AL – however, the cutter was still extremely effective for the team, as they ranked 3rd in the league in that regard (+14.9). Though the pitch was well above average for them, the Yankees’ ranking was mainly based on Andy Pettitte’s season, for his cutter was 15.5 runs above average (and he threw it the most). No one else had a positive cutter rating as a starter.

Best — Andy Pettitte (+15.5)
Worst — Alfredo Aceves (-0.4)

Slider — Even with the addition of CC Sabathia, who is known for his slider, the team’s use of the slider was surprisingly below average. They didn’t throw it much – 11th in the AL – and when they did, the velocity was fairly low (11th in the AL). Everyone on the staff threw a slider outside of Aceves and Hughes, though no slider, in particular, was as effective as Sabathia’s changeup, Burnett’s curveball, or Andy Pettitte’s cutter. They were all decidedly average, including Sabathia’s, which was worth only 1.1 runs above average after being 33.9 runs above average in 2008. Joba Chamberlain’s slider was the best on the staff at 7.5 runs above average. Therefore, though the team’s collective use of the pitch was below average, no one had a terrible slider (other teams were just more effective in their use of the pitch).

Best — Joba Chamberlain (+7.5)
Worst — Sergio Mitre (-0.1)

Any thoughts on the numbers?

© 2011 TYU Suffusion theme by Sayontan Sinha