It is no secret that Mariano Rivera’s average velocity on both his four-seamer and his cutter was down last season. Now that he is a full year removed from shoulder surgery, an issue that seemed to hinder his arm strength for much of 2009 and cause, in part, the downturn in pitch speed, we have a reason to be optimistic about his velocity going forward. However, if his velocity remains in its current range, or falls further, there is reason to wonder about his effectiveness over the course of a new contract, which he will seek after entering free agency at the end of the year.

Some may decry the notion that Rivera’s loss in velocity impacted his year – he did pitch exceptionally well, as he usually does – but, believe it or not, Rivera’s minor decrease in pitch speed did manifest itself in his contact rates. In fact, Rivera had some of the higher contact rates in the American League a season ago. In the spirit of Alice in Wonderland, the following is a nice 3D bar chart – I love me some bar charts, man – that showcases this relationship.

Rivera’s career average velocities for his fastball (purple bar) and his cut-fastball (blue bar) are featured on the left (in mph) and, as you can see, in 2009, on the right, the two pitch speeds are down a few mph – 91.8 and 91.3 – in comparison. Conversely, but not coincidentally, the amount of contact hitters made on Rivera’s pitches outside of the zone, i.e., O-Contact% (green bar), and the amount of contact hitters made on Rivera’s pitches inside of the zone, i.e., Z-Contact% (red bar), both experienced significant increases – O-Swing of 73.2% and Z-Swing of 90.2% – when compared to the career numbers (O-Swing of 61.7% and Z-Swing of 85.9%). From this, it seems reasonable for one to then ponder a possible connection between Rivera’s downturn in velocity and his upswing in contact percentage. Essentially, when your pitches are not really as fast as they once were, there is more time for hitters to react to them.

This, of course, could relate to pitch movement, too, rather than just velocity. Rivera’s decrease in pitch speed was likely brought on by a lack of arm strength throughout the season, and this issue seemed to simultaneously lessen the movement on his fastball and cut-fastball. In 2009, according to pitch f/x, the vertical movement (up) on Rivera’s fastball was 4.83 inches and the horizontal movement (lateral, in right-handers) was 0.74 inches. Both numbers were well below average. For comparison, in 2008, Rivera’s fastball rose 7.52 inches and broke in on righties at 1.54 inches (below average but not like in 2009). That signals a significant loss of movement on the fastball which probably explains why Rivera rarely used it last season, throwing it only 7% of the time, according to FanGraphs.

The cutter, the pitch Rivera used 82% of the time last season, also experienced a loss of movement. In 2008, its vertical rise was 7.21 inches – slightly less than the average mark for that year – and its horizontal movement (in on lefties, away from righties) was 2.52 inches, a mark which was well above average. However, in 2009, its vertical rise was 6.22 inches and its vertical movement was 2.12 inches. The vertical movement was a bit below average, about an inch below, but the horizontal break was still VERY good, despite the stated loss in year-to-year movement.

This, then, the decrease in Rivera’s pitch velocity and movement explains the marked increase in his contact rates (I looked at command, too, but his BB/9 of 1.63 was still under his career mark of 2.11). The two negative trends were likely brought on by the shoulder surgery Rivera had last winter that impacted his arm strength, but I’m sure age had something to do with it, as well (to a smaller degree). Some may say, well, if his velocity and pitch movement was down, and his contact rates were up, why was he still so effective in 2009? That is a valid question, of course, and I think it is mainly because Rivera has done away with his fastball in order to use the cutter almost exclusively. Even with the lesser movement last season, the movement was still great, which says a lot about the pitch. More contact was made, a notion evidenced further by Rivera’s higher than usual line drive rate – 21.8% in 2009, up from his career mark of 16.8% – but his peripherals were still above average across the board. Rivera seemed to realize the lack of velocity issue and went with more movement instead, though the cutter had less movement than it did in the past.

As I said at the outset of this novel, if the decrease in velocity remains, or continues, it might cause some concern when Rivera enters free agency and is looking for another contract. Those concerns are understandable, as the velocity change would impact Rivera’s game, a point made by his contact rates in 2009. However, he has clearly adapted well to his current abilities, and remains as effective as ever. He’s a robot, with or without a 96 mph fastball.

Photo by Reuters

According to the Star-Ledger’s Marc Carig, right-hander, A.J. Burnett, is refining his changeup this spring and hopes to overcome a fear he has of getting beat by the pitch in order to employ it more often in 2010. “I think it’s a big key,” noted Burnett when discussing the pitch, which he used only 3.1% of the time a season ago, the lowest rate of any American League starter with at least 180 innings accrued. “Whether I throw it or not, I don’t know, but I’ve been working on it,” he added. Carig states that Burnett is trying to get comfortable with the offering in camp so that he can utilize it specifically when his curveball is off in the upcoming regular season. Earlier this month, I actually suggested that Burnett should use his changeup more this year, citing the 33-year old’s weak fastball numbers from last season, according to pitch type values, as a reason for the increase in usage. As I see it, there’s no downside in trying it.

Photo by the AP

From Chad Jennings (courtesy of RAB Twitter):

For now, Phil Hughes is only throwing fastballs and changeups in his bullpen sessions, and he expects to throw one more bullpen before he mixes in curveballs and cutters. He compared the development of his changeup to last year’s development of the cutter. “I’ll concentrate on it all spring,” he said. “Hopefully I’ll get it to a point where it’s a solid pitch for me. It just comes with repetition.”

Although Hughes does not need a changeup to be successful as a reliever or a decent starter, he may need one to be an upper echelon type starter. The cutter is simply a fastball variant, and I am not sure he can get by throwing a fastball or similar pitch 70-75% of the time. Mixing in a solid changeup, even if he only throws it once an inning, will help keep hitters off balance and will force them to refrain from sitting on the fastball and curve. However, improving a pitch is not an easy endeavor, and there are no guarantees that Hughes’ hard work will pay off. Hopefully, he can experience at least some success with the pitch, and broaden his repertoire in preparation for his eventual move to the rotation.

In a FanHouse piece in which Frankie Piliere outlines a handful of former prospects with something to prove in 2010, Piliere cites the Yankees’ young starter/reliever, Phil Hughes. “Bullpen or no bullpen, we saw the real Hughes start to shine through in 2009,” writes the former Texas scout. Piliere attributes Hughes’ newfound success to him seeming “more aggressive and comfortable in every way” last season, as these traits allowed the 23-year old to look like a “different pitcher” on the mound when compared to the discernibly diffident version we saw in 2008. Much of this aggressiveness, notes Piliere, was derived from Hughes’ confidence in one pitch, in particular—his fastball.

In 2009, working primarily as Mariano Rivera’s setup man, Hughes’ fastball averaged 93.7 mph. In 2008, as a starter, Hughes’ velocity averaged nearly 3 mph less at 91.2 mph. The noticeable uptick in velocity can help to explain the changes in Hughes’ demeanor from 2008 to 2009 as he was simply working with more gas last year, in a relief role (he could let it “fly”), as opposed to two years ago. As stated by Piliere, Hughes had “more confidence in his fastball command,” and, obviously, it is a lot easier to believe in your fastball when you throw it harder since added velocity means not having to worry as much about your overall location or control. The numbers bare this out with regards to swing percentage. In 2008, while in the rotation, hitters only swung at 16.5% of the pitches Hughes threw outside of the zone – he throws his fastball the most, so many of those off-the-plate offerings were fastballs – whereas, in 2009, hitters swung at 25.7% of the pitches Hughes threw that were outside the strike zone. Also, hitters swung at more pitches in the zone a season ago – 69.0% compared to 64.4% in 2008 – while making less contact (82.5% in 2009 as a reliever versus 91.5% in 2008 as a starter). Thus, pitching out of the ‘pen coaxed an extra 3 mph (roughly) out of Hughes’ California-bred arm, which basically led to his now vaunted confidence and celebrated aggressiveness.

This big question, of course, is whether or not this confidence, which was so essential to the Yankees in 2009, will remain with Hughes if he is reinserted into the rotation, where he will lose the added velocity he gained last season.

Photo by Ronald Martinez/Getty Images

Despite being the proud of owner of a fastball that could often challenge radar guns for accurate readings, for much of his career, A.J. Burnett has been surprisingly ineffective with his seemingly impressive mid to upper-90s heat. For instance, while with the Blue Jays from 2006-2008, Burnett’s fastball was, in total, 1.8 runs below average (-4.1 in ’06, +8.2 in ’07, -5.9 in ’08). In 2009, the lanky starter actually posted his worst fastball value mark ever, as the offering, which generally clocked in at 94.2 mph, was 13 runs below average. In the American League, only James Shields (-13.2) and Carl Pavano (-23.6) were worse, and their fastballs were significantly slower than Burnett’s. If one considers that Burnett is essentially a fastball-curveball pitcher, then this becomes an even greater problem.

But how, exactly, does Burnett manage to be so unproductive with a fastball that most pitchers would die for? According to pitch f/x data from a year ago, the movement on his fastball was solid and, of course, the velocity he can wield is above average. Thus, there is little there to indicate a flaw. Perhaps, then, the problem is not with Burnett’s fastball and, instead, the underlying issue rests on what the pie-loving right-hander is not throwing—his changeup.

In 2009, Burnett threw his changeup just 3.1% of the time. This was actually the lowest percentage of any starter in the American League with at least 180 innings under their belt. Though the best items in his tool belt are his gas and his hammer, utilizing the changeup in a way that matched his career average (5.7%) might have helped the 33-year old achieve greater success with his fastball. I say this because, based on historical pitch value data, Burnett’s best seasons with the fastball also featured an uptick in changeup employment. For instance, in 2007, Burnett’s fastball was 8.2 runs above average as he threw the change 7.1% of the time. Further, in 2005, Burnett’s fastball was 7.4 runs above average and 9.9% of his pitches were changeups. Basically, in the years Burnett utilized his changeup more often, his fastball’s efficacy increased. In the years Burnett threw his changeup less – 3.1% in 2009 (wFB of -13.0), 5.0% in 2008 (wFB of -5.9), and 4.2% in 2006 (wFB of -4.1) – his fastball’s efficacy was hindered. While I cannot prove a direct relationship between the two, it does not seem entirely far-fetched to link his fastball to his changeup, as the fastball and changeup are often dependent upon one another in order to be successful. In fact, it is the only noticeable correlation I can extract from the pitch value data (his use of the curve and slider have not varied much annually).

In 2010, I think we might see Burnett go to his changeup more often (it will be interesting to see how much Jorge Posada or Francisco Cervelli might call for it as compared to Jose Molina), as it will likely help setup his other pitches and increase the overall effectiveness of his fastball. Given the available data, it seems like a constructive idea.

Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images

Here’s Ben over at RAB on Joba’s latest start:

For Joba, the problem seemed to be one of velocity. While he was throwing more strikes, he averaged below 92 with his fastball and peaked at around 94.4. His changeup, slider and curve were all working nicely, but I still wonder, as I have many times this season, where Joba’s 97 mph fastball went. He threw it last year regularly as a starter but only occasionally this year.

Now here are some interesting numbers on Joba’s fastball via FanGraphs:

From 2007-2008, Joba famously started as a reliever and he then transitioned into the rotation in ‘08. Therefore, the velocity on his fastball during those years is somewhat inflated. This season, Joba is a full-time starter and we’ve seen a noticeable drop in velocity. That is to be expected, of course. However, as Ben notes, Joba’s dominant heat—the velocity he brought to the table last year as a starter—has all but vanished. Obviously, it’s okay to conserve one’s energy and save the gas so that you can go deep into ballgames, but Joba’s fastball is an entirely different animal this season (there’s no premium gas). In fact, due to newly his tamed fastball, Joba has seriously suffered as a starter in 2009.

According to FanGraphs’ pitch value data, Joba’s fastball is worth 15 runs below average. That’s third worst in the AL behind Detroit’s own, Armando Galarraga and our old friend, Carl Pavano. In 2008, when Joba’s fastball still popped as a starter, the pitch was 8.6 runs above average. There’s something wrong here although I wonder if it’s solely a velocity issue—perhaps movement is involved, as well—although that appears to be the most explicit explanation. Joba’s fastball has gone from a serious weapon to a significant burden and is now hurting him rather than helping him. When compared to previous years, in 2009, hitters are making contact with Joba’s pitches at a higher rate—80.4% compared to 73.5% in ‘08—and this too, it seems, can be attributed to his weakened fastball. This is especially the case when he challenges someone outside of the zone (55.5% contact rate compared to 46.8% a year ago). He’s just more hittable than he has ever been in his short career. If his fastball is the issue, it doesn’t help that he throws the pitch more than anyone on the Yankees’ staff outside of A.J. Burnett.

However, maybe it’s not all the fastball’s fault. While I don’t know what to make of his velocity, maybe he could help his fastball out by improving his overall pitch selection. I think a lot of hitters choose not to swing at Joba’s slider—his second most used pitch—due to his command. He doesn’t really throw it much for strikes (that’s my subjective opinion). Further, he doesn’t throw his curveball much—only about 9% of the time—despite it being a good pitch. Therefore, hitters can simply wait out the fastball because they know it’s coming. This explains the higher contact rates. When the heat isn’t as good as it was in 2008, they hit it harder and more frequently. Joba would probably benefit from using the curve more often so as to offset a batter’s expectations. He’s essentially pitching with his bullpen repertoire (fastball, slider) and it’s hurting his fastball’s effectiveness. Perhaps that’s the main problem—predictable pitch selection—rather than the fastball itself (though the drop in fastball velocity is significant because of the predictability).

Or maybe the Yankees should just have Jose Molina catch all of Joba’s starts instead of Jorge Posada. I’m sure that would help (I’m kidding!).

Here are two interesting numbers for you:

91.9 and 91.4.

91.9 mph is the average velocity of Mariano Rivera’s fastball and 91.4 mph is the average velocity of Mariano’s cutter. These numbers are for this season and are noteworthy as they both signal a significant downturn in Rivera’s overall pitch velocity. In the past, Mo’s fastball has been in the 93 mph range (his career velocity is 93.3 mph) while his cutter has been in the 92-93 range (the pitch has a career velocity of 92.7 mph). Even in 2008, Mo’s fastball typically sizzled at 93.1 mph and his cutter was equally imposing at 92.8 mph (on average). The velocity was there just a year ago, however, a year later we’ve seen a noticeable loss of power on his two primary (and only) pitches.

Mariano and co. seem to have noticed this, too, as Mo is throwing fewer fastballs than ever before. Instead, he’s choosing to throw his cutter more frequently as it is a pitch with enough movement to shoulder the loss in velocity. This season, Mo has only thrown straight fastballs 8.2% of the time, while he has thrown the cutter 91.8% of the time. In the past, fastball usage was a lot higher for Rivera as the percentages between it and his cutter were fairly close. That changed in 2007, though, with Rivera using the cutter more often by a significant margin (73.2% versus 26.7%). Since ‘07, he has relied mainly on the cutter and in ‘08, when his velocity dropped a bit, Mo used the cutter even more than he had in 2007. Now that his velocity has dipped even further—which may be the result of a combination of things, including age, shoulder soreness and offseason surgery—the fastball has essentially fallen to the wayside and Mo seems to be fine with that as long as his cutter is working.

To further support this theory, one can also look at pitch type values at Fangraphs for more data. You can read about the data here, but as David Appelman notes, the main crux of the data is to “see in runs the actual effectiveness of each pitch.” In 2009, Mariano Rivera’s fastball is valued at -1.4, meaning that, when compared to the league-average fastball, Mo’s fastball is 1.4 runs below average. This is the lowest rating for his fastball on record and is his only negative value, an issue that seems to coincide with the loss in velocity. For comparison purposes, Mo’s cutter is 15.5 runs above average, which is obviously why he uses it as often as he does (the movement and, of course, command allow it to be as effective as it has been). These numbers may seem randomly generated to some, but the wFB value appears to be in agreement with what we’ve seen this season in relation to Rivera’s “fading” fastball.

It will be interesting to see how Rivera’s fastball and cutter look in 2010. It may jump back up to the 93 mph range with a full winter to rest up, however, it may also continue to decrease as he ages. He has still been very effective—one of the best pitchers in baseball—yet his 1.04 HR/9 rate may be foretelling (it’s the highest HR/9 he has had since 1995). If his velocity falls even more next season, it’ll be interesting to see how he performs and whether or not he is brought back for 2011 and beyond.