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John Manuel of Baseball America recently did an interview
with NoMaas, and made a number of interesting statements over the course of his remarks. The one I found most compelling was his opinion on Jesus Montero’s defense:

The consensus is (and frankly has been for the last two years) that Montero has improved, but will never be an average defender.
He’s got plus raw arm strength, but a slow, inconsistent release. He’s become more flexible and agile behind the plate, but is who he is — a behemoth for a catcher. He’s just big, in a better way now, but still big. I believe he can catch in the majors, but it would always be “adequate,” and he would be an asset for his offense, not his defense.
Comparing him to Mike Piazza, he has a better arm but is a lesser receiver. He’s never been held up as a guy who is great at handling pitchers, either.

Check out the remainder of the interview, as Manuel is very candid in his assessments and NoMaas asks some strong questions. As for Jesus, I recently suggested that the Yankees might be better off just sticking Montero at DH and forgetting about him for the next 10 seasons, but that contention was based upon the premise that Montero will be an awful defender. If he can be adequate or even moderately below average behind the plate, it is almost certain that he would provide more value to the club in both the short-term and long-term as a catcher. It seems like the Yankees believe that he can meet that standard, and I expect them to give him a chance to be the starting catcher on Opening Day 2012, and possibly sooner if Russell Martin does not work out.

Ever since Derek Jeter was handed another Gold Glove award yesterday, the old debate about fielding metrics and their value has once again come to the forefront of baseball discussion on the internet. The statheads have decried Jeter being awarded the honor, pointing to practically every available metric to show that Jeter is an awful defensive player. The traditionalists have basically retorted with “he’s not that bad,” stating that he has legendary instincts on the field and rarely makes mistakes, as evidenced by his low error count and league-leading fielding percentage.

Mark Feinsand spoke to one scout who had the following to say:

“In my opinion I think he’s well-deserving,” the scout said. “I know his range is not as good as a lot of other guys, but aside from that, I still think he’s above average.”

“You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to see that his range is declining, but that’s age,” the scout added. “He’s still very good. He’s not able to move left and right as well as he used to, but he always seems to be standing in the right place at the right time.”

[...]

“Before, he was above average range-wise, and now he’s just average. I don’t think his defense is going to become a negative for him for quite some time,” the scout said. “They say that great outfielders never have to dive, I think that applies to Jeter, too.

“Because he’s older, a little more wise and he knows opposing hitters, how infields play, his catcher, his pitcher – all those factors. Good shortstops have instincts, and I put an 80 on his instincts this year.

“If you were going to create a baseball player, you’d want him to have Derek Jeter’s brain. That’s part of who he is and that’s never going to change, even if he’s a tick slower. He’s smarter than he was when he was younger.”

That’s the basic gist of the arguments in Jeter’s favor. Another element to the argument is that UZR does not like Mark Teixeira and Robinson Cano, and therefore must be fatally flawed. I would like to address defensive metrics in general, and in the process discuss Derek Jeter’s defense.

The defensive metrics that we have are far from perfect. They are all subject to sample size issues, some have inherent biases, and all must cope with the fact that with the technology currently in play, we are unlikely to measure defense with any semblance of exactitude. Additionally, some of the more popular metrics that are based on batted ball and hit location data compiled by video scorers, such as UZR and +/-, are beholden to evaluations that are at least partially subjective. For example, in an excellent Baseball Prospectus article yesterday, Colin Wyers discussed range bias, in which a players range influences his expected outs. Put simply, it suggests that a player with poor range can actually have his UZR or +/- inflated because the scorer who is marking the game will mark a ball that he could not reach out of the player’s zone incorrectly. This subjectivity means that these metrics should not be taken as gospel, and are not fit to be used to evaluate defense with the same degree of confidence as wOBA or FIP might be used to measure other elements of the sport.

This does not make the metrics worthless. Consider that the alternative method for judging defense is to base your evaluations on your observations and the observations of others. Such evaluations are inherently subjective, particularly because most of those doing such evaluations tend to watch particular players a lot more than others, or only get to watch 1 or 2 players at a position a night. Conversely, the evaluations used in metrics are the product of scorers who work hundreds of games and tend to have set parameters within which to work. This does not necessarily make them better, but it does suggest that they have a larger sample size from which to draw.

The point is that there is no perfect way to evaluate defense right now, and that we should try and consider ALL of the data that we have before making an evaluation. A year ago, I might have blindly pointed to UZR and ripped the voters for yesterday’s results. But with all of the questions that have been raised by people such as Colin since that point, I think doing so is irresponsible, and trusts the metrics past the point that its own creators do. As such, it makes sense to look at UZR, but look at DRS, TotalZone, Fan Scouting Reports, nFRAA, fielding percentage, errors, putouts, assists, other fan opinions, the thoughts of scouts, and your own observations as well.

Looking at the full picture like that will give you a much better understanding of where a player stands defensively relative to his peers. That is why I had no issue with Robbie Cano or Mark Teixeira winning yesterday. Some of the metrics like them, some do not, the fans think they are excellent, scouts agree, and my personal observation confirmed that perception. I cannot say with any sort of accuracy that they were the best players at their positions, but I believe they belong in the conversation and have no problem with either player winning. By the same token, I would have been just fine with either of them losing as well. Anyone who thinks they can tell you with exactitude who is the best defensive player at a position is exhibiting immense hubris, believing themselves to be able to block out the incredible amount of bias that goes into such a subjective evaluation. All we can say with at least a bit of certainty at this point is whether someone belongs in the conversation, and even that can get murky depending on which sources of data you value most.

This brings us to Jeter. Everything other than errors, fielding percentage, and the subjective evaluations of a minority of fans, reporters, and scouts sees him as a poor defensive player. Regarding errors and fielding percentage, I do not think anyone can deny that they are an incomplete measure at best. Jeter makes all the plays he can get to, but as Ben Kabak noted, you cannot drop what you do not reach. If you hate advanced metrics and do not want to use them, that is fine. Let’s stick to basic statistics such as putouts and assists, which can help us complete the fielding percentage and errors picture in evaluating defense. Let’s look at how Yankee shortstops stacked up in these areas.

Yankee shortstops made 211 putouts, relative to a league average of 241. Now, some putouts are based on your other fielders, particularly the ones that deal with force plays on throws from other fielders. However, Yankees SS graded out just fine on putouts on force plays, with 107 relative to an average of 102. The problem was on balls caught (88 relative to a 114 average) and tag plays (17 relative to a 26 average), which are more directly attributable to the SS itself. Looking at assists, which are likely a better measure of how many balls the SS is getting to with the ability to then make a play, shows a similar issue, as Yankee shortstops had 405 relative to a league average of 466.

This is not a new issue. Yankee shortstops have been below league average in these areas for EVERY SEASON in the Jeter era other than 2005, and were well below average in most years. This despite the fact that the defenders surrounding Derek were usually around average in these areas, suggesting that it was not the pitchers or other conditions that created this deficiency. These are not advanced metrics, they are very basic stats that simply tell us how many plays the guy makes. Is it perfect? No. But neither is fielding percentage, and this serves to poke a giant hole into the fielding percentage argument.

As for those observers whose eyes tell them that Jeter is still a superior defender, I think some of that has to do with his reputation. Also, as @AndyInSunnyDB notes, missing that many assists still only comes out to about one a series, so the naked eye is much more likely to observe a lack of errors than a missed play per series. However, even if you feel differently and want to take those evaluations at face value, I still think the weight of the evidence leans strongly in favor of the conclusion that Jeter is a poor defender. Both basic and advanced metrics show that he does not make close to the number of plays an average shortstop makes, let alone an elite talent at the position. Most fans, Yankee or not, see him as a poor defender, and it has become obvious to many that he will soon need to be moved off the position.

I am uncertain that I have the expertise or the unbiased, objective evidence to declare Jeter the worst shortstop in baseball. But I can state with a fair amount of confidence that he does not belong in the conversation for the Gold Glove.

This is part 5 of 6 of The Yankee U’s preview of the 2010 American League Championship Series. Part 1 examined C.J. Wilson and Colby Lewis. Part 2 featured Cliff Lee and Tommy Hunter. Part 3 looked at the Texas offense, and Part 4 examined the Texas bullpen and bench.

Stephen asked me to handle this small portion of the preview, and I was glad to oblige. I looked at the Texas defense, going around the diamond in order and then looking at outfielders as well.

C: Bengie Molina
2010-2008 UZR: None
2010-2008 DRS (+/-): -1, -2, 6

Advanced metrics are fairly flawed when it comes to catchers, so we need to use simpler numbers to show that Molina had a solid year behind the plate. He caught 24 basestealers against 79 stolen bases, which is an adequate total, and allowed 4 passed balls and just 1 wild pitch to elude him all year in 113 games.

1B: Mitch Moreland
2010-2008 UZR: -.1, NA, NA
2010-2008 DRS (+/-): 0, NA, NA

Again, the advanced metrics do not help us much here, as Moreland is a rookie with too small a sample at the position to give us an adequate picture of the quality of his defense. It is instructive to note that he was replaced at the position by Chris Davis late in games down the stretch, suggesting that the Rangers see him as a liability in the field.

2B: Ian Kinsler
2010-2008 UZR: 2.1, 10.1, -5.2
2010-2008 DRS (+/-): 8, 22, -7

UZR was killing Kinsler for years, but in 2009 he suddenly turned things around and put up a stellar season in the field accoring to both UZR and DRS. I am wary about giving much weight to a single season worth of UZR, but he followed it up with another positive year in 2010, suggesting that he may have worked on his defense and has therefore become a good second baseman. I’d likely rate him as solidly above average but not spectacular, based on the numbers and my (very) amateur scouting eye.

SS: Elvis Andrus
2010-2008 UZR: 0.1, 12.1, NA
2010-2008 DRS (+/-): 0, 14, NA

Neither metric loved Andrus quite as much as they did in 2009, but I think the scouting reports and the numbers match-up here. While he is prone to an error here and there, Andrus has fantastic range and gets to balls most other shortstops do not. I would put him among the top 5 defensive shortstops in baseball without any qualms.

3B: Michael Young
2010-2008 UZR: -5.4, -7.6, -4.6
2010-2008 DRS (+/-): -12, -18, -5
Young graciously moved from SS to 3B after the 2008 season to make room for budding prospect Elvis Andrus. While the move has helped the team defensively at SS, it has done them no good at third. Young is just as bad there as he was at short, as he generally makes the play right at him but has poor range in every direction.

RF: Nelson Cruz
2010-2008 UZR: 7.7, 9.6, 2.8
2010-2008 DRS (+/-): 11, 11, 2

While scouts do not see Cruz as a spectacular defender, advanced metrics see him as one of the better right fielders in the sport. He shows good range, has a solid arm, and does not make a ton of mistakes. With a small right field in Yankee Stadium, he should have no problem covering ground in front of the short porch.

CF: Josh Hamilton
2010-2008 UZR: 1.1, 4.3, -15.4
2010-2008 DRS (+/-): 4, 9, -5

Hamilton spent most of his team playing left for the Rangers this year, but I think we will see him in CF on most nights during the ALCS. The only season in which he actually got the bulk of his time in center was 2008, and his defensive numbers were poor that year. I would consider him an adequate center fielder, but nothing more, particularly because he seems to be playing hurt. If they do move him to left field and bench David Murphy against lefty starters, Julio Borbon will see time in CF. Borbon is an excellent defensive player with spectacular range, but his arm can be run on.

LF: David Murphy
2010-2008 UZR: -2.3, 3.2, 3.5
2010-2008 DRS (+/-): 0, 2, 0

Murphy is an average to slightly above average defensive player who is not spectacular at any aspect of fielding but is solid at all. He can throw a bit, he gets to his fair share of flyballs, and he does not make many mistakes.

Conclusion

Texas is a good defensive team (6th in DEF according to BPro) that is poor at just one position, third base. They are likely adequate in CF and at 1B, and are above average at C, 2B, and LF. They also have two excellent starters in right and at short, and the backup in CF is excellent as well. I would not expect them to make a lot of defensive mistakes in the series.

May 272010

Apart  from Swisher’s home run, no other play in the entire game last night had a higher Win Probability Added, in terms of absolute value, than when Andy Pettitte got Joe Mauer to bang into a double play in the eighth inning.  This was a glorious moment, and it was brought about by two key factors: Pettitte’s approach and Jeter’s positioning.

First, some background.  In the sixth inning, Pettitte struck Mauer out on five pitches, which you can see here:

In this at-bat, Pettitte began with a curveball high and inside, which Mauer took for a strike.  He then followed this with a fastball on the inside corner, and Mauer fouled it off.  With the count at 0-2, Pettitte threw Mauer three consecutive cutters.  The first one was low and away, and Mauer took it for a ball.  Pettitte elevated the next one slightly more, but Mauer took it for a ball as well.  Pettitte then elevated it a few more inches, and Mauer swung and missed for the strikeout.  The pattern was clear: fastballs in, cutters away.

When Pettitte faced Mauer in the bottom of the eighth, with runners on first and third and only one out, the pressure was on.  As you can see in this screenshot of the at-bat, he varied his approach:

Here he began the at-bat by throwing him two consecutive mid-80s cutters on the outside corner.  This was the same approach as the sixth inning, just with the opposite order.  The first cutter barely missed, but the second one nipped the corner and was called a strike.  With the count even at 1-1, Pettitte attempted to go inside on Mauer, placing two 90 mph fastballs right on the inside corner.   These weren’t brushback pitches, but Pettitte was no doubt attempting to set up the fifth pitch of the at-bat, which was away and offspeed, by changing the velocity and the location.  Certainly he was hoping that at least one of the two fastballs would have been called a strike or fouled off, because he would have had Mauer 2-2 and could have gone for the strikeout.

With the count 3-1, Pettitte threw the same cutter than he had gotten Mauer to chase in the sixth and had thrown for a strike on the first pitch of this at-bat.  This cutter was a bit more outside (and clearly ball four), but Mauer chased it anyway.  It’s unclear why.  Maybe he was frustrated by the strikeout in the sixth.  Maybe he thought the pitch was just too hittable.  Regardless, it was a ball, and instead of walking and loading the bases for the wOBA-leading Morneau, he drove it up the middle.

Off the bat, I thought the ball would go through and the Twins would score the go-ahead run.  However, as you can see in the video, Jeter was positioned perfectly.  He only had to take one step to the right in order to field the ball, and didn’t even need to backhand it.  Maybe the Yankees coaching staff had read JMK’s piece from yesterday on Mauer’s spray data, or maybe they do their own research, but they had Jeter positioned perfectly.

The Yankees were out of the inning, and a few minutes later Nick Swisher launched a flat changeup into the night air.  It was a good fifteen minutes, and a great ending to a very successful day for the Yankees.

With Marcus Thames on the Yankees’ bench to start the season, despite a dreadful spring in which the 33-year old outfielder hit a dreadful .135/.182/.269 while striking out a team-leading 21 times, many were left wondering what role he would play. Would he be a late-inning pinch-hitter used only against left-handers, where his strong career numbers versus southpaws could hopefully do some damage, or, would he be used in a greater capacity, perhaps in a platoon with the gritty Brett Gardner, who has yet to prove himself, offensively, above Scranton/Wilkes-Barre.

Just 12 games into the season, it appears as though the latter is true, as Gardner, with his speed and defense, has started games with right-handed opponents on the mound, and Thames, with his power bat, has been used in games that feature a left-handed starter. Over that time, on the season, Gardner has hit .333/.444/.333 while Thames has hit an obviously unsustainable .500/.545/.600. To be clear, the bulk of their numbers are derived from opposite-handed matchups, with Gardner batting .308/.438/.308 as a lefty facing righties, whereas Thames is batting .556/.600/.667 as a righty facing lefties. Together, from the left field combination, the Yankees are receiving production to the tune of an .800+ OPS. Gardner provides the majority of the offense with his speed, while Thames injects a bit of power.

Manager Joe Girardi, who was, at one point, awfully cryptic with his language when discussing the situation in left field, refusing to confirm whether or not a platoon was, in fact, to be utilized, has seemingly come around after a mere handful of games and is now openly touting the idea. “Thames has swung the bat well, and I like what we’ve seen from him,” noted Joe Girardi yesterday afternoon. “Thames is going to get some time, and [the platoon] has worked pretty good,” he added. However, while the platoon has worked from an offensive standpoint, thus far, one wonders how it will unfold defensively, as the length of a full season might just exacerbate real fielding concerns.

Already, Thames has been shaky in left field, with runs plating due to his defensive woes. The Yankees have been winning, so those miscues, as memorable as they have been, have not been discussed too much, or at least we have “forgiven” them in the grand scheme of a 9-3 record. A full season of such defensive ineptitude could become a much more tangible issue, of course. Then again, given Thames’ right handedness, he will likely receive lesser playing time than Gardner this year, limiting the damage. Girardi could always sub in Gardner in the later innings of games, too, further preventing Thames’ defense from becoming a significant detriment to the team’s overall fielding.

The verdict is still out on the effectiveness of the Yankees’ left field platoon. As I have said before, its efficacy will ultimately be judged by a look at runs saved versus runs produced. But, what we do know after 12 games is that a platoon is the current plan. Marcus Thames will basically have to play himself out of the role for that to change.

Photo by Jim Rogash/Getty Images


Earlier this week, Fangraphs added John Dewan’s +/- defensive stats to their player pages, a major addition that gives users the two most widely accepted defensive measures (UZR and +/-) in one place. +/- is on a similar “runs saved” scale to UZR, so the two numbers can be used together to try and get an accurate look at a player’s defense. The first thing I did with the new data was use Fangraph’s “last 3 years” split to get an adequate sample, and then looked for Yankees to see if anything unique popped up. While Mark Teixeira graded out better in +/- and Curtis Granderson was second among all CF’ers over the sample, the most interesting tidbit I found regarded Robinson Cano.

While Cano was similarly situated on the leaderboard whether UZR or +/- was used, total runs saved relative to the average was much better under +/-. Take a look at his defensive stats from 2005-2009 (DRS is +/-):

As you can see, UZR and +/- are basically on the same page until 2009, when they diverge wildly. The difference results in Cano being +16 by DRS over the 2007-2009 sample, but -1.8 based on UZR. Looking at Cano’s +/- fits with the narrative that 2008 was simply an off year for him in all facets of the game, while UZR seems to suggest that he is a mediocre fielder who has only had one positive defensive season. So who is right about Robbie?

The truth is, it is hard to tell. One year samples such as the one we have on 2009 are unreliable, and the divergence in the 3 year number makes it difficult to come to a conclusion on Cano’s defense. I would probably guess that the answer lies somewhere in the middle, which shows the value in having as much defensive data as possible. Because the samples tend to have some errors and inherent biases involved, it makes sense to use as many metrics as possible to try and come to a conclusion about a player’s defense. I’d suggest that Cano is a solid defensive second baseman, likely above average, something I was less likely to say when all I had was the UZR data.

This is a question I have asked before, and Bill Simmons touched on some relevant answers in a recent mailbag:

We knew something shifted in baseball a few years ago; it’s definitely happening in basketball right now. Whether it transforms the other sports remains to be seen. I do think we could reach a ceiling with performance-related formulas some day soon — if we’re not getting there already — and complicated analysis will shift to less definable quantities like injury recovery and behavior. But that’s a few years away. As I mentioned at the conference, the big challenge for sabermetricians this decade will be learning how to educate a mainstream audience in a relatable and entertaining way. Easier said than done.

There are some quantifiable areas that have yet to be fully explored, with defensive metrics still waiting for technologies such as Hit f/x to help take them to the next, more accurate level. However, there are some elements of the game, particularly offensive production and pitching, where the innovation seems to be about building upon existing ideas and adding a higher degree of accuracy rather than reinventing the wheel.

Outside of defense, where might we see some revolutionary ideas? Simmons mentions behavior and health, and I think health in particular will become a new frontier for statistical analysts, as we try and predict injuries based on workloads, pitch and swing types, and other observable factors. Teams that can find some measure of predictability in terms of player durability will find themselves at a strong advantage when it comes to building an effective, consistent team. Injury projections represent a logical evolution of the “Moneyball” philosophy that encourages teams to exploit market inefficiencies.

Where do you think the sabermetric revolution will take us next?

Last season, with regards to defense, Nick Swisher was worth 0.8 runs below average in right field, according to his Ultimate Zone Rating. This mark would actually surprise many Yankee fans, particularly those who are not defensive metric wonks, as there seemed to be a prevailing perception in such circles that Swisher was an awful outfielder. Statistically speaking though, that was far from the truth a season ago and has never really been true historically. Over the course of his career, from Oakland to Chicago, Swisher has been a consistently average corner outfield defender with shades of above averageness. Despite a few strange routes to fly balls that birthed a sense of a fielding ineptitude, 2009 was not a deviation from that assessment. All in all, he was really a decent outfielder.

With that cleared up, digging a bit deeper into Swisher’s UZR, so as to better understand the number’s meaning, I turn to a Swisher UZR Chart – you can read my writeup on UZR Charts here – that illustrates the three components of FanGraphs’ Ultimate Zone Ratings (for outfielders), range runs (RngR), arm runs (ARM), and error runs (ErrR).

As you can see from the chart, in 2009, Swisher’s biggest strength was his range (blue bar), at 4.3 runs above average, the fifth best rating amongst right fielders in either league, yet it was entirely negated by his foremost flaw, his arm (green bar). Swisher’s arm value, pegged at 4.6 runs below average – almost half a win – was the worst mark in the American League and the third worst in baseball (only Brad Hawpe and Andre Ethier were worse). He and Johnny Damon, who was 4.2 runs below average, were very similar in terms of arm awfulness (now that’s saying something). Swisher’s UZR (red bar) of -0.8 is, essentially, a measure of conflict between range runs and arm runs.

From what we saw last season, earlier in the year, Swisher often threw balls in recklessly, which resulted in errant overthrows. His arm strength seemed average, with accuracy being the main issue. He and the Yankees recognized the problem, and worked to resolve it in the latter half of the season. Though I am not privy to any month-by-month UZR figures – I don’t know if those exist, actually – speaking subjectively, Swisher’s throwing noticeably improved as the year wore on. Hopefully the improvements made will carry over into the upcoming regular season. If they do, then Swisher has a chance to be referred to as one of the best right fielders in the game (this notion is based not only on last year’s UZR data, but on the previous years, as well). It might sound like a stretch, but it is possible (he’s close).

His range is definitely there, and the pendulum doesn’t swing very far in either direction, good or bad, with regards to error runs (yellow bar), so, correcting the arm runs issue will be his biggest defensive challenge in 2010.

Note – Swisher’s UZR on FanGraphs actually reads as -0.7, however, when you add his RngR, ARM, and ErrR, you get -0.8. I figured it was just a rounding issue, but to preclude confusion, I discuss it as -0.8, not -0.7. I only do this because it is but a fraction of a run.

Photo by Reuters

Over the weekend, Bob Klapisch of the Bergen Record compared Yankees second baseman, Robinson Cano, to Boston’s Dustin Pedroia. At one point in the text, Klapisch discusses the two in terms of fielding ability, and concludes that Cano is actually a better second baseman than Pedroia. “In this regard,” he writes, “Pedroia doesn’t come close to Cano – he can’t duplicate his rival’s range to his right and that signature ability to throw to first base while moving in the opposite direction.” However, it seems that Ultimate Zone Rating disagrees with Klapisch.

According to FanGraphs, which Klapisch later uses to discuss offense yet did not use to justify his defensive evaluation (for whatever reason), Robinson Cano’s career UZR is -26.8 and his career UZR per 150 defensive games is -5.4. On the other hand, Dustin Pedroia’s career UZR is +21.7 and his career UZR per 150 defensive games is 7.4. With regards to defense, there is a fairly large gulf, run-wise, between the two, with Pedroia reigning supreme. While I do think that UZR actually underrates Cano – a product, perhaps, of the way in which his “smooth” style of play is perceived, i.e., as not trying hard enough – to say that Pedroia “doesn’t come close to Cano” with a glove is quite a reach. Based on what I have seen, Cano has a better arm and range to his right, but Pedroia, with his speed and instincts, seems to react better and, as a result, can often cover more ground, overall (he was 7.5 range runs above average in 2009, and Cano was 2.5 runs below average). Would most fans agree with that assessment? I think so.

Cano has the potential to improve significantly, and become a better second baseman, but, as of right now, if I were building a defense-first team and were forced to choose between he and Pedroia, I would probably take the latter.

Photo by Reuters

Feb 252010

Derek Jeter’s UZR at shortstop last season was 6.6 runs above average. Nick Swisher’s UZR in right field last season was -0.7 runs below average. Johnny Damon’s UZR in left field last season was -9.2 runs below average. From my own experiences, many baseball fans often toss around FanGraphs’ Ultimate Zone Ratings without much context or detail, citing UZR similarly to the way in which I have done just prior to this sentence, as if the numbers provide all that is needed in order to fully understand a player’s defensive impact on a given season. However, for those who rely upon FanGraphs for their UZR figures (most of us, it seems), it is very important to remember that each player’s rating can be broken down further into three distinct parts.

For outfielders, the three-pronged rating is the final sum of a player’s range runs (RngR), error runs (ErrR), and arm runs (ARM), whereas for infielders, a player’s UZR is based on on range runs and error runs, however, arm runs are actually replaced by double play runs (DPR). Each of the three values, together, amount to a respective Ultimate Zone Rating. The problem, though, is that sometimes, ratings are cited at large, with writers employing FanGraphs’ UZR system and citing an UZR without added delineation that might provide greater insights as to why a player’s rating is as high, low, or average as it is. In reality, an UZR can occasionally be the product of just one of the three elements which are used to comprise it, making matters more than confusing when evaluating a player’s overall defensive value in a given year. For instance, an extremely high ErrR can skew an infielder’s UZR, masking tangible range issues. However, if the error score is not expounded upon, defensive weaknesses may go unnoticed.

This is an issue I often deal with when discussing a player’s Ultimate Zone Rating. In order to address it, I tend to rehash much of what I said above, but in an abbreviated form. For practical purposes – and for some nerdish fun – I thought perhaps I could try something different, and hopefully more interesting, to help readers understand what an UZR really “means” when it is attached to a player. Hence, the UZR Chart is born (I guess DiamondView inspired me). I have opted to represent the three defensive components of a player’s UZR using a simple bar chart. The bar chart seemed like a good idea because it allows for negative numbers and creates a rather straightforward visual comparison. Also, it allows us to visually perceive the way in which a player’s UZR, which I have also decided to include in each UZR Chart, can sometimes be heavily determined by one of the three defensive elements – RngR, ErrR, ARM/DP – discussed. Basically, via chart, we can eyeball a high or low UZR score relative to a high or low RngR, etc.

An example of this is the figure to the right, which is an UZR Chart documenting the defensive abilities of Houston Astros outfielder, Hunter Pence, in 2009. I chose to chart Pence, a non-Yankee, as the first illustration, mainly because of his interesting UZR. Last season, Pence’s Ultimate Zone Rating was +5.5 runs—an above average defensive mark (roughly half a win). At first glance of this rating, one might assume that Pence’s defense was strong in the outfield and that he did a combination of positive things, defensively, to earn such a score. However, it was Pence’s strong arm score of +5.9 runs that catapulted his UZR into the “above average” territory, while he was merely average with regards to range runs (-0.3) and error runs (-0.2). His UZR Chart makes this particularly clear as the ARM bar (green) and the UZR bar (red) are nearly identical. And so is the purpose of the UZR Chart, to detail what an UZR really means via an easy visual.

With that said – hopefully the explanation provided was clear (or clear enough, at least) – here’s another UZR Chart, though this one features a simple trend analysis of Derek Jeter’s Ultimate Zone Rating over the last five years.

As you can see from the chart, Jeter’s abysmal range (blue bars) from 2005 to 2007 essentially dictated his UZR. Outside of his ErrR in 2005, Jeter did not do anything particularly well in the field, either, as he was generally average in double play runs and error runs and terrible range-wise. His averageness did little to curb the damage brought onto his final rating by his range run totals. Whereas Hunter Pence has his great arm to increase his overall value, Jeter had nothing, really. Of course, in 2008, there is a noticeable change in Jeter’s defensive value, which is the direct result of a new training regimen employed by Jeter to address his range problems. His range improved tremendously – the blue bar ascends – and, thanks to a positive error runs total of 4.5, Jeter’s -0.5 UZR was his first average mark in years. The gains continued into 2009, as Jeter was worth 6.6 range runs. The area that was once a huge weakness is now a strength.

From now on, unless you guys see a mistake in this “method” that I am not seeing (comment away), when discussing and citing UZR totals from FanGraphs, I’ll probably offer an UZR Chart as well. It seems to be useful in pointing out the intricacies of the ratings so as to enhance understandings of a player’s defensive contributions (in a single year, or over time), as specific weaknesses – Derek Jeter’s range – or strengths – Hunter Pence’s arm – that may dilute or inflate an Ultimate Zone Rating are made apparent through such simple illustrations. By looking at a chart, it is much easier to decipher why an UZR score “is,” essentially. Plus, they’re fun to look at, too, which is an added bonus.

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