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Javier Vazquez looked incredibly sharp in last night’s relief appearance, going 4.2 innings while allowing one run on two hits and 6 strikeouts. He looked sharper than he had since August started, and credited the change to a mechanical tweak made by Dave Eiland:

There is a slight mechanical adjustment that seems to be helping Vazquez’s fastball. When he lifts his left leg in his delivery, Vazquez is bringing the leg farther back. It’s not more of a twist, he said, and the leg’s not coming up any higher, it’s just coming a little farther back toward second base.

“The arm angle also has to play a part of it, but (pitching coach Dave Eiland) feels like that’s going to give me better momentum, and it has,” Vazquez said. “The ball was true to where I wanted it to be.”

The mechanical change had tangible results, as Javy’s stuff was noticeably sharper than it had been in recent weeks. Unlike Javy’s starts in August, during which he was battling a dead arm and averaged 88 MPH on his fastball, Javy was close to 90 MPH (89.37) with his fastball. He threw 30 four seamers, including 19 for strikes with 3 swinging strikes, and 6 two seamers which netted 5 strikes. His breaking stuff was even better, as he threw 7 of his 10 changeups for strikes (2 swinging), 13 of his 17 curveballs for strikes (3 swinging), and 2 of his 3 sliders for swinging strikes. He had swing and miss stuff last night, as he got 10 swinging strikes among his 66 pitches (15.1%).

The question is, what is the next step with Javy? I have seen some people state that the team should take it slow with him and let him work in the bullpen for a bit longer to make sure he is equipped to start again. I disagree, and feel that he should take Dustin Moseley’s next turn. Javy was excellent from the middle of May through July, a stretch that constituted the bulk of his season. He lost his starting spot due to a dead arm that resulted in 4 atrocious starts, rather than due to an extended period of ineffectiveness. Now that his velocity is back up and his breaking stuff looks sharper, I see no reason to believe that Dustin Moseley will be the more effective starter going forward.

May 102010

Here’s something I wrote regarding Phil Hughes back in early February:

In 2009, working primarily as Mariano Rivera’s setup man, Hughes’ fastball averaged 93.7 mph. In 2008, as a starter, Hughes’ velocity averaged nearly 3 mph less at 91.2 mph. The noticeable uptick in velocity can help to explain the changes in Hughes’ demeanor from 2008 to 2009 as he was simply working with more gas last year, in a relief role (he could let it “fly”), as opposed to two years ago. As stated by Piliere, Hughes had “more confidence in his fastball command,” and, obviously, it is a lot easier to believe in your fastball when you throw it harder since added velocity means not having to worry as much about your overall location or control. The numbers bare this out with regards to swing percentage. In 2008, while in the rotation, hitters only swung at 16.5% of the pitches Hughes threw outside of the zone – he throws his fastball the most, so many of those off-the-plate offerings were fastballs – whereas, in 2009, hitters swung at 25.7% of the pitches Hughes threw that were outside the strike zone. Also, hitters swung at more pitches in the zone a season ago – 69.0% compared to 64.4% in 2008 – while making less contact (82.5% in 2009 as a reliever versus 91.5% in 2008 as a starter). Thus, pitching out of the ‘pen coaxed an extra 3 mph (roughly) out of Hughes’ California-bred arm, which basically led to his now vaunted confidence and celebrated aggressiveness.

This big question, of course, is whether or not this confidence, which was so essential to the Yankees in 2009, will remain with Hughes if he is reinserted into the rotation, where he will lose the added velocity he gained last season.

Obviously, so far this season, the fastball I wondered about has been central to Phil Hughes’ success. Though he is not throwing the four-seamer as hard as he was as a reliever, at 92.8 mph, on average, Hughes’ fastball velocity is still very impressive (and we might even see glimpses of 95-96 in a given start). Plus, the above average movement he gets on it, particularly the vertical movement – 11 inches and the league average is 8.8 – adds to its overall effectiveness. After a good year with his four-seamer in 2009, following a poor year with the pitch in 2008 (which can be attributed to lesser velocity), Hughes has picked up where he left off. With the offering being as good as it is, Hughes is throwing it a lot (just over 52% of the time) and he’s throwing it for strikes (close to 70% of the time).

Basically, Hughes’ fastball confidence remains because the pitch continues to be a weapon for him. There hasn’t been a significant or substantial drop in velocity and the movement is definitely there. In retrospect, last year’s stint in the bullpen certainly helped the Yankees in 2009, but it also seems to have helped Hughes’ future as a pitcher.

Photo by Jim McIsaac/Getty Images

Javier Vazquez turned in a solid performance last night, allowing 3 runs on 6 hits, 3 walks, and 6 strikeouts in 5.1 innings. The last two runs came on one swing from Kurt Suzuki on Javy’s final pitch of the night, and followed a misplayed popup that dropped between Cano and Granderson. In all, it was an improvement over his previous outings, but a variety of elements still do not look quite right.

1) His fastball velocity was still down. Javy averaged 88.9 MPH on his four seamer last night, and was unable to exceed 91.4 all night. He has said that he needs to sit at 91-93 to be successful, and his arm is simply not ready to provide that kind of velocity at this point. I am not worried about this loss in pitch speed yet, but it is something worth keeping an eye on.

2) His fastball continues to tail over the plate. Multiple media outlets reported Vazquez’ contention that his arm is lagging in his delivery, causing his loss in velocity as well as forcing his fastball to tail over the middle. With his velocity down as well, this makes for a dangerous situation when a mistake is made. Let’s take a look at the Suzuki at-bat. Javy threw Suzuki two pitches in the middle of the plate, a fastball that Kurt took and then a change that he fouled off, to get ahead 0-2. He went back to fastball on the next pitch, hoping to get Suzuki to swing at a pitch low and away. Here is where Posada set up:

And here is where the pitch ended up as Suzuki made contact:

As you can see, Javy missed entirely, and a look at the video will show that the pitch tailed dramatically, right into the middle of the plate. This seems to be a mechanical issue that Javy can rectify, but until he does, it will result in some balls getting hit a long way.

3) He cannot seem to finish hitters. He was better in this regard yesterday, as he struck out 6 batters and got 12 swinging strikes. As Mike at RAB noted, “Sixteen of the 23 batters he faced saw at least four pitches in their plate appearances, and ten saw at least five.” That is simply too many long counts from a guy who has traditionally been able to go deep into games and has four legitimate pitches to attack hitters with. By my count, he threw 41 of his pitches with two strikes (to 20 hitters who reached that count), and 7 of his 9 baserunners reached after Javy had notched two strikes in the at-bat. He simply does not seem to have an out pitch working right now.

Javy has a strong track record, such that none of these issue are particularly troubling. All of them can be fixed with some hard work, and it seems clear that Javy is aware of the problems and is already trying to reverse them. Last night was a step in the right direction, but he is not there yet.

Apr 162010

Let’s take a quick look at the following via the Bergen Record’s Bob Klapisch:

The Yankees will tell you their 5-3 loss to the Angels was uneventful, forgettable, even, but senior officials have to be concerned by Vazquez’s velocity readings. Forget about the booing: the real story was Vazquez’s inability to crank up his fastball much beyond 88-89 mph, and the subsequent failure to put hitters away at two strikes.

Vazquez came to the Yankees this winter as a bona fide strikeout pitcher – only Randy Johnson fanned more batters in the last decade – yet the right-hander only got two swings and misses with his fastball all day.

First, Javier Vazquez generally sits in the 91 mph range with his fastball (FanGraphs notes his career average as 91.3 mph). Therefore, I am not too concerned with his velocity right now, as he was hitting 88-91 mph yesterday. In fact, according to Brooks Baseball’s PitchFX data, Vazquez’s average speed against the Angels was 88.82 mph, and his max speed was 91 mph, which is not a far cry from where he normally is with his four-seamer. Perhaps the velocity will further improve as the days go by and the weather continues to warm. This does not appear to be a real issue.

Secondly, Vazquez is, indeed, a strikeout pitcher, however, his strikeouts are generally obtained through the use of secondary pitches – the breaking stuff – not fastballs. That is not to say that Vazquez does not strike people out with his fastball, of course, as the whiff rate on it last season was 8.4%. However, the percentages on his slider (13.6%), curveball (17.9%), and changeup (21.9%) were markedly better. Thus, it is disingenuous, at least journalistically, to paint Vazquez as some flamethrower that lost his spark and, as a result, cannot strike any batters out. Although that might make for a provocative piece that lures Javy-hating Yankee fans, in reality, such a description is inaccurate.

But, hey, why let a little thing like the truth get in the way of your article? It is boring, after all…

Photo by Getty Images

Entering the 6th inning of yesterday’s 5-3 loss to the Angels, it looked as if Javier Vazquez was going to turn in an outing good enough to silence some of his critics, as he had allowed just two runs to that point despite not having his best stuff. Three batters later, Javy was getting booed off the mound following doubles by Torii Hunter and Kendry Morales. Let’s take a look at those two at-bats, with screengrabs from Gameday, to see what went wrong (Mike at RAB also looked at the Morales at bat).

The Hunter at-bat was fairly straightforward. Vazquez started with 2 fastballs to go 0-2, and then went with two sliders and a fastball down and away to push the count to 3-2. This is representative of the trouble Javy had putting hitters away yesterday, as he could not seem to find the right pitch to finish hitters off with two strikes. I understand the goal of getting a free swinger type like Hunter to flail at something, but none of the 3 pitches was at all close to the zone and did not tempt Hunter at all.

The final pitch of the at-bat was a fastball that was belt-high and on the outer half. While I have no problem with going to the heater there, I do take issue with the location. When backing up a fastball with a second heater, it is imperative that you do something to change the hitter’s eye level or catch him protecting the wrong portion of the plate, unless you have enough velocity to simply blow it by the hitter in the same location. Vazquez did attempt to do so, bringing the pitch up from below the knees to the belt area. However, changing the eye-level of a fastball hitter like Hunter means bringing that pitch all the way up, letter high, particularly when he knows that the pitch is likely coming into the zone due to the full count. Essentially, there is a good chance that Hunter was sitting on a fastball there, and it needed to get further up the ladder or further inside in order to fool him. Instead, it was an 89 MPH pitch right where the first two fastballs were, and Hunter did not miss it. I am not sure if the problem was the pitch call or the execution, but I thought that it was an incredibly poor pitch that put Vazquez in a bind. After a wild pitch and a strikeout of Matsui, Javy faced Morales and had a similarly poor at-bat.

The issue in the Morales at-bat was not so much location as it was pitch sequencing and selection. Morales fell behind 1-2 on the strength of two changeups that he swung and missed on. Javy followed with two more changeups out of the zone that Morales did not bite on, and suddenly it was 3-2. However, Morales is a left handed hitter and first base was open, so Vazquez did not have to throw a strike and could play for the double play with Juan Rivera coming up. He had the ability to attack Morales in a number of ways.

The only thing that would not make any sense in this spot would be to throw a changeup in the strikezone due to the count. Morales had already seen the pitch 4 times in the at-bat, and had likely timed it at that point. While doubling up changeups is actually a pretty solid pitch combination, four in a row is pushing it. To throw that same pitch but to make it more hittable by throwing it higher than any of the previous ones is simply poor strategy (Mike’s post showed that Jorge set-up lower, and Javy missed the spot. Even so, the pitch would have been in the same spot as pitches 1 and 3). A fastball up or a breaking ball in the dirt would have been vastly preferable. Instead, Javy threw the changeup belt high, and Morales drove it into the gap to end Javy’s afternoon. Those two at-bats, particularly the final pitch of each, were the difference between a good outing and getting boo’ed off the mound.

It is no secret that Mariano Rivera’s average velocity on both his four-seamer and his cutter was down last season. Now that he is a full year removed from shoulder surgery, an issue that seemed to hinder his arm strength for much of 2009 and cause, in part, the downturn in pitch speed, we have a reason to be optimistic about his velocity going forward. However, if his velocity remains in its current range, or falls further, there is reason to wonder about his effectiveness over the course of a new contract, which he will seek after entering free agency at the end of the year.

Some may decry the notion that Rivera’s loss in velocity impacted his year – he did pitch exceptionally well, as he usually does – but, believe it or not, Rivera’s minor decrease in pitch speed did manifest itself in his contact rates. In fact, Rivera had some of the higher contact rates in the American League a season ago. In the spirit of Alice in Wonderland, the following is a nice 3D bar chart – I love me some bar charts, man – that showcases this relationship.

Rivera’s career average velocities for his fastball (purple bar) and his cut-fastball (blue bar) are featured on the left (in mph) and, as you can see, in 2009, on the right, the two pitch speeds are down a few mph – 91.8 and 91.3 – in comparison. Conversely, but not coincidentally, the amount of contact hitters made on Rivera’s pitches outside of the zone, i.e., O-Contact% (green bar), and the amount of contact hitters made on Rivera’s pitches inside of the zone, i.e., Z-Contact% (red bar), both experienced significant increases – O-Swing of 73.2% and Z-Swing of 90.2% – when compared to the career numbers (O-Swing of 61.7% and Z-Swing of 85.9%). From this, it seems reasonable for one to then ponder a possible connection between Rivera’s downturn in velocity and his upswing in contact percentage. Essentially, when your pitches are not really as fast as they once were, there is more time for hitters to react to them.

This, of course, could relate to pitch movement, too, rather than just velocity. Rivera’s decrease in pitch speed was likely brought on by a lack of arm strength throughout the season, and this issue seemed to simultaneously lessen the movement on his fastball and cut-fastball. In 2009, according to pitch f/x, the vertical movement (up) on Rivera’s fastball was 4.83 inches and the horizontal movement (lateral, in right-handers) was 0.74 inches. Both numbers were well below average. For comparison, in 2008, Rivera’s fastball rose 7.52 inches and broke in on righties at 1.54 inches (below average but not like in 2009). That signals a significant loss of movement on the fastball which probably explains why Rivera rarely used it last season, throwing it only 7% of the time, according to FanGraphs.

The cutter, the pitch Rivera used 82% of the time last season, also experienced a loss of movement. In 2008, its vertical rise was 7.21 inches – slightly less than the average mark for that year – and its horizontal movement (in on lefties, away from righties) was 2.52 inches, a mark which was well above average. However, in 2009, its vertical rise was 6.22 inches and its vertical movement was 2.12 inches. The vertical movement was a bit below average, about an inch below, but the horizontal break was still VERY good, despite the stated loss in year-to-year movement.

This, then, the decrease in Rivera’s pitch velocity and movement explains the marked increase in his contact rates (I looked at command, too, but his BB/9 of 1.63 was still under his career mark of 2.11). The two negative trends were likely brought on by the shoulder surgery Rivera had last winter that impacted his arm strength, but I’m sure age had something to do with it, as well (to a smaller degree). Some may say, well, if his velocity and pitch movement was down, and his contact rates were up, why was he still so effective in 2009? That is a valid question, of course, and I think it is mainly because Rivera has done away with his fastball in order to use the cutter almost exclusively. Even with the lesser movement last season, the movement was still great, which says a lot about the pitch. More contact was made, a notion evidenced further by Rivera’s higher than usual line drive rate – 21.8% in 2009, up from his career mark of 16.8% – but his peripherals were still above average across the board. Rivera seemed to realize the lack of velocity issue and went with more movement instead, though the cutter had less movement than it did in the past.

As I said at the outset of this novel, if the decrease in velocity remains, or continues, it might cause some concern when Rivera enters free agency and is looking for another contract. Those concerns are understandable, as the velocity change would impact Rivera’s game, a point made by his contact rates in 2009. However, he has clearly adapted well to his current abilities, and remains as effective as ever. He’s a robot, with or without a 96 mph fastball.

Photo by Reuters

Feb 262010

According to the Star-Ledger‘s Marc Carig, right-hander, A.J. Burnett, is refining his changeup this spring and hopes to overcome a fear he has of getting beat by the pitch in order to employ it more often in 2010. “I think it’s a big key,” noted Burnett when discussing the pitch, which he used only 3.1% of the time a season ago, the lowest rate of any American League starter with at least 180 innings accrued. “Whether I throw it or not, I don’t know, but I’ve been working on it,” he added. Carig states that Burnett is trying to get comfortable with the offering in camp so that he can utilize it specifically when his curveball is off in the upcoming regular season. Earlier this month, I actually suggested that Burnett should use his changeup more this year, citing the 33-year old’s weak fastball numbers from last season, according to pitch type values, as a reason for the increase in usage. As I see it, there’s no downside in trying it.

Photo by the AP

From Chad Jennings (courtesy of RAB Twitter):

For now, Phil Hughes is only throwing fastballs and changeups in his bullpen sessions, and he expects to throw one more bullpen before he mixes in curveballs and cutters. He compared the development of his changeup to last year’s development of the cutter. “I’ll concentrate on it all spring,” he said. “Hopefully I’ll get it to a point where it’s a solid pitch for me. It just comes with repetition.”

Although Hughes does not need a changeup to be successful as a reliever or a decent starter, he may need one to be an upper echelon type starter. The cutter is simply a fastball variant, and I am not sure he can get by throwing a fastball or similar pitch 70-75% of the time. Mixing in a solid changeup, even if he only throws it once an inning, will help keep hitters off balance and will force them to refrain from sitting on the fastball and curve. However, improving a pitch is not an easy endeavor, and there are no guarantees that Hughes’ hard work will pay off. Hopefully, he can experience at least some success with the pitch, and broaden his repertoire in preparation for his eventual move to the rotation.

Feb 122010

In a FanHouse piece in which Frankie Piliere outlines a handful of former prospects with something to prove in 2010, Piliere cites the Yankees’ young starter/reliever, Phil Hughes. “Bullpen or no bullpen, we saw the real Hughes start to shine through in 2009,” writes the former Texas scout. Piliere attributes Hughes’ newfound success to him seeming “more aggressive and comfortable in every way” last season, as these traits allowed the 23-year old to look like a “different pitcher” on the mound when compared to the discernibly diffident version we saw in 2008. Much of this aggressiveness, notes Piliere, was derived from Hughes’ confidence in one pitch, in particular—his fastball.

In 2009, working primarily as Mariano Rivera’s setup man, Hughes’ fastball averaged 93.7 mph. In 2008, as a starter, Hughes’ velocity averaged nearly 3 mph less at 91.2 mph. The noticeable uptick in velocity can help to explain the changes in Hughes’ demeanor from 2008 to 2009 as he was simply working with more gas last year, in a relief role (he could let it “fly”), as opposed to two years ago. As stated by Piliere, Hughes had “more confidence in his fastball command,” and, obviously, it is a lot easier to believe in your fastball when you throw it harder since added velocity means not having to worry as much about your overall location or control. The numbers bare this out with regards to swing percentage. In 2008, while in the rotation, hitters only swung at 16.5% of the pitches Hughes threw outside of the zone – he throws his fastball the most, so many of those off-the-plate offerings were fastballs – whereas, in 2009, hitters swung at 25.7% of the pitches Hughes threw that were outside the strike zone. Also, hitters swung at more pitches in the zone a season ago – 69.0% compared to 64.4% in 2008 – while making less contact (82.5% in 2009 as a reliever versus 91.5% in 2008 as a starter). Thus, pitching out of the ‘pen coaxed an extra 3 mph (roughly) out of Hughes’ California-bred arm, which basically led to his now vaunted confidence and celebrated aggressiveness.

This big question, of course, is whether or not this confidence, which was so essential to the Yankees in 2009, will remain with Hughes if he is reinserted into the rotation, where he will lose the added velocity he gained last season.

Photo by Ronald Martinez/Getty Images

Feb 082010

Despite being the proud of owner of a fastball that could often challenge radar guns for accurate readings, for much of his career, A.J. Burnett has been surprisingly ineffective with his seemingly impressive mid to upper-90s heat. For instance, while with the Blue Jays from 2006-2008, Burnett’s fastball was, in total, 1.8 runs below average (-4.1 in ’06, +8.2 in ’07, -5.9 in ’08). In 2009, the lanky starter actually posted his worst fastball value mark ever, as the offering, which generally clocked in at 94.2 mph, was 13 runs below average. In the American League, only James Shields (-13.2) and Carl Pavano (-23.6) were worse, and their fastballs were significantly slower than Burnett’s. If one considers that Burnett is essentially a fastball-curveball pitcher, then this becomes an even greater problem.

But how, exactly, does Burnett manage to be so unproductive with a fastball that most pitchers would die for? According to pitch f/x data from a year ago, the movement on his fastball was solid and, of course, the velocity he can wield is above average. Thus, there is little there to indicate a flaw. Perhaps, then, the problem is not with Burnett’s fastball and, instead, the underlying issue rests on what the pie-loving right-hander is not throwing—his changeup.

In 2009, Burnett threw his changeup just 3.1% of the time. This was actually the lowest percentage of any starter in the American League with at least 180 innings under their belt. Though the best items in his tool belt are his gas and his hammer, utilizing the changeup in a way that matched his career average (5.7%) might have helped the 33-year old achieve greater success with his fastball. I say this because, based on historical pitch value data, Burnett’s best seasons with the fastball also featured an uptick in changeup employment. For instance, in 2007, Burnett’s fastball was 8.2 runs above average as he threw the change 7.1% of the time. Further, in 2005, Burnett’s fastball was 7.4 runs above average and 9.9% of his pitches were changeups. Basically, in the years Burnett utilized his changeup more often, his fastball’s efficacy increased. In the years Burnett threw his changeup less – 3.1% in 2009 (wFB of -13.0), 5.0% in 2008 (wFB of -5.9), and 4.2% in 2006 (wFB of -4.1) – his fastball’s efficacy was hindered. While I cannot prove a direct relationship between the two, it does not seem entirely far-fetched to link his fastball to his changeup, as the fastball and changeup are often dependent upon one another in order to be successful. In fact, it is the only noticeable correlation I can extract from the pitch value data (his use of the curve and slider have not varied much annually).

In 2010, I think we might see Burnett go to his changeup more often (it will be interesting to see how much Jorge Posada or Francisco Cervelli might call for it as compared to Jose Molina), as it will likely help setup his other pitches and increase the overall effectiveness of his fastball. Given the available data, it seems like a constructive idea.

Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images

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