From Larry Brooks:
But the bullpen illustrates the most obvious difference between the past and present manager.
In 2005, three Yankees were among the top 11 in the AL in innings pitched by a reliever; in 2006, three Yankees were among the top nine; in 2007, two were in the top 13. Last year, in Girardi’s first season running the show, no Yankees relief pitcher was among the top 12.
This year, even with Chien-Ming Wang compromised and Joba Chamberlain unable to deliver consistent length, Alfredo Aceves ranks highest, at 12th in the league after last night’s four shutout innings in relief of Sergio Mitre that allowed the rest of the corps to, well, rest.
“The bullpen to me is something you really have to watch,” Girardi said. “You have to be careful that you don’t fall in love with one guy because then you wear him down and he no longer can be effective.
“The key is to be effective for the whole year, not two weeks or a month.”
Looking at total IP is a bit misleading, considering that some relievers have not been with the club all season. However, a closer look at each pitcher’s individual usage pattern suggests that Joe spreads the work around and tries to keep everybody fresh. Let us take a gander at the numbers for the 5 relievers currently in the pen that have not had their usage interrupted by injury. Remember that August still has 17 days in it, so the last number in each row will obviously be lower.
Dave Robertson:
IP by month: 2.1, 5.0, 10, 11, 3.2
App. by month: 2, 7, 10, 9, 6
Robertson spent the first two months shuttling back and forth to SWB. Since sticking with the big club, he has averaged 10.5 innings per month and 9.5 appearances. As you can see, his usage for his two full months with the club has been very consistent.
Phil Hughes:
IP by month: 6, 28.2, 13, 14.2, 4.2
App. by month: 1, 6, 8, 11, 6
Hughes was a starter for the first two months. His two months as a reliever are very similar in terms of innings pitched, although his appearances are increasing as he is used more as a one inning reliever. Again, the usage seems well conceived, without any real signs of overuse.
Phil Coke:
IP by month: 9.2, 11, 12.2, 9.2, 5
App. by month: 11, 11, 14, 12, 7
It does not get more consistent than that. He has been between 9.2 and 12.2 IP in each month, and is between 11 and 14 appearances a month. Appearances are expected to vary more for a lefty, who might be used frequently to get one batter.
Alfredo Aceves:
IP by month: 0, 19.2, 13.2, 15, 9
App. by month: 0, 9, 9, 9, 3
Aceves came up in early May and has made exactly 9 appearances in each month since. He was used primarily as a long man in that first month, which explains the higher inning total for that month.
Mariano Rivera:
IP by month: 9.2, 11, 11, 11.2, 5.2
App. by month: 10, 10, 11, 12, 5
You probably get the point by now. Once again, the pattern of usage is startlingly clear.
To me, the numbers tell an obvious story. If Girardi was Torre-like in overusing a hot pitcher, you would see outlier months for some of the relievers, where they would have inflated innings or appearances totals due to being overused by the manager. Instead, Joe Girardi spreads bullpen work around efficiently and consistently, and sticks to a plan in terms of staying away from overuse. For the second consecutive year, his deft handling of the bullpen is paying dividends.
As fans, we often get fairly cocky about our knowledge of the sport. We make sweeping generalizations about a manager and a decision based upon our own store of experience, often criticizing moves as being clearly wrong. However, in actuallity, baseball is a complex sport that often presents multiple reasonable courses of action. Yet we tend to see things in absolutes: my way or the highway.
Let me give an example. In the 6th inning of last night’s game, Robbie Cano hit a leadoff double. Jerry Hairston Jr was not bunting, the Yankees did not score, and lost by one run. Many at Lohud were livid, and are still complaining about that idiot Girardi costing the Yankees the game. Conversely, most fans at RAB were pleased by the non-bunt. Two fan bases, both sure of the correctness of their convictions. Yet, to be honest, neither is really right or wrong. Either course of action would have been reasonable and defensible, yet as fans we automatically assume that we know better than the manager. This leads to a hypercritical view of the manager, as every move that does not fit our particular philosophy is ripped as being indicative of bad managing.
Am I saying that we need to stop analyzing managerial decisions? Certainly not. But I think that we need to remember that the course of action that we would have taken is not necessarily the only right move. Just because the manager has a different philospohy does not necessarily mean that he is always wrong. Sometimes, the manager just knows better.
Joe Girardi came under fire after yesterday’s game for a number of the decisions that he made prior to, and during, yesterday’s 6-4 loss to Oakland. Being that I found all of his moves entirely logical and defensible, I would like to serve as Joe’s mouthpiece for a second and explain his decisions.
1) Sitting Posada, Matsui, and Damon on the same day: Let us go through these one by one.
Posada is typically going to sit for a day game after a night game. Furthermore, Molina has had success with Pettitte recently, and I think that we may see them paired together frequently going forward.
Matsui sat so Jeter could DH. Jeter came up limping after a slide last week, and Girardi obviously felt the need to give him a day prior to the upcoming series with Tampa Bay. While Joe could have DH’d Jeter on Sunday, sitting Matsui on Saturday against struggling lefty Gio Gonzalez made more sense, being that A-Rod is likely to get a day off this weekend as well. This way, A-Rod can sit against the righty, while Matsui and Damon sit versus the lefty.
Damon needs to be rested periodically to remain effective, and I am sure that they wanted to get him a day before the Tampa series as well. Again, he could have sat Sunday, but his .250/.306/.384 line against lefties means that Melky (.291/.365/.488) is a better bet against Gonzalez anyhow.
Basically, Posada sitting was the obvious move, while Matsui and Damon sat on the same day because a lefty was pitching and Melky is a great option against lefties anyhow. Furthermore, A-Rod needing a day off basically means that Joe chose to sit Matsui and Damon together, and sit Alex by himself. While you may disagree with Joe’s choice, it was certainly defensible.
2) Leaving Andy Pettitte in during a 1-0 game with 2 on and one out, with 3 righties due up: I really do not get this complaint. Andy was at 95 pitches, and had allowed 4 baserunners and no runs in 6.1 innings to that point. The three righties were the 6-7-8 hitters on a last place team, with none batting over .260. If fans really would have pulled Pettitte due to fear of Rajai Davis, maybe they should look up Davis’ OPS (.698). This is a classic second guess.
3) Not bunting Posada in the 9th with two on and nobody out, down 6-4. The last time Jorge bunted was 1997. Enough said.
From Bob Klapisch:
But there’s more to managing than simply bodysurfing a winning streak. Girardi looked crisp and in control when the Yankees were mauling the AL a month ago, launching all those crazy comebacks. But now they’re struggling — the Red Sox’ domination of the Bombers is nothing short of humiliating — and Girardi’s confidence has turned to a square-jawed form of desperation.
That’s why A-Rod played every day until he couldn’t bring his bat through the strike zone anymore — and, as he’s hinted, his hip is so stiff. It’s the reason why no one comes to Sabathia’s rescue in the seventh or eighth innings.
It’s because Girardi knows his managerial career will be over if he gets fired by the Yankees. The team is feeling the angst over ticket sales — they failed to sell out the Subway Series and are urgently reminding fans that seats are available for the Red Sox series in August.
I have to strongly disagree with Bob here. Girardi has not changed his managing one bit since the team started losing. He has leaned on CC during good times and bad, and the same can be said about A-Rod. He has said from the start that he would be willing to use Mariano for 4 outs, and did so against the Mets because it was the right tactical move. If anything, the critique on Joe in the past is that sometimes he is too concerned with resting players and usage than winning the game at hand, a criticism that I do not suscribe to. There is no desperation in Joe’s managing, although it would make for a more compelling story if there was.
What do you think? Do you see Joe as acting out of desperation? Have you noticed any changes in his style lately?
With the recent explosion of the internet as a means for sports discussion and analysis, the typical sports fan has become significantly more informed and intelligent. The more frequent exchange of ideas has led to the questioning of some of the conventional wisdom that butresses many of the decisions that managers make ”by the book.” When the Yankees brought in Joe Girardi, one of the things frequently said about him was that he was not your father’s manager. He would use statistics and logic to reach decisions, rather than just repeating the mistakes of his predecessors in the profession. Last night, we saw Joe abandon ”the book” in one situation while adhering to it against all logic in another. The second choice cost the team the game.
Melky Cabrera led off the 7th inning with a single in a game the Yankees trailed 1-0. With Frankie Cervelli, the 9 hitter up, conventional wisdom would call for a bunt to move a runner into scoring position for the top of the order. Rather than give up the out, Joe called for a hit and run, and Cervelli delivered an RBI double over the drawn in Mike Lowell. Having an extra out paid further dividends when A-Rod drove in two runs with a two out double. The decision was truly a great one, as it clearly caught the Red Sox off guard and was a play at the big inning rather than just an attempt to score one run. Had the Yankees won the game, this post would end right here.
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However, Joe’s next decision stuck steadfastly to the book, and it cost the Yankees dearly. With CC Sabathia faltering in the 8th (lead cut to 3-2, two on, none out), Girardi had Alfredo Aceves and Mariano Rivera warming. Rather than go to his best reliever to get out of the jam, Joe saved him for the save situation, as most managers would have. Some believe that Joe should have gone to Mo for 6 outs. Personally, I think that would have been the wrong decision, suggesting that in the long run, these games are more important than those against any other team. However, I certainly would have allowed Mo to pitch the 8th and then gone to Aceves for the 9th. The save situation last night came in the 8th inning, with two on in a one run game and Youkilis and Bay coming up. Your best reliever needs to pitch in that spot. Someone else can retire the bottom of the order in the 9th. While most managers would have made the same move, that does not make it any less wrong. As Mike at RAB stated during the game yesterday, a book of cliches could have managed that inning. With a manager who was supposed to be different, I find that quite disappointing.
This from NY Post hockey guru Larry Brooks:
“He’s pitched Upton tougher than he’s pitched Longoria during the course of his career,” Girardi said. “That’s why I made the move.”
The small samples showed that Upton had gone 1-for-7 with six strikeouts against Rivera while Longoria had gone 2-for-6 with a home run, so the manager was technically correct. But Longoria, bothered by a sore hamstring, hadn’t played since Tuesday, and would not have been able to leg anything out had he hit a grounder; indeed, he was replaced by a pinch runner as soon as he took the base he was given by Girardi.
But is this what it’s come to for Rivera, pulled in the middle of an inning for the second time already this year after suffering that fate once over the previous three years and three times total over the last six seasons? Is it now about his comparable success against batters he’s faced fewer than 10 times over the course of his career?
Or is playing percentages with the closer an indication that the manager doesn’t have faith that the Great Rivera can still get anybody out at any time, because it sure appeared that way yesterday?
That walk to the mound and the instruction to intentionally walk Longoria sure seemed like a vote of no confidence from the manager, even to Rivera, who came as close to saying that as possible without actually using the words.
“If it were me, I would have pitched to [Longoria], but I’m not the manager,” said Rivera, who yielded an RBI single to Upton that prompted Girardi to pull him. “[Why?] Because that’s what I do; I don’t go out there to intentionally walk guys.
“I think I have good stuff to get people out, but it’s not my decision.”
Apparently an intentional walk means that the manager has no confidence in the pitcher. Joe Torre obviously had no faith in Mariano, being that he asked him to issue intentional passes on 31 occasions. Seriously now, the manager made a strategic decision that made plenty of sense and was in no way disrespectful towards Mo. Mo was having a rough afternoon, and Girardi saw an opportunity to avoid having him face the RBI leader. I do not see how a decision that would have been the right move with Mariano in his prime could be viewed as a slap in the face. Mo clearly wanted to face Longoria, but most pitchers have that competitive streak that makes them want to face every hitter. I do not think he took Girardi’s decision personally, and Brooks seems to be injecting controversy where there is none. Maybe he should stick to writing about hockey.
From David Pinto:
Erik Boland posts the Yankees lineup, which includes Berroa at third, Gardner in center, and Melky Cabrera in leftfield. Damon and Matsui are on the bench. The Indians are throwing a bad left-handed pitcher tonight, Jeremy Sowers, one that right-handers eat up. So Girardi takes the opportunity to rest his older lefties and get a somewhat better defensive team in there to help Joba. Seems to me a very good move on Girardi’s part.
This is a rational take on Girardi’s use of his bench in a good spot for it. When a lineup like tonight’s gets posted, the first reaction of many fans is to question the manager’s sanity. But with Damon having cooled off recently and Matsui’s knees obviously bothering him, tonight is as good a chance as any to give those guys a break and hopefully win the game regardless. With Joba on the hill, the worst case scenario is that the game is close going into the late innings, when those players can be used as pinch hitters anyhow.
From Joel Sherman:
This is not a Joe Girardi criticism. This is a criticism of all managers for continuing to let a statistic prevail over common sense. I only use the decision by Girardi on Sunday to highlight what I feel is total stupidity.
The score was 4-4 going to the bottom of the ninth in Cleveland and the Indians had just used their closer, Kerry Wood, to pitch to the top of the ninth. To preserve a tie and force extra innings, Girardi used first Phil Coke and then David Robertson and together those two conspired to yield the winning run. The Yankees lost without ever using their best reliever, Mariano Rivera. The theory goes that – on the road – you hold your closer until you have a save situation. And I have always found that to be ludicrous.
The Lawnmower Man download The first job of the visiting manager in that game is to force extra innings and the best chance of doing that is to use your best reliever. I believe you have to manage that game as if you are going to score several runs in extra innings and make it easier for any reliever to close the game. But even if you don’t, who cares?
In no other sport do you ignore the best person for a job in anticipation of rewarding that person with a statistic that may never become available. And why is pitching a sudden-death inning – the home team scores in a tie game that team wins – any less pressure packed then pitching with, say, a one-run lead in extra innings?
Personally, I do not think this strategy has much to do with the save statistic. It has a lot more to do with the irrational fear from managers of burning their best reliever in a spot that will not end the game. They ignore the fact that they could lose the game now, in the 9th, so that they might be able to hold onto their top bullpen guy for a situation where he can win the game for them. In the mind of a manager, the best thing that can happen in the bottom of the 9th is forcing extra innings, at which point he would need to use a lesser reliever anyhow. So while logic would dictate using your better reliever so as to get another chance at bat and possibly win the game, fear causes managers to save their closer for a possibly “more important” spot later. Joe Girardi has shown a willingness to break the mold of bullpen roles in his usage of Alfredo Aceves. Hopefully he figures out that not using Rivera in a tie game on the road is a poor strategic move, and decides to buck that trend as well.
Dave Cameron of USS Mariner takes a look at new M’s manager Don Wakamatsu:
While the Griffey scenario was the biggest challenge, he’s also proven adept in other areas. His handling of the bullpen has been very good so far, finding the right options for high leverage situations and relegating Batista to a back-up role despite his vast experience lead over the rest of the relief arms. He’s shuffled the line-up depending on opposing pitcher handedness, something the previous managers simply weren’t willing to do. He’s stuck with struggling starters when the team needed innings and managed the workloads without riding anyone excessively hard.
You know who that paragraph could apply to? Joe Girardi. The same things that Joe has been criticized for at different times this year are things that Cameron (and I fully agree) sees as attributes of a good manager. He has been open to finding the right options for high leverage situations, using Phil Coke and Jon Albaladejo in important spots rather than the more experienced Jose Veras, Edwar Ramirez, and Damaso Marte. He stuck with struggling starters to save his bullpen (CC Sabathia against Oakland, for example) and has managed workloads very well, spreading the large number of bullpen innings over all of his relievers (6 relievers between 7.1 and 10.1 innings). Finally, he has shuffled the lineup based on the pitcher’s handedness, something he did last season to resounding criticism. He has not been perfect, but he continues to distinguish himself as a good manager in terms of strategy. The Yankees are playing poorly, but it is not Joe Girardi’s fault.
On the face of it, Joe Girardi’s lineup for yesterday was puzzling. With Mark Teixeira and Alex Rodriguez already out due to injury, Joe decided to rest both Jorge Posada and Johnny Damon. This drew some raised eyebrows from fans, as some remembered Joe resting players at seemingly inappropriate times last season. However, a closer look at the events of the last few days helps to explain why Joe decided to put out his weakest lineup.
Firstly, I just want to point out that for all of the complaining about Girardi’s usage of Damon and Jason Giambi last season, he kept both players healthy and surprisingly effective for most of 2008. I think that he does a great job in keeping his older players fresh, an important skill for a manager of an older roster to have. Additionally, I get the idea of giving layers full days off, and not using them to pinch hit prior to the ninth inning. However, one could argue that Damon and Posada should have been rested on different days. In fact, that is what Joe intended originally.
Posada is always going to get the day game following a night game off. This is a good practice, especially with a catcher coming off of major shoulder surgery. Damon was not in the original starting lineup for Saturday’s game. Joe had decided that Johnny needed a day off, and inserted Nick Swisher in his place. However, Teixeira then informed Joe that he could not go, leaving the manager with a few choices. Being that Tex was expected to play Sunday, it made sense to have Damon’s bat in the lineup on Saturday and give him the off day on Sunday. Basically, Joe decided to play both Posada and Damon on Saturday with Tex out, and then give both off on Sunday when Tex returned. When Tex could not go again, Girardi might have selected to place Damon back in the lineup. However, being that he had already delayed the off day once and Damon was 3-27 against Meche anyhow, the choice that Girardi made was the best available to him.
