Let me clear something up right off the bat. I have been squarely in the ‘Joba starts’ camp from day 1. I believe he has the body type, repertoire, and yes, makeup to be an outstanding starting pitcher. This choice doesn’t alter that view one bit, I still see both Joba and Hughes as starters long term. Some fans worry about him (and Hughes) not getting enough innings if they don’t start this year. I can understand worrying about exceeding innings at a young age, but not going below them. The innings limits many teams follow are up to the age 25 season. Both pitchers will be 25 in 2011, and therefore can be full fledged starters next year without any added health related concerns. I’m not even sure there are any concerns now, the Joba Rules have already been lifted and (as pitching coach Dave Eiland has noted) Phil Hughes has pitched full seasons in the minors, so his limits are minimal. But what I don’t buy into is the notion that if he (or Phil Hughes) doesn’t start this year, it will be bad for his development and/or preclude him from starting down the road. Working out of the bullpen will give both pitchers valuable experience facing MLB hitters, working out of jams and much-needed confidence, especially in Hughes’ case. From a development standpoint, they have as much (if not more) to learn by facing tough MLB hitters as they do by blowing away minor leaguers. Even with Ace as the #5, I still see both of them as starters for the 2011 season, taking 2 of the spots of Vasquez, Aceves, or Pettitte. I simply believe that on this team, this year, Ace as the #5 is the best use of your roster.
Check out the scouting reports of all 5 candidates (h/t NYBD):
Alfredo Aceves:
PITCHES: Throws fastball 90-92mph (47% of all pitches), cutter 87-90 (14%), curveball 77-82 (20%), changeup 80-85 (19%). FB is most effective, cutter least effective. 1,232 total pitches (62% in the strike zone). Threw 199 of 318 first pitches for strikes (63%).
Strengths: Great command of CB. Great command of CH. Great command of cutter. Great overall dominance with 4.31 K/BB. Induces pop-ups often. Rarely walks batters – 0.19 BB/IP (0.39 is avg).
Joba Chamberlain
PITCHES: Throws fastball 91-94mph (64% of all pitches), slider 83-87 (19%), curveball 76-82 (12%), changeup 81-84 (5%). FB is most effective, changeup least effective. 2,619 total pitches (55% in the strike zone). Threw 370 of 662 first pitches for strikes (56%).
STRENGTHS: Plus command of slider.
WEAKNESSES: One of the walk leaders with 76.
HABITS: 3-0 ALWAYS throws FB to lefties 100% (86% is avg). 3-2 throws slider to righties 58% (16% is avg). 3-2 throws slider to lefties 50% (14% is avg). Throws sliders 60% more frequently from the stretch (24% vs 15% of all pitches).
Chad Gaudin
PITCHES: Throws fastball 89-92mph (58% of all pitches), slider 77-82 (30%), changeup 83-87 (9%), curveball 76-82 (2%). Slider is most effective, changeup is least effective. 5,040 total pitches (59% in the strike zone). Threw 108 of 186 first pitches for strikes (58%). Threw 265 of 453 first pitches for strikes (58%).
STRENGTHS: Deceptive curveball causes 29% of swings to miss. Plus command of changeup.
WEAKNESSES: Poor command of CB. Changeup velocity is not deceptively slower than FB – only 4.2 mph.
HABITS: 3-0 ALWAYS throws FB to righties 100% (86% is avg). Locates CB 3″ down from the stretch. Lean body. Likes to make pickoff attempts. Gets little spin on FB (21% below MLB avg.) His slider is one of the slowest at 79.7 and “slurvy”. Gets good spin on slider (67% above MLB avg.)
Phil Hughes
PITCHES: Throws fastball 92-95mph (64% of all pitches), cutter 87-91 (8%), curveball 75-79 (21%), slider 87-89 (6%), changeup 82-86 (1%). Curveball is most effective, fastball is least effective. 1,456 total pitches (60% in the strike zone). Threw 208 of 338 first pitches for strikes (62%).
NOTES: Injury a concern – was on the DL 135 days over the past 3 seasons. Likes to make pickoff attempts.
STRENGTHS: Plus command of slider. Well above avg overall dominance with 3.42 K/BB. Entered 13 games with runners on base and allowed 67% fewer to score than the average reliever in the same situations. Strikes out batters often – 1.11 K/IP (0.77 is avg). Consistently came in to 33 “late and close” games and pitched effectively.
HABITS: 88% of swings make contact off his slider. Throws FB outside to righties. His FB is on the faster side at 93.5. Deceptive FB causes 15% of swings to miss. Gets good spin on CB (33% above MLB avg.). He throws a hard SL that averages 87.8.
Sergio Mitre
PITCHES: Throws fastball 90-92mph (31% of all pitches), sinker 89-92 (38%), changeup 82-85 (17%), curveball 78-80 (9%), slider 77-80 (6%). 793 total pitches (61% in the strike zone). Threw 131 of 210 first pitches for strikes (62%).
NOTES: Injury a concern – was on the DL 90 days over the past 3 seasons.
STRENGTHS: Plus command of slider. Changeup has a big tailing action.
WEAKNESSES: Not a deceptive slider: 94% of swings make contact. Has a high ERA of 6.79. Rarely induces pop-ups.
HABITS: 1-2 throws CH to lefties 50% (14% is avg). 2-0 does not throw FB to righties often – 30% (72% is avg). 2-0 does not throw FB to lefties often – 13% (74% is avg). 2-2 throws CH to lefties 45% (15% is avg). Infrequently throws inside twice in a row 21% of the time (29% is avg). Slider release point comes towards 1B 1.7″ from the stretch. Throws sinkers 22% more frequently from the stretch (42% vs 34% of all pitches). FB has a big tailing and sinking action. Has 11-5 CB break angle (-17 deg). Throws slider high to lefties. His “slurvy” slider is one of the slowest at 78.5.
What jumps out at me is that Ace is the clearly the most mature and polished of the above candidates. Joba and Hughes may have far more upside, but have yet to reach it as starting pitchers on the big league level. Ace is the safe choice, the one who you know will give you innings and consistency, which allows you to use your relievers in a much more orderly fashion. Bullpens tend to get into trouble when they get overworked, and managers are forced to push relievers into situations that they aren’t suited for. We know AJ Burnett will have the occasional clunker, and we’ve seen that Joba the starter can often fall into the same category. While I’m sure Girardi will split them up, I value the reliability I think Ace will give me. The innings he can give helps you optimize the rest of your resources.
On to the roster and bullpen alignment. You have Chad Gaudin to take Ace’s place as the long man and spot starter. Both of them being in the bullpen is a complete waste, two long men just means one of them never pitches, especially on a team loaded with 200+IP guys. In case of injury to one of your starters, Gaudin simply moves into the rotation and you can call up an innings eater like Jon Albaladejo from AAA to do mop-up work. In case of injury/ineffectiveness of one of your relievers, you can call on a high-upside arm such as Mark Melancon, which is attractive both now and for future considerations. That means you can smooth MM’s transition to the bigs in low leverage situations, which is preferable to throwing him into the fire right away. Melancon’s uncharacteristic lack of control last year at the MLB level leads me to believe that he was a bit overwhelmed as a rookie.
Finally, on to performance. Aceves has a full, if unspectacular repertoire. He’s well suited to start, and give different looks to hitters facing them multiple times. His stuff plays the same in a relief role as it does out of the bullpen, it’s not like he gains some extra MPH on the fastball the way power pitchers like Hughes and Joba do. On the other hand, both Hughes and Joba have been ungodly as relievers, yet mundane as starting pitchers. Both gain velocity in the bullpen, both are able to go with their 2 best pitches and not risk getting beat on a lesser pitch. Both have put up numbers in the bullpen that are unrealistic to expect them to repeat in the rotation. I’d rather get outstanding performances from both of those two than get more innings and less results from one, while Aceves sits in the bullpen.
If the Yanks serious about this “open competition” stuff (which strikes me as silly since were talking about Spring Training) then Ace would be my choice. Not based on how he performs this spring, but on maximizing the assets I have to work with. That would leave the Yanks with Joba AND Hughes in the pen, one of the scariest bullpens ever assembled. You would have not one, not two, but three ‘relief aces’ who can come in at almost any time of the game to put out a fire against the heart of an order. That means at least 2 of the 3 are available to you every day, and you are still well covered in case of injury. Both pitchers will still be eligible, without restrictions, to be starters next season. Or possibly even this season in case of a major injury. I just want reliable innings out of my #5, and the prospect of having a bullpen for the ages, even for just one season, is the best use of your resources in 2010.
Mike Silva spoke to Chad Jennings last night, and Jennings suggested that the Chan-Ho Park addition could result in Alfredo Aceves beginning the year in the minors. Here’s how:
Rivera, Robertson, Marte, Joba/Hughes, and Park. I would put Aceves as a lock, but what if Melancon or Albaladejo have a great spring? Don’t forget Chad Gaudin who the Yankees brass likes. The Yankees rotation is going to give length on most nights and Park is someone that could go 2 innings plus, if necessary. Last year he was called on for two or more innings eleven times by Charlie Manuel.
Another thing going against Aceves is the fact that he has options. Gaudin will need to clear waivers if he is demoted. Knowing the state of pitching in the game it’s hard to imagine another team not claiming him if he has a good spring. Aceves might very well become a victim of the numbers game.
Basically, the idea is that Park might make carrying Aceves and Gaudin redundant, such that the club would be inclined to take a one inning type reliever such as Melancon rather than both Aceves and Gaudin. Being that Aceves has options and the others do not, he would be the odd man out.
The one thing that bothers me about this idea is that I’m not so sure Melancon or Albaladejo are better one inning relievers than Aceves at this point. If Aceves only provided flexibility over the one inning type options, I would understand giving that up for better performance due to the flexibility of the other Yankee relievers. But if the Yankees believe that Aceves is the better pitcher, he should not be sent down simply because his greatest attribute is something that the Yankees have plenty of. Hopefully, the Yankees take their seven best bullpen arms north.
What do you think? Is there a scenario under which you would send Aceves to AAA?
Last night, via Newsday’s Ken Davidoff, we learned from Yankees manager, Joe Girardi, that the final spot in the club’s 2010 starting rotation will be decided by a five-man contest this spring, one that features Phil Hughes, Joba Chamberlain, Alfredo Aceves, Chad Gaudin, and Sergio Mitre. Still, given practical concerns (i.e., Hughes’ innings limit and Chamberlain’s lack thereof) as well as the important matter of a recent starting track record, it appears as though Joba Chamberlain will be in the lead for that role, at least initially, with Phil Hughes serving as the Nebraskan’s foremost competition. Chamberlain, however, does not appear to be overly concerned by the situation.
According to the NY Post’s Mike Puma, Chamberlain, who will report to Tampa next week in order to effectively prepare for the upcoming season, will be training as a starter, because “[t]eam brass has told him to have that mindset.” When asked about the spring competition, Chamberlain stated, “I’m going to go in and understand a lot of guys are fighting for that spot. Nothing is guaranteed.” This is, of course, exactly why the Yankees have promoted the fifth spot in the team’s rotation as an up-for-grabs affair, one that will ultimately be awarded to the most effective arm in Spring Training (although I don’t think anyone truly believes that the competition is totally “open”). Chamberlain, who spent the majority of the 2009 season as a starter – he was more frustrating than brilliant – is headed to Tampa weeks in advance in order to prepare for the season and seems eager to prove himself. If you ask me, it looks as though the competition idea is already beginning to pay dividends for the Yankees.
Photo by Al Bello/Getty Images
Coming into Spring Training, I think we can all feel pretty confident with the Yankees. The lineup is frankly pretty damn good, even with Brett Gardner in left field; the rotation contains at least two guys who could top a rotation, and the fifth starter will be one of two incredibly talented young stars. While people may have questions about the bullpen, it’s not changed much from 2009’s bullpen and a Robertson/Marte set-up combination should be just fine.
There is, however, one area that concerns me a bit, and that’s the starting pitching depth. One through four, the Yankees are just as good as any team in baseball. At number five, they’ve got “ridiculous upside”. After that, it could get a bit dicey.
If I have my way, the “loser” of the Chamberlain/Hughes battle will be the sixth starter, stashed away in Scranton. In terms of depth, this would be great for the Yankees. Most GM’s would kill to have a sixth starter with the talent of Hughes or Chamberlain. But, if the battle’s loser is put in the bullpen, the Yankees’ starting depth could take a hit. After them, the depth is a little bit shallow.
After Jophil Chamberhughes, there’s a few guys we could see get starts for the Yankees: Sergio Mitre, Chad Gaudin, Alfredo Aceves, and Ivan Nova.
Sergio Mitre could step forward this year, as he gets farther and farther away from his Tommy John Surgery. However, the results in 2009 were not pretty. His ERA pushed seven, his WHIP was 1.63, and struck out fewer than six batters per nine. And, despite walking only 2.26 per nine, his FIP was 5.30 and his tRA (FanGraphs version) was 5.85. I’m really not too high on Mitre. The low walk total is definitely encouraging, but it just seems that Mitre gives up way too much hard contact to ever really be effective.
Next, there’s mid-season acquisition Chad Gaudin. He pitched to a 3.43 ERA last season, despite a middling 1.452 WHIP in his time with the Bombers. The 7.3 K/9 was nice, but the 4.3 BB/9 is a tad bit high. His FIP with the Yankees was 4.16 and his tRA was 4.51. He pitched a little above his head ERA wise, but even a “market correction” should bring him up to only the low or mid fours. Gaudin is also pretty young, as he won’t turn 27 until mid-March. There could still be a bit of upside left for Gaudin.
Again, swingman Alfredo Aceves could see some starts. He only got one last year, and it did not go well, but there’s still always a possibility. His good control is definitely desirable out of any pitcher, especially one who could get an occasional spot-start. However, I don’t see “Ace” getting many–if any–starts in 2010. While he pitches well out of the bullpen, it seems that he doesn’t have the pure stuff to get through a lineup more than one time.
Ivan Nova is quite a long shot, but in terms of minor leaguers, he’s probably the closest to being able to get a start. He is, however, a long shot. Other long shots include Wilkin De La Rosa, Hector Noesi, and Andrew Brackman. I only mention these four because they are all on the 40-Man Roster. if Zach McAllister absolutely crushes AAA, I could see him being placed on the 40-Man mid-season, and perhaps getting a “show me” start in September.
All in all, I’m not super-confident in the Yankees’ pitching depth. Regardless, it’s unlikely that the Yankees will get starts from more than seven or eight guys. If they have to go farther, chances are the season may be in trouble. And while after the sixth or seventh guys the Yankees aren’t too strong, how many teams really are?
Yesterday, during the bottom half of the 11th inning and with the score tied, 4-4, Joe Girardi decided to replace David Robertson with Alfredo Aceves. Robertson had already retired both Juan Rivera and Kendry Morales, two of LA’s more dangerous hitters, and he seemed poised to dispose of the third batter, Howie Kendrick, who had already tripled and hit a homer run earlier in the game. However, Robertson would not get that chance, as Girardi—apparently influenced by something within his neatly organized blue binder of information—hurried to the mound in order to make a pitching change. Given a specific scouting report on Kendrick (or a series of reports), the Aceves-Kendrick pairing seemed like a more effective option to Girardi, despite Robertson’s stellar work out of the bullpen for the first two outs.
Of course, as we all know, Girardi’s decision to bring in Aceves ended up backfiring on both him and the Yankees. Kendrick quickly singled and then scored the winning run after the almighty Jeff Mathis hit a walk-off double out to left-center. The Rally Monkey strikes again. Now, while the game is certainly over, questions remain as to why Girardi chose Aceves over Robertson? What did he see in his blue binder that ultimately forced his hand? In order to better understand the decision, I turn to Frankie Piliere (Fanhouse), a former scout with the Texas Rangers. Here’s his take on the controversial call that many will argue cost the Yankees a commanding 3-0 lead in the ALCS.
The obvious question is what exactly was in that book? Well, let’s take it from the top. Robertson, a right-hander, throws a fastball at 91-94 mph with what scout’s like to a call late hop. He likes to change eye levels and gets swings and misses up with the fastball and down with his plus 12-6 curveball. He has back-end-of-the-’pen type stuff.
Aceves, on the other hand, has more of a starter’s approach, pitching to contact with a number of pitches to which he can turn. He has mostly been working at 89-91 with the fastball in recent outings, but what is concerning is the feel for his secondary pitches. In his playoff outings, his breaking balls have been elevated, often backing up on him over the plate.
So, what was Girardi’s line of thinking? He’s unlikely to read off his scouting report to the media, but it obviously came down to the advanced scouting. The Yankees have had fits with Howie Kendrick since he arrived in the big leagues, mainly because they just can’t seem to be able to get inside on him. With that in mind, it looked like with Aceves they were hoping to get him out away with soft stuff on pitches moving to the outside. Keep in mind that, just innings earlier, he had pounded a 96-mph fastball off of Joba Chamberlain for a triple.
Kendrick is a hitter that needs to be attacked with patterns and a mix of speeds. He pounds the fastball, and especially against New York, doesn’t seem to let many mistakes get by him. All three of his hits on Monday came off some kind of fastball — cutters from Pettitte and Aceves and straight heat from Chamberlain. Robertson tends to let the fastball ride high with his four-seamer, and with Kendrick’s approach it’s likely the Yankee manager sensed a repeat of his at-bat against Chamberlain.
These are all interesting insights that can be further examined. Essentially, according to Piliere, Girardi brought in Aceves because, as a former starter, he knows how to mix his pitches and change speeds, whereas Robertson is more of a fastball, curveball reliever that will try to sneak a high fastball by batters for a strikeout (along with the low curve). However, Kendrick does, indeed, love the fastball—pitch value data agrees—and he had already made an example out of Joba Chamberlain’s fastball during the 7th inning (and Joba’s pitch is considered more overpowering than Robertson’s). Therefore, approaching Kendrick with a different set of tools might have enticed Girardi. With Aceves’ repertoire featuring a fastball, cutter, curveball, and changeup, perhaps Girardi thought that this particular combination of pitches would prove more effective if located properly (i.e., away from Kendrick).
The pitch-by-pitch data (Gameday) seems to be in congruence with this notion, as Aceves threw Kendrick three 89-91 mph cutters to the outer edge of the zone in an attempt to induce a ground ball or soft fly. The cutters weren’t necessarily “soft stuff,” which works against Piliere’s theory, yet the location and the movement were away from Kendrick, rather than on the inner part of the plate (as Piliere suggested). Aceves could not perform effectively, though. His command was poor and Kendrick took advantage of a misplaced cutter that sat in the middle of the zone, sending it directly by Aceves’ outstretched glove for a clutch single.
This, then—the pitching style employed by Alfredo Aceves—explains why Girardi thought it best for Aceves, not Robertson, to face Kendrick (Robertson has a slider that he could have used, but he rarely ever throws it). At least now, with this information from Piliere and assuming that it’s somewhat accurate, there is a better understanding of what Girardi was attempting to do. Still, while his decision-making is made clearer given Piliere’s analysis, Piliere himself seems to believe that Girardi should have exercised better judgment when weighing a season’s worth of scouting reports comparing pitcher and hitter styles versus a reliever’s most recent performances.
Regardless of the scouting report favoring Aceves’ style against Kendrick, it’s questionable whether a scouting report should trump the consideration of recent performances. Robertson has been free and easy of late, getting through his fastball, getting to the outside corner on righties, and commanding his sharp breaking ball. Aceves has been quite the opposite, looking tentative in recent outings and appearing to push his breaking ball. Many will call out Girardi for relying on the scouting report rather than having a feel for how his current pitcher is looking and conversely how shaky Aceves has looked lately.
Bob Klapisch (The Record) offered a similar view late last night. “[N]o one ever said he was blessed with the gift of tuition,” noted Klapisch about Girardi. “Girardi instead lives safely within the margins, protecting himself with numbers. Managers who choose this path never have to believe their own eyes, which is why Girardi could ignore the fact that Robertson had dominated Juan Rivera and Kendry Morales for the first two outs in the 11th.” Both, Klapisch and Piliere are stating that Girardi failed to consider recent context—immediate context in this case—choosing, instead, to allow a lifeless scouting report to guide his final call. However, as with any analysis—let’s be clear, Girardi’s decision was an on-the-spot analysis—one should aim to use all manners of data present, whether they be quantitative (scouting reports) or qualitative (recent performance). For Girardi, he mistakenly chose only the former.
In the end, I think most of us would agree that Girardi made a bad decision. His strict adherence to a specific type of data likely hurt the team’s chances in Game 3. But, to be fair, that does not mean he is a bad manager. Furthermore, that also does not mean that the Yankee players, and their fans, should continue to dwell on the move, especially since the team’s offense was the main culprit for last night’s loss. Today is a new day and the Bombers still hold a 2-1 advantage in the series. With 4 games left to play before a winner is decided, that’s all that really matters.
Photo by Kevork Djansezian/Getty Images
In last night’s victory over Toronto, Alfredo Aceves notched his 10th win to move to 10-1. This led some fans over at RAB to suggest that this shows just how silly the win statistic is, a product of luck and being in the right place at the right time. I thought it would be instructive to look at the context for each of Alfredo’s wins.
May 16th, 6-4 W over Min.: Alfredo threw 1 perfect inning, the 11th inning of a tie game that the Yankees won on a two run homer by A-Rod.
May 17th, 3-2 W over Min.: Alfredo threw 1 perfect inning, the 10th inning of a tie game that the Yankees won on a homer by Johnny Damon.
May 21st, 7-4 W over Bal.: Alfredo threw 3.1 innings, and allowed 3 hits and a walk but no runs. He relieved Joba Chamberlain in the 1st due to injury, and held Baltimore scoreless while the Yankees put up 6 runs.
June 7th, 4-3 W over Tam.: He threw 2 innings of 1 hit ball. He entered in the 7th inning of a game the Yankees trailed 3-1, and held Tampa down while the offense did its comeback thing.
June 25th, 11-7 W @ Atl.: He allowed 3 baserunners and no runs over 2.1 innings. He entered an 8-6 slugfest in the 4th inning, and settled things down while carrying that score through the 6th.
July 20th, 2-1 W over Bal.: He entered a tie game in the 9th with a runner standing on 1st, and got two outs sandwiched around an intentional walk. The Yankees won the game on Matsui’s home run in the bottom of the inning.
Aug. 5th 8-4 W @ Tor.: He pitched two innings, allowing one run on a solo homer. He entered in the 5th inning of a game the Yankees trailed 3-2, and once again let the Yankees do their thing.
Aug. 19th 3-2 W @ Oak.: He went 2.1 innings, and allowed 2 runs on 4 hits. He entered in the 5th with the Yankees leading 3-0. This was a scorer’s decision, and a bit of a strange one.
Aug. 30th 8-3 W over Chi.: 3 innings of 2 hit ball. He entered in the 4th inning with the Yankees up 3-2 and pitched a stellar 3 innings before the Yankees pulled away.
Sep. 3rd 10-5 W over Tor.: He allowed 2 runs, one earned, in 2.1 innings. He entered when the Yankees had a 5-3 lead.
He allowed runs in 3 of his 10 victories, and never more than 2. He entered 4 tie games, 2 games the Yankees trailed, and just once entered with the Yankees leading by more than 2 runs. While all wins by relievers depend on manager usage and chance, I would suggest that Alfredo likely deserved a number of those victories. He has been a rock for this relief core, allowing Joe Girardi to pull an ineffective starter without destroying the bullpen, and I am glad he is being recognized on the stat sheet, even if the win is generally a silly statistic.
Here’s the video. RAB’s Mike Axisa recaps the Yankee highlights via MLBTR:
- Yankees GM Brian Cashman told Rosenthal that he was “very aggressive” going after pitching help, whether it be high-end starters, low-end starters, or relievers. “I was on all of it,” Cashman said.
- Cashman specifically targeted Jarrod Washburn, but the Mariners asked for top prospect Austin Jackson in return. The Yankees were also “one of several clubs” to inquire about Felix Hernandez.
- Rosenthal says Heath Bell was their primary target among relievers, as the idea was to make him the primary setup man for Mariano Rivera, and possibly put Phil Hughes or Alfredo Aceves back into the rotation.
A few reactions. First, kudos to Cash for passing on Washburn. He’s a nice pitcher who’s having a good season, but I don’t give up a top flight prospect like A-Jax for 2 months of him. Next, if Heath Bell was on the team, then even with as great as Hughes has been as the setup man, he would be expendable to be stretched out in the minors and join the rotation in September. But the trade didn’t happen so he’s not. This illustrates that the Yanks still view Hughes as a starter long term, and and their desire to make Aceves the 5th starter. But since a trade didn’t pan out, now they’ll be looking to make these things happen internally. The key(s) to this will be the performances of Brian Bruney, Mark Melancon and possibly Damaso Marte. If any of them assert themselves as reliable bullpen options on par with Aceves, look for his return to the rotation. That doesn’t mean Mitre is out, Aceves will likely be taking Joba’s place as he approaches his innings limits.
Finally, I’m amazed the Mariners are even listening to offers for King Felix at this point. He has only 4 years of service time, so the team still controls him for the next few seasons. But the fact that they even listened to offers signals their intent with him, and unless he signs a massive extension (doubtful) I’d expect him to be the focus of attention for next year’s trade deadline should the Mariners fall out of contention. He will draw an enormous trade package, and the biggest contract in Baseball history should he go free agent. 25 year old elite power pitchers just don’t hit the FA market, ever. He could garner 8-10 years at CC Sabathia money as a free agent. Depending on his health, he’s also a possible 300 game winner in an era where many sportswriters thought they’d never see one again.
BTW-Once again, NoMaas knocks it out of the park. Congrats to the Melkman, who made quite the delivery yesterday.
According to Bryan Hoch, Alfredo Aceves’ shoulder felt better today after a 20-pitch bullpen session.
In addition, from PA, we learn that Damaso Marte was throwing 88 mph meatballs last night (he gave up 2 homers). Marte has now given up 3 ER over 4 2/3 IP with Scranton. He usually throws around 92 mph, so maybe it’s just a bit of rust. However, as PA states, I don’t think the Yankees can count on him coming back anytime soon. His latest outing may force them to pursue another lefty via trade.
In the past, I have been very critical of writers for presenting opinions from anonymous scouts without providing us with the scout’s credentials. This is a tactic that allows a writer to spout off about whatever they so choose, as the following quote from Jayson Stark’s most recent column illustrates perfectly:
On Joba Chamberlain: “They’re waiting for him to become the next Josh Beckett, and it ain’t gonna happen. He just doesn’t have the power stuff Beckett has. He doesn’t have the delivery. He’s not the athlete Beckett is. And he doesn’t have the breaking stuff. If they ever get smart, they’ll put him back in the bullpen and let [Alfredo] Aceves be the [No.] 3-4 starter he ought to be.”
Firstly, advocating that Joba go back to the bullpen so Aceves can start is ridiculous. Aceves is excellent in the bullpen, and probably would be a 4 type starter, while Joba has ace potential. Whoever this scout is, he does not know much about maximizing value.
Secondly, I never understood why a guy as inconsistent as Beckett was the goal for Joba Chamberlain. Let’s hope he turns into Roger Clemens sans steroids. However, even playing along with the scout leads me to believe that the guy has not done his homework. In regard to stuff, Joba’s velocity is similar to Beckett’s at Joba’s age, and Joba utilizes more pitches than Beckett did at the time (Beckett was FB, CB, CH, while Joba is FB, SL, CB, CH). While Beckett is a bit more fit than Chamberlain, Joba has not heard real questions about his weight since college. Neither is a particularly great athlete, and both have adequate deliveries that they occasionally struggle to repeat. It is also important to note that this scout is comparing Joba to the veteran Beckett. Let’s take a look at the numbers from Beckett’s early years compared to Chamberlain’s. Remember that Josh was in the NL East, while Joba pitches in baseball’s toughest division, and that Chamberlain did spend some time in the bullpen.
Beckett through age 23 season:
273 IP, 239 H, 111 BB, 1.279 WHIP, 3.32 ERA, 125 ERA+, 7.9 H/9, .8 HR/9, 3.7 BB/9, 9.5 SO/9
Joba at this point:
227 IP, 201 H, 93 BB, 1.295 WHIP, 2.93 ERA, 151 ERA+, 8 H/9, .8 HR/9, 3.7 BB/9, 9.7 SO/9
When considering the league difference, Joba has had a better start to his career, as evidenced by his significantly higher ERA+. To state unequivocally that he has no chance of replicating Beckett’s career when he has the stuff and the results that suggest the contrary is incredibly bold and seemingly uninformed. I would love to hear an explanation. Alas, the opinion comes from an anonymous source, severely diminishing it’s value.
