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Dave Cameron thinks so:

In fact, if we look at his underlying numbers, the decline doesn’t appear to be that dramatic at all.

2010, Career:

BB%: 8.1%, 9.0%
K%: 15.6%, 16.9%
ISO: .109, .140

He’s both walking and striking out a little less than his overall career averages, and while his power is down slightly, it’s not like he was ever a guy who counted on driving the ball to produce value. The real areas where his numbers vary significantly from his established norms are the following two areas:

GB%: 65.8%, 56.9%
BABIP: .297, .356

He’s always been a groundball guy, but this year it’s been extreme. He leads all major league hitters in groundball rate, and it’s not even close – Elvis Andrus is second, five percentage points behind Jeter. And yet, even though groundballs have a higher rate of becoming hits than fly balls, Jeter’s BABIP is the lowest of his career, and by a large margin. Before this year, he’d never posted a mark below .315, and he has more seasons with a BABIP over .350 than under that mark. While BABIP is a high variance statistic, even for hitters, Jeter has a well established skill at producing above the league average. That just hasn’t translated onto the field this year.

Odds are pretty good that Jeter’s going to hit better next year than he has this year.

This is an important point to note. Jeter has performed to the very bottom of his range of projections, falling off a cliff rather than experiencing a slow decline. There are players who simply have the bottom fall out and never recover from a bad year at an advanced age, with Robbie Alomar serving as a good example of this phenomenon. However, most players tend to experience a more gradual decline, and I think the underlying rates Cameron points out suggest that Derek might just be having a poor season and will see some measure of recovery in 2011.

Additionally, it seems that Derek has experienced some bad luck as well. Looking at his BABIP compared to his career BABIP is not sufficient, as the quality of the balls that he has put into play impacts his BABIP, as do a number of other factors. xBABIP, a stat which looks a variety of factors to distill exactly which portion of a player’s BABIP is attributable to luck, is useful in this context. Jeter’s XBABIP, or expected BABIP, is .341, compared to an actual BABIP of .297. This suggests that the deterioration in his skills has been coupled with a measure of bad luck that has made his decline seem more steep than it actually is. While I do not expect to ever see Jeter return to his 2009 or even 2007 levels at the plate, I would not be surprised to see him put up a year like 2008 next season. That would be a subpar Jeter season, but it would represent a nice recovery from 2010 and fit in with a more gradual decline pattern.


Earlier this week, Fangraphs added John Dewan’s +/- defensive stats to their player pages, a major addition that gives users the two most widely accepted defensive measures (UZR and +/-) in one place. +/- is on a similar “runs saved” scale to UZR, so the two numbers can be used together to try and get an accurate look at a player’s defense. The first thing I did with the new data was use Fangraph’s “last 3 years” split to get an adequate sample, and then looked for Yankees to see if anything unique popped up. While Mark Teixeira graded out better in +/- and Curtis Granderson was second among all CF’ers over the sample, the most interesting tidbit I found regarded Robinson Cano.

While Cano was similarly situated on the leaderboard whether UZR or +/- was used, total runs saved relative to the average was much better under +/-. Take a look at his defensive stats from 2005-2009 (DRS is +/-):

As you can see, UZR and +/- are basically on the same page until 2009, when they diverge wildly. The difference results in Cano being +16 by DRS over the 2007-2009 sample, but -1.8 based on UZR. Looking at Cano’s +/- fits with the narrative that 2008 was simply an off year for him in all facets of the game, while UZR seems to suggest that he is a mediocre fielder who has only had one positive defensive season. So who is right about Robbie?

The truth is, it is hard to tell. One year samples such as the one we have on 2009 are unreliable, and the divergence in the 3 year number makes it difficult to come to a conclusion on Cano’s defense. I would probably guess that the answer lies somewhere in the middle, which shows the value in having as much defensive data as possible. Because the samples tend to have some errors and inherent biases involved, it makes sense to use as many metrics as possible to try and come to a conclusion about a player’s defense. I’d suggest that Cano is a solid defensive second baseman, likely above average, something I was less likely to say when all I had was the UZR data.

Feb 252010

Derek Jeter’s UZR at shortstop last season was 6.6 runs above average. Nick Swisher’s UZR in right field last season was -0.7 runs below average. Johnny Damon’s UZR in left field last season was -9.2 runs below average. From my own experiences, many baseball fans often toss around FanGraphs’ Ultimate Zone Ratings without much context or detail, citing UZR similarly to the way in which I have done just prior to this sentence, as if the numbers provide all that is needed in order to fully understand a player’s defensive impact on a given season. However, for those who rely upon FanGraphs for their UZR figures (most of us, it seems), it is very important to remember that each player’s rating can be broken down further into three distinct parts.

For outfielders, the three-pronged rating is the final sum of a player’s range runs (RngR), error runs (ErrR), and arm runs (ARM), whereas for infielders, a player’s UZR is based on on range runs and error runs, however, arm runs are actually replaced by double play runs (DPR). Each of the three values, together, amount to a respective Ultimate Zone Rating. The problem, though, is that sometimes, ratings are cited at large, with writers employing FanGraphs’ UZR system and citing an UZR without added delineation that might provide greater insights as to why a player’s rating is as high, low, or average as it is. In reality, an UZR can occasionally be the product of just one of the three elements which are used to comprise it, making matters more than confusing when evaluating a player’s overall defensive value in a given year. For instance, an extremely high ErrR can skew an infielder’s UZR, masking tangible range issues. However, if the error score is not expounded upon, defensive weaknesses may go unnoticed.

This is an issue I often deal with when discussing a player’s Ultimate Zone Rating. In order to address it, I tend to rehash much of what I said above, but in an abbreviated form. For practical purposes – and for some nerdish fun – I thought perhaps I could try something different, and hopefully more interesting, to help readers understand what an UZR really “means” when it is attached to a player. Hence, the UZR Chart is born (I guess DiamondView inspired me). I have opted to represent the three defensive components of a player’s UZR using a simple bar chart. The bar chart seemed like a good idea because it allows for negative numbers and creates a rather straightforward visual comparison. Also, it allows us to visually perceive the way in which a player’s UZR, which I have also decided to include in each UZR Chart, can sometimes be heavily determined by one of the three defensive elements – RngR, ErrR, ARM/DP – discussed. Basically, via chart, we can eyeball a high or low UZR score relative to a high or low RngR, etc.

An example of this is the figure to the right, which is an UZR Chart documenting the defensive abilities of Houston Astros outfielder, Hunter Pence, in 2009. I chose to chart Pence, a non-Yankee, as the first illustration, mainly because of his interesting UZR. Last season, Pence’s Ultimate Zone Rating was +5.5 runs—an above average defensive mark (roughly half a win). At first glance of this rating, one might assume that Pence’s defense was strong in the outfield and that he did a combination of positive things, defensively, to earn such a score. However, it was Pence’s strong arm score of +5.9 runs that catapulted his UZR into the “above average” territory, while he was merely average with regards to range runs (-0.3) and error runs (-0.2). His UZR Chart makes this particularly clear as the ARM bar (green) and the UZR bar (red) are nearly identical. And so is the purpose of the UZR Chart, to detail what an UZR really means via an easy visual.

With that said – hopefully the explanation provided was clear (or clear enough, at least) – here’s another UZR Chart, though this one features a simple trend analysis of Derek Jeter’s Ultimate Zone Rating over the last five years.

As you can see from the chart, Jeter’s abysmal range (blue bars) from 2005 to 2007 essentially dictated his UZR. Outside of his ErrR in 2005, Jeter did not do anything particularly well in the field, either, as he was generally average in double play runs and error runs and terrible range-wise. His averageness did little to curb the damage brought onto his final rating by his range run totals. Whereas Hunter Pence has his great arm to increase his overall value, Jeter had nothing, really. Of course, in 2008, there is a noticeable change in Jeter’s defensive value, which is the direct result of a new training regimen employed by Jeter to address his range problems. His range improved tremendously – the blue bar ascends – and, thanks to a positive error runs total of 4.5, Jeter’s -0.5 UZR was his first average mark in years. The gains continued into 2009, as Jeter was worth 6.6 range runs. The area that was once a huge weakness is now a strength.

From now on, unless you guys see a mistake in this “method” that I am not seeing (comment away), when discussing and citing UZR totals from FanGraphs, I’ll probably offer an UZR Chart as well. It seems to be useful in pointing out the intricacies of the ratings so as to enhance understandings of a player’s defensive contributions (in a single year, or over time), as specific weaknesses – Derek Jeter’s range – or strengths – Hunter Pence’s arm – that may dilute or inflate an Ultimate Zone Rating are made apparent through such simple illustrations. By looking at a chart, it is much easier to decipher why an UZR score “is,” essentially. Plus, they’re fun to look at, too, which is an added bonus.

The Yankee blogosphere has been buzzing lately with the news that Curtis Granderson has agreed to move to left field if the club asks him to. This is a move that we have discussed extensively here at TYU, with most of the writers advocating the club putting the better defender, Gardner, in center field. I have been a bit more hesitant, agreeing with Rob Neyer that practical concerns and the chance of a Gardner flop make the switch a bad idea. Dave Cameron, however, has a different perspective that may be the definitive view on the subject:

Whether you have Brett Gardner in left and Granderson in center or vice versa, the overall impact on the Yankees will be so minor as to not be worth the discussion.

Gardner may actually be the better defender at this point, and we have been conditioned to believe that the best defensive outfielder should play center, as he will have more opportunities to flag down balls than either of the corner outfielders. But if you have two guys who can capably handle center field (as the Yankees now do), it isn’t all that important which one ends up in CF……

The total difference in defensive performance between the two alignments is simply the drop in value in right-center balls caught minus the rise in value in left field line balls caught. We’re talking about a marginal difference on just a handful of balls in play over a full season. We’re talking about fractions of a run.

Cameron then goes on to suggest the Yankees go with Granderson in center simply to avoid the inevitable media attention should he be moved. Quite frankly, this is a point that I made when this discussion was first raised, and I continue to believe that it is the most logical course of action. Unless Granderson shows that he has inexplicably experienced a steep decline defensively, the difference between the two players is simply too small to justify moving the better player out of his spot. I would say that there is a decent chance that Brett Gardner is not the Yankee center fielder in 2011. Why mess with Granderson simply to save “fractions of a run” in 2010?

Agree? Disagree? Chime in below.

With the announcement coming down just last night that Fangraphs has added splits to their stat pages, I thought it would be fun to look at interesting 2009 splits for each likely member of the 2010 Yankees. I looked at hitters this morning, and will now address starting pitchers, with relievers to follow at some point tomorrow. I will likely expand on some of these over the next few weeks. Remember, when you do splits, you are essentially splitting the sample, such that small sample size caveats apply.

CC Sabathia

FIP v. L: 2.43

FIP v. R: 3.69

CC against righties is a very good pitcher, but likely not a Cy Young candidate. His dominance against lefties is what makes him such a dangerous weapon. Much of the difference in performance comes from his significantly better K-rate against left handed batters (9.94 v. 7.02). I think it is interesting to note that CC would be a well above average pitcher even if he only faced righties.

AJ Burnett

Bases Empty:  WHIP 1.63, BABIP .348, FIP 4.62

Men On Base: WHIP 1.16, BABIP .250, FIP 4.03

AJ was significantly better once runners were on than he was with the bases empty, apparently buckling down once he got into trouble. However, as the BABIP suggests, he was quite unlucky with the bases empty and was very lucky once men reached. If both issues correct themselves, he should be slightly worse with runners on but will face fewer such situations due to an improvement with the bases empty.

Andy Pettitte

Home FIP: 4.67

Road FIP: 3.59

Pettitte had some major problems pitching in the new stadium, a fact that is reflected in his results. This is despite the fact that as a left-hander, he should have the tools to partially neutralize the effects of the ballpark. He gave up more line drives and more flyballs on the road, but significantly more of the fly balls allowed at home left the park (13.2% v. 5.1%).

Javier Vazquez

Bases Empty:  1.61 K/BB, .67 HR/9, 1.06 WHIP, 2.40 FIP

Men on Base: 2.12 K/BB, 1.06 HR/9, .98 WHIP, 3.34 FIP

As we have discussed at numerous points this offseason, Vazquez has, for much of his career, had difficulty pitching from the stretch. It is fascinating to note that his 2009 WHIP was lower with men on. However, is control seemed to get worse in those situations, and he gives up a lot more homers in those spots. Basically, Vazquez gives up his biggest blows with runners on base, which is why his ERA is usually worse than his FIP.

Joba Chamberlain

BABIP by Month (LD% in parenthesis)

Apr. .295 (23.9)

May .371 (25.5)

June .290 (15.5)

July .269 (23.6)

Aug. .374 (23.1)

Sep. .348 (19.3)

Rob at BBD did a study on Chamberlain’s velocity today, and found that his terrible August and September numbers could not be attributed to a loss in velocity. One possible explanation is what you see above. Joba’s BABIP in those two months was sky high, and could not be entirely explained by his LD%. It is possible that Joba was simply unlucky down the stretch.

With the announcement coming down just last night that Fangraphs has added splits to their stat pages, I thought it would be fun to look at interesting 2009 splits for each likely member of the 2010 Yankees. I will look at hitters now, and address pitchers later today. I will likely expand on some of these over the next few weeks. Remember, when you do splits, you are essentially splitting the sample, such that small sample size caveats apply.

Jorge Posada

Home: wRC+ : 167

Away: wRC+: 101

For those that are not aware, wRC+ is the Fangraphs version of OPS+, and is likely a better measure because it corrects the OBP/SLG weighting problem inherent to OPS. Regarding Posada, I was surprised to see how stark his home-road splits were, considering that he is a switch hitter and is not a dead pull hitter. He certainly made use of the short porch, notching a 271 wRC+ when batting as a lefty and hitting the ball to right field.

Mark Teixeira

Grounders: .187/.187/.214

Fly Balls: .327/.320/.991

Liners: .747/.747/.939

According to Fangraphs, league average in these categories:

Grounders: .231/.231/.253
Flies: .217/.212/.602
Liners: .727/.723/.974

Teixeira did significantly better than average on flies and worse than average on grounders. The ground ball data suggests he needs to keep the ball in the air, but I wonder about the flyball data. It may be possible that shots that would qualify as liners in other parks are being ruled flies when they clear the wall in Yankee Stadium, such that much of his power is being shifted from the liner category to the fly ball category.

Robinson Cano

Low Lvg. FB% 30.2

Med Lvg. FB% 34.1

High Lvg. FB% 48.1

The more important the situation, the more likely Robbie was to hit a fly ball. This strengthens my belief that he is trying to do too much in those spots. It is important to note that players only have 60-80 high leverage at bats a year, such that the sample is small. As such, take this more of an observation of what happened last year than something that necessarily represents a trend.

Derek Jeter

ISO to Left: .105

ISO to Center: .082

ISO to Right: .278

Almost all of Jeter’s power was to the opposite field. That is a startlingly large split in power, and was a greater dichotomy than that in Jeter’s career ISO.

Alex Rodriguez

Low Lvg. HR/FB: 20.3

Med Lvg. HR/FB: 21.1

High Lvg. HR/FB: 45.5

A-Rod hit flyballs with about the same frequency in all situations. However, when the game was on the line, he took the ball out of the ballpark with much greater frequency. Unclutch, indeed.

Nick Johnson

Low Lvg. BB/K 1.02

Med Lvg. BB/K 1.29

High Lvg. BB/K 1.42

Johnson did will in high leverage spots overall, but I found his increased patience in those spots fascinating. When the situation was important, Johnson became more likely to strike out, but also more likely to take a walk.

Nick Swisher

Home ISO: .168

Away ISO: .316

Most of Swisher’s power came on the road, despite the New Yankee Stadium being a homer haven. If he can maintain something close to his road performance while bumping his home power a bit, he could find himself at 35 or more home runs.

Curtis Granderson

Home HR/FB: 8.9%

Away HR/FB: 15.7%

Granderson simply did not get much bang for his buck on fly balls in Comerica. His road numbers were significantly better than his home numbers, particularly against lefties, giving hope that he might return to the superstar that he was in 2007 once he gets out of the large ballpark in Detroit.

Brett Gardner

wRC+ v. L 115

wRC+ v. R 93

Gardner actually played fairly well against lefties. If he continues that and Granderson is not able to turn it around against lefties, might Randy Winn become the platoon caddy for Granderson rather than Brett?

Randy Winn

wRC+ v. R 102

wRC+ v. L -9

Of course, if Winn cannot turn this around, he will not be caddying for anybody. He has pretty solid career numbers against lefties, so this seems to be an anomaly, but he did hit significantly fewer line drives and more fly balls against lefties, both bad signs.

In case you have been under a rock for the last 12 hours, the Yankees have reacquired RHP Javier Vazquez and LHP Boone Logan from the Braves for OF Melky Cabrera, LHP Michael Dunn, and RHP Arodys Vizcaino.  Yankee fans probably remember Vazquez best for his shaky 2004 season, which saw him get off to a strong first half start (even making the All Star team) and struggle mightily in the 2nd half of the season, including the playoffs (giving up an infamous grand slam to Johnny Damon).  Based on his 2004 season, the criticism of Vazquez was that he was not mentally tough enough to handle playing in New York, and people who believe that to be the case will likely be outraged at this acquisition.

For those who weren’t following the NL closely this season, Vazquez was one of the top 5 pitchers in the National League, going 15-10 with a 2.87 ERA.  In 219 1/3 innings, he had 238 strikeouts against only 44 walks, with a 1.03 WHIP and a career-low 20 home runs allowed.  It was a potential Cy Young caliber season, and he finished 4th in the voting (behind Tim Lincecum, Chris Carpenter and Adam Wainwright).  It was a career year for Vazquez, even better than his superb 2003 with Montreal that caused the Yankees to trade for him the first time around.  While Vazquez’s ERA is likely to rise moving to the AL and Yankee stadium, I’m going to look at his stats to see if he is likely to be a better pitcher than the 4.91 ERA that he put up in 2004.  Was 2004 the norm, or an exception to an otherwise impressive career?  Or was 2009 a fluke?  To Fangraphs, we go.  Analysis after the jump. Continue reading »

Fangraphs has a look at CC Sabathia’s rough start yesterday, and found that there is nothing for Yankees fans to be worried about:

Despite what Joe Morgan stated, Sabathia’s velocity was fine. Sabathia’s average fastball touched just over 93 miles per hour, and topped out at 95. Over the last three seasons, Sabathia’s average fastball velocities are 93.7, 92.9, and 93.7. Either Morgan was unaware and fabricating excuses for the Yankees’ new ace, or he simply has no idea how hard Sabathia normally throws.

In fact, the only slight difference between Sabathia yesterday and Sabathia of yesteryear was pitch usage; ~59% fastballs (right around average), 28% sliders (a tick above normal), 12% change-ups (a tick below) and one curveball. Oh, and yes, those velocities were all in check as well. Everything moved as it should, and if you don’t want to take my word for it, look below and guess which pitches are from yesterday and which are from Sabathia’s best start last season – as determined by WPA.

Click the link to Fangraphs to see the actual graph and a brief explanation of what it means. Basically, Anderson finds that CC’s pitches were at their proper speed and moved in their typical way, and command was the only issue that plagued Sabathia, as the big lefty stated himself. So there you have it: evidence that Sabathia is not injured or suffering from some sort of dead arm. He just had a bad day, and hopefully he is better the second time around.

Fangraphs has their organizational rankings up, and the Yanks popped up at #3.

NOTE: This is NOT just the farm system, they look at the franchise as a whole and rate them from top to bottom.

Here’s Cameron’s take:

#3: New York Yankees

Ownership: A+

Say what you will about the Steinbrenner’s, but the Yankees enjoy a monstrous financial advantage over the rest of baseball due in large part to the way they have expanded the Yankee brand. The creation of YES Network gave them a significant revenue stream that other teams simply couldn’t match, and while they had an inherent advantage thanks to the history of the franchise, they have capitalized on that legacy more than any other team. The Yankees can literally spend any dollar figure they want on the team and still be profitable. Money just isn’t an issue in the Bronx, and that gives them a sustainable advantage that essentially ensures their competitiveness on a yearly basis.

Front Office: B+

Brian Cashman doesn’t get enough credit for the things he’s done right in New York. Yes, the payroll gives their baseball operations department room to make mistakes that no other franchise could live with, but he’s continually targeted the highest quality of players. He’s also redirected significant cash back into the farm system to develop home grown talent, and he’s shown that he’s an adept trader when he needs to add a piece to the puzzle. The money obviously helps, but Cashman is a good GM, and the Yankees are run well.

Major League Talent: A

With expenditures on major league talent approaching $250 million (including luxury tax payments), it shouldn’t be a surprise that they have a lot of good players. I don’t even have to name them all – we all know who the players on their roster are. The offense is terrific, the rotation is excellent and deep, and the bullpen still has Mariano Rivera. The team lacks depth on the infield and has too many outfielders, but that should be a relatively easy problem to fix. The core of the team isn’t young, but the team always has enough salary obligations opening up to be a premier spending in free agency, so that’s less of an issue than it would be for other organizations.

Minor League Talent: C+

Again, thanks to the financial advantage the Yankees have, the fact that they don’t have a great minor league system isn’t that big of a deal. Jesus Montero has a great bat, but he’s not a catcher in any way, shape, or form. Austin Jackson is a solid prospect who looks like a good bet to be an average to slightly above center fielder. Dellin Betances and Andrew Brackman have high ceilings and come with lots of risk. Besides Montero and maybe Jackson, most of the position players in the system are trade bait, as they probably aren’t good enough to start for the Yankees, so they’ll be shipped off for a major league player who is. It’s just the nature of the Bronx Beast.

Overall: A

When you outspend everyone else by close to $100 million, it’s hard not to win. The Yankees have done a fantastic job of creating a revenue model that works better than any other franchise in any sport, and they’re reaping the rewards of that advantage. Unless MLB intervenes and adds a third franchise into New York, it’s hard to see them ever going through a sustained down period. They are the Wal-Mart of baseball, and the machine is basically unstoppable. Love them or hate them, they aren’t going anywhere.

Not much I disagree with, but I will add this. As he lays out, the Yankees have a business model that revolves around expanding and polishing their brand. If they determine a player is hurting that brand, no matter how productive, they will choose the franchise over any one player. As we just saw yesterday, there’s one player they needed to explain this to.

Mar 192009

We did an article on Darvish recently. If that caught your interest, here’s a cool analysis of his latest performance from FanGraphs.  Hmmm, 95mph with an unhittable slider?  That sounds a lot like another young pitcher I know of.  Hint: his name begins with a J and sounds like Schmobba.

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