Steve Goldman recently wrote an interesting post over at Pinstripe Bible about the Yankee lineup and the best place in it for Robinson Cano:

A career .306/.339/.480 hitter, Cano freezes up with runners on base. This was clearly demonstrated last season, when he batted only .255/.288/.415 with men on and .207/.242/.332 with runners in scoring position. Conversely, leading off an inning he hit an incredible .441/.459/.797. Batting with the bases empty, he hit .376/.407/.609. While Cano hasn’t been this extreme every year, he has been fairly consistent in this regard. He’s a career .256/.291/.398 hitter with runners in scoring position, .280/.312/.425 with men on, and .331/363/.528 with the bases empty.

This doesn’t mean that Cano isn’t a good hitter, but that he simply has limitations. To get the most out of Cano, a manager might keep him out of RBI spots. Now, when you have one of the best offenses in baseball, your whole batting order is an RBI spot. That’s why the second spot in the order is a place he might prosper. Even if the Yankees get another .400 OBP from their leadoff man, Cano would be batting with the bases empty 60 percent of the time, do his best hitting, and be on base for Mark Teixeira, A-Rod, et al. The downside is that you might get a few extra Cano double-play specials when the leadoff man does reach base.

Basically, Goldman suggests that the 2 slot in the order would be a good fit for Cano, being that it is not an “RBI spot” and would maximize what you can get from him. I think this idea has two flaws. Firstly, Cano will only be batting with the bases empty 60 percent of the time in his first at bat. After that at bat, all subsequent at bats will likely have the guys at the bottom of the order hitting before him as well as the leadoff man, meaning he will be in more RBI spots than Goldman suggests.

More importantly, the Yankees should not be ordering their lineup to do what is best for Cano while disregarding what is best for the club. I am quite certain that Cano’s career .339 OBP makes him a bad fit in the 2 spot, as you want someone in that slot to reach base for A-Rod and Teixeira. Rigging the lineup to help Cano in a way that will hurt the two sluggers does not seem like a great plan.

Furthermore, Goldman’s overall point presupposes the idea that we should expect Cano to continue to fail in “clutch” spots going forward simply because he has done so in the past. To steal a thought from Fack Youk, there’s a big difference between “hasn’t” and “can’t”. Just because Cano has not been able to perform as well with runners on in the past does not mean that he cannot. As Greg at Pending Pinstripes notes:

It is very evident that, to date, Cano has been very unclutch in his career. This doesn’t signal that he will be unclutch going forward. Another conclusion on clutch hitting from The Book is:

For all practical purposes, a player can be expected to hit equally well in the clutch as he would be expected to do in an ordinary situation.

This thought made me curious as to whether there was something changing in regard to Cano’s approach with runners on base that we could point to and say, “That is why he fails in the clutch.” Thankfully, SG over at RLYW looked at this issue recently. He examined luck factors, batted ball data, and pitch type, and found the following:

Honestly, I expected to see more of a split here in the underlying data, but it’s just not there. Cano’s results to this point with runners on base are markedly worse than his results with the bases empty, but it’s not because of any obvious change in his approach in the two scenarios, unless I’m missing something here or not considering something that I should be. I guess this is encouraging, because it means we really shouldn’t have any reason to think that Cano will continue to hit as poorly with men on base as he has so far.

Greg at PP had similar results in his study linked above, suggesting that nothing in the observable data reflects a change in approach by Cano with men on base. I would like to put forth an alternative theory, although I do not have much evidence to support it due to my inability to split certain data sets into bases empty v. men on base sections.

After Cano’s awful 2008, I made the following assertion:

Cano was flying open and jerking his head, leading to a multitude of soft popups. Rather than take those pitches up the middle or the other way, Robbie played into the pitchers hands by attempting to pull everything. Bad mechanics, rather than bad luck, were what killed Robinson Cano’s 2008.

This point was supported by Pitch F/x research done by Josh Kalk and the batted ball and swing data, and I am quite confident in its accuracy. Cano bounced back in 2009, and the data showed me the following:

Cano continued to expand his zone in 2009, but was more comfortable going with the pitch on the outer half. In fact, he made even more contact on those pitches than usual, leading to him striking out less. Increased and better contact on those pitches led to more of his fly balls leaving the ballpark than in the previous season, meaning he finally saw the benefits of trading ground balls for fly balls. New Yankee Stadium certainly helped, but his IsoP was almost as good on the road as it was at home. To sum up, I believe that Cano saw a BABIP increase because he was making better and more consistent contact on pitches on the outer half and out of the strike zone, leading to more homers and general power on fly balls than he got last season. Kevin Long worked particularly hard with Cano in the offseason regarding reaching that ball on the outer edges and going the other way with it, and I believe it paid off.

Cano’s spray charts, linked in the 2009 post, suggest that this interpretation of Cano’s performance has some merit to it. To state my conclusion succinctly, I believe Cano’s poor 2008 was the result of attempting to pull everything, and that his turnaround was the result of a focused attempt to take pitches on the middle and outer portions of the plate the other way.

What does this have to do with our discussion of clutch? Well, I would posit that Cano may have his 2008 issues regarding pulling the ball whenever there are runners on base. As Kevin Long and most other coaches would tell you, a player that attempts to pull everything is simply trying to do too much, attempting to change the entire game with one swing. That mindset snowballed on Cano in 2008, as the more he struggled, the more he attempted to alter things by crushing the ball. It may be possible that he always has that “trying to do too much” mindset when there are runners on base, and therefore fails to focus on taking pitches the other way and gets pull happy. If this is in fact the problem, some more work with Kevin Long might be able to solve it. (Anecdotally, because it does not really mean much in the way of proof, I would like to note that Cano’s 2008 numbers and his career numbers with men on base are very similar).

This is simply a theory, and I myself am not entirely convinced of it. I would just as soon believe that there is absolutely nothing behind Cano’s struggles with men on base, and that we should expect him to perform to his overall career averages regardless of the situation going forward. However, if you do believe that something must be changing with runners on base, I think this is as good a theory as any, and does have some factual underpinnings in terms of the 2008 data.

What are your thoughts on the issue?

Thus far, what has been a memorable postseason, to say the least, has not been kind to Yankees slugger, Mark Teixeira. Though he has often dazzled with his golden glove, causing the always insightful Tim McCarver to continuously refer to him as a Hoover—like the vacuum, Teixeira has struggled mightily to produce offensively, as his bat has languished. For whatever reason, whether it be the persistent pressure intrinsically connected to Teixeira’s pinstriped jersey or a simple slump at the worst possible time, the man that had assaulted AL pitching in 2009, hitting 39 home runs and plating 122, appears to be stuck in a seemingly endless state of offensive ineffectiveness.

In the ALDS, against the Twins, a team that Teixeira normally enjoys facing—his career line against Minnesota is .371/.415/.670, he hit a feeble .167/.231/.417, and looked more like Robinson Cano with runners in scoring position than the player that led the league in RBI. He walked once and drove in 1 lone run on a solo home run (it was a big home run, but the lack of general production is obviously evident). It was merely a poor series, we all thought, upon reflection. It was preposterous to assume that such a miserable postseason performance could continue into the ALCS. Thinking that Mark Teixeira, who hit .292/.383/.565 during the regular season, would hit under .200 against the Angels was absurd, it seemed. No way would he fold—not Big Tex. The ALDS was nothing more than a sour fluke.

Of course, those who quietly feared that Teixeira would continue to struggle against his former SoCal brethren had their fears confirmed in each grueling ALCS game, as Teixeira hit a remarkably poor .222/.290/.259 during the series (hey, at least he stayed above .200 this time). He drove in 4 runs and struck out 8 times over 6 games. Though the Yankees managed to escape the ALCS winners, one wonders what would have occurred had the Yankees lost. Would Teixeira have been blamed for the early exit? It was, of course, very likely, as the much maligned Alex Rodriguez did more than his part to pave a path to playoff glory, a path that ended and began with the World Series.

However, hypotheticals aside, the Yankees did not lose, as they are, indeed, in the World Series and continue to battle the Phillies for baseball’s bedazzled crown and impressive throne. Sadly though, for the Bombers, Mark Teixeira’s frustratingly flaccid bat has followed him into the fray. He has been but a shell of his regular season self, hitting a paltry .105 through the first 5 games. He has 2 RBI, a number that is simply unacceptable given his position above A-Rod in the Yankees batting order. Normally a patient hitter, Teixeira has walked only twice during the series while striking out 7 times. One of his more cited strike outs can be found in last night’s ballgame, when Teixeira swung at a pair of Ryan Madson changeups that were well out of the zone, ending the game with Hideki Matsui standing at second base (Teixeira was, himself, the tying run) and Alex Rodriguez stranded in the on-deck circle. If only, if only…

Following his prominent game-ending strike out, Teixeira seemed impervious to his offensive listlessness. “I think I’ve done a lot, this postseason, to help this team win,” he chirped. “That’s what I’m going to try and do [Wednesday].” Please, allow me to stage an intervention—Mark, with your limp Louisville, you have done little to help the team this postseason. Remember, admitting you have a problem is the first step to recovery. The Yankees have 2 possible games left this season and, in order to defeat a strong Philly lineup, the team needs Mark Teixeira to produce with both his bat and his mitt. As of right now, the mitt is present (UZR be damned), but the bat is nowhere to be found.

Photo by AP

Alex Rodriguez has 6 strikeouts, thus far, in the World Series. He’s performing like it’s 2006.

Here’s Tom Verducci’s (SI) take on A-Rod’s first two games of the series:

Those were some funky swings Alex Rodriguez took in Games 1 and 2 in the World Series, looking nothing like the compact, balanced strokes he took in the ALDS and ALCS. His swing was at times lengthened and at times became very defensive, more of swatting for the ball or feeling for it than taking a quick path to it. It’s almost as if he’s a shooter in basketball whose stroke gets tighter with each miss; he needs something to go down to restore confidence.In two games Rodriguez has swung at 23 pitches and put two balls in play: a grounder to third and a flyball to left field. He punched out three times in Game 1 and three times again in Game 2. Only one other player ever had back-to-back three-strikeout games in World Series history: Jim Lonborg. A pitcher. In 1967. It’s not the kind of World Series history Rodriguez had in mind. He waited his whole career to get to the World Series, and when he got here, he immediately became the first hitter, other than a pitcher with a .136 career average, to whiff three times in two straight World Series games.

To better understand the situation, here are A-Rod’s 8 at-bats (6 K, 8 outs) of the World Series, via Brooks Baseball.

Alex Rodriguez versus Cliff Lee, Game 1, 2nd inning, strikeout:

Based on the location of these pitches—up in the zone, middle of the plate—Alex must not have been seeing the ball well against Lee, or he was trying to be overly deliberate while at the plate. Lee threw him 4 pitches (1, 2, 3, 5) which should have been hit out of the park.

Alex Rodriguez versus Cliff Lee, Game 1, 4th inning, strikeout:

A-Rod’s patience is, for the most part, intact here, as he identifies 3 balls out of the zone. He chases pitches 1 and 2, though, and the first pitch (1) was particularly tough to hit since it was inside and low. Either could have been called strikes by the umpire, but maybe Alex should leave that up to the umpire rather than swing.

Alex Rodriguez versus Cliff Lee, Game 1, 7th inning, groundout:

A-Rod’s strike zone has expanded, inside. After laying off the first inside pitch, he should have laid off the second, as they were nearly identical. He fouled it off, instead, and when Lee came inside but caught a good amount of the plate, Alex simply missed it.

Alex Rodriguez versus Cliff Lee, Game 1, 9th inning, strikeout:

Lee leaves another pitch, pitch 2, in the middle of the plate and Alex merely fouls it off. Even the first pitch on the outside corner should have been hit since it’s right in his wheelhouse (perhaps he went up with the intention of taking the first pitch). The fourth pitch by Lee was pretty nasty, low, but Alex probably could have done some damage with it since it wasn’t inside on him (or far outside).

Alex Rodriguez versus Pedro Martinez, Game 2, 2nd inning, strikeout:

Against Pedro, A-Rod starts off the game with a good at-bat, however, again, 4 of these pitches (4, 5, 6, 9) were practically dead center. Alex should have hit all 4 of them, especially the 2 (4, 5) that are in the upper part of the zone. He also chases the first and the second pitch. Those 2 pitches are well out of the zone. The A-Rod we saw in the ALCS and the ALDS generally didn’t chase pitches like this.

Alex Rodriguez versus Pedro Martinez, Game 2, 4th inning, fly out:

Again, these pitches aren’t necessarily well located. Out and over the plate is a strength for A-Rod, but he failed to do anything here. He hit the ball hard, but he pulled it to left field rather than going with the pitch, away (this was directly after the Teixeira home run).

Alex Rodriguez versus Pedro Martinez, Game 2, 6th inning, strikeout:

A-Rod’s strike zone just doesn’t seem as good as it was against the Angels and the Twins. While Pedro makes 2 pretty good pitches here (2, 4), the third pitch of the at-bat was out of the zone. If Alex would have been patient with it, the count would have been a more favorable 2-1 (assuming the umpire calls the third pitch a ball) rather than the unfavorable 1-2. That, then, led to pitch 4—the strikeout pitch, inside.

Alex Rodriguez versus Ryan Madson, Game 2, 8th inning, strikeout:

Against Ryan Madson and his changeup, A-Rod totally folded. Though he allowed the first pitch to go by for ball 1, he then swung at 3 pitches that were in the exact same location (or thereabout, anyway) and all of them were well outside. Madson saw him diving over the outer part of the plate and just kept plugging away until he finally changed it up with a pitch on the inside (and up). There you have it, A-Rod’s worst at-bat of the series (on his last at-bat before Game 3).

Based on these 8 at-bats, I think A-Rod looks far too anxious at the plate. In previous postseason games this year, he would take his walks and allow the umpire to decide whether a close pitch was a strike or not (he wouldn’t chase). The Ryan Madson at-bat, in particular, was such a far cry from what we had been seeing all October, which was a patient Alex Rodriguez. In addition, when the Angels or the Twins left pitches up in the zone, especially on the outer part of the plate, Alex would crush them. Perhaps his nerves have finally caught up to him, at least for these two games.

Do I think we’ve seen the last of a clutch A-Rod this October? No, not at all. However, the at-bats above are, indeed, frustrating affairs. His strike zone judgment from Game 1 to Game 2 seems to have gotten worse, as well, which would indicate that he’s trying too hard. Hopefully, when he arrives in Citizen’s Bank Park and faces off against Cole Hamels in Game 3, he’ll opt for a more patient approach at the plate.

From R.J. Anderson (FanGraphs):

With that in mind let’s address the topic before the headlines do.Alex Rodriguez does not hit well in the playoffs

His career wOBA in the regular season is .412. His career post-season wOBA is .368. Relative to his standards he doesn’t hit well in the playoffs.

He’s been the invisible man with the Yankees

Let’s drop wOBA for a moment and simply look at his playoff series lines in pinstripes:

2004 ALDS: .421/.476/.737 (21 PA)
2004 ALCS: .258/.378/.561 (37 PA)
2005 ALDS: .133/.381/.200 (21 PA)
2006 ALDS: .071/.071/.071 (14 PA)
2007 ALDS: .267/.353/.467 (17 PA)

You have one great series and two awful, and two below A-Rod standards. Invisible? No. Not as good as his regular season self? Yes. The sample size isn’t big enough to say whether this is simply random fluctuation or a fear of the post-season stage.

What do you think? Will A-Rod show up this October or will we witness a meltdown? Were ‘05-06 the products of bad luck or was A-Rod simply letting the postseason pressure get to him?

Speaking subjectively, I believe that ‘05 was just an awful postseason for Alex—bad luck, perhaps—and then Joe Torre made matters worse in 2006 by bouncing A-Rod around the lineup like a spare part. It’s hard to rebound from a poor playoff experience when your manager makes it clear that he has no confidence in your abilities in the following playoff appearance. For that reason, I don’t blame A-Rod for his performance against the Tigers (he’s at fault, but it’s not all on him). Of course, that’s just my opinion.

With the Yankees notching yet another walk-off won this afternoon, an interesting question popped into my head. As Robbie Cano walked to the plate, most Yankees fans were not expecting much from a guy hitting about .200 with RISP. My question is, who would you most want at the plate with the game on the line? Second and third, down one, two outs in the 9th, who do you hope is standing at the dish? And who would you hope is planted firmly on the bench?

Personally, I would like to see Jeter up there. Besides for his reputation in the clutch, he is the best pure hitter on the club. However, I could see an argument for pretty much anyone in this lineup. Who would you choose?

Robinson Cano is the most “unclutch” player in baseball.

His clutch score is -2.40. Miguel Cabrera is second with a -1.72. I’ve written about clutch score before, so you can read about it here. Basically, what this means is that there is a huge disparity between Cano’s ability to hit in high leverage situations and his ability to hit in “neutral” situations. For instance, with the bases empty, Cano hits .345/.385/.550. However, with the bases loaded he hits .250/.261/.300. With RISP, Cano is hitting .202/.239/.318 and with RISP and 2 outs, Cano is hitting .195/.235/.299. Essentially, what clutch score indicates is that Cano is having an excellent year when no one is on base (yay!). Of course, in baseball, where you optimize your offensive output by hitting with RISP, this is problem for Robbie and the Yankees.

What does this mean, exactly? Is there no hope for our free-swinging friend?

Well, no—not exactly. In the past, Cano’s clutch score, with the exception of last year, has always been in the red. However, in 2009, Robbie’s numbers—clutch score, etc—in high leverage situations have been markedly lower than they have been in previous seasons (Cano’s previous clutch scores were -0.75, -0.36, -0.86 and 0.32). He’s basically having the worst season of his career with men on base. Therefore, though he isn’t really delivering with runners on in 2009, it appears as though these issues are particularly pronounced this year. For this reason, I wonder if he has just been unlucky. However, on the other hand, he has looked awfully impatient at the plate whenever a man is on base. Whatever the case may be, the Yankees have worked with Cano to address the problem, yet I haven’t seen much of an improvement (I’ve seen glimpses, nothing concrete, though).

I’m just tired of cringing every time I see a man on base and Cano in the batter’s box. At least we still have Johnny Damon, Mark Teixeira and Melky Cabrera…

I admit to loving the wonderful and curious statistics that sabermetricians and other super statheads are gracious enough to enrich my existence with, but by no means would I consider myself a sabermetrician.  Rather, I enjoy plucking random metrics from the sabermric ether and using them to lend credence or dispel some of my notions.  I really have only a superficial understanding of the numbers, themselves, and am somewhat skeptical regarding the ability of statistics to accurately measure certain aspects of the game.

One of these aspects is “clutch hitting.”  The widespread sabermetric stance is that it doesn’t exist, and this has always been at odds with my own observations.  Here’s what David Grabiner, in his “Sabermetric Manifesto” says, “if there is an ability, players who hit well in the clutch in the past
will continue to do so.  This can be tested, and has been; there is only
very weak evidence of an ability, and it is clear that whatever ability
there is does not mean much in baseball terms.”

I find it hard to believe that Manny Ramirez is not a better clutch hitter than A-Rod.  Some players tense up in a big spot while others (like Manny) seem to stay loose and raise their level of focus.  However, statheads pretty much across the board, seem to agree on this, so I’ll let it slide, but I can’t help wondering if we’re all approaching this from the wrong angle.

Maybe it’s not a “clutch” factor we’re looking for but simply the ability to hit better pitching.   We’ve all seen minor leaguers who mash at one level, yet can’t hack it at the next.  Isn’t it sensible to think that major leaguers are the same way?  Isn’t a hitter’s ability to hit top pitching a better way to evaluate a player than looking at his numbers in “bases loaded” “scoring position, 2 out” “late and close” or “runners on” situations, particularly if you’re a team like the Yankees who is very interested in how a player will perform in playoff situations, where the pitching is much better?