11 wins to defend that title.
11 wins to once again reach the pinnacle of the baseball world.
Five down, six to go.
The march to championship #28 continues tonight.
Oct 222010
Oct 222010
Jon Heyman has the scoop:
The Yankees plan to bring back manager Joe Girardi at a raise, no matter what some fans may say about his reliance on his ever-present binder. He is well-liked by Yankees honchos Hal Steinbrenner, Randy Levine and Brian Cashman.
I really do not have much to add, as I have been screaming this from the rooftops since the rumors about him leaving surfaced. Everything Joe could want out of a managing job is available in New York, and the Cubs filling their opening removed any incentive he might have to go elsewhere. For the Yankees, I do not see a better option than Joe out there. He does a great job managing his roster, seems to respected in the clubhouse, and is adequate in terms of in-game strategy. The team has no reason to fiddle with something that works.
Oh, and I guess that Incarcerated Bob fellow who reported that Joe was toast is going to end up being wrong. How about that. Shocking.
Oct 222010
In my 2010 ALCS preview of Cliff Lee and Colby Lewis, I noted that Lewis is has a fairly typical arsenal of fastball, slider, curveball and changeup. We learned that he unsurprisingly takes a different approach against righties and lefties. Against righties he relies throws his fastball and slider almost exclusively:
To right-handed batters, Lewis uses his fastball around 53% of the time and then relies heavily on the slider, throwing it on 35% of the time. To right-handed batters, Lewis is throwing a fastball or a slider on almost 9 out of every 10 pitches. He mixes in the curveball (7.5%) and the changeup (4.3%) from time to time, but righties can expect a heavy diet of fastballs and sliders. Righties have had a very tough time with his slider in 2010, whiffing on it nearly a quarter of the time.
To lefties, however, Lewis preferred in 2010 to take a more diverse approach with his offspeed pitches:
With left-handed hitters Lewis takes a more varied approach. He still throws his fastball with frequency (60%), but throws his slider, curveball and changeup at nearly the same rate (14.3, 13.5 and 12.6, respectively). Lewis prefers to start batters out with his fastball. If he gets ahead 0-1 he still relies on his fastball but also introduces the curveball. At 0-2 he throws more offspeed stuff, relying on the fastball only 40%, throwing a slider 37% and a curveball 20%. Note the difference between lefties and righties. When up 0-2 on righties he’s big on the fastball and lighter on the slider. When up 0-2 on lefties he relies way more on the slider and the curveball.
In Game 2 of the ALCS, Hunter faced off against Phil Hughes and pitched fairly decently, going 5.2 innings and allowing 6 hits, two runs, three walks and six strikeouts. How did his approach match up with the scouting report?
Against right-handed pitchers Lewis was extremely predictable. The only two right-handed hitters in the lineup, Jeter and Rodriguez, saw a total of 15 pitches. Eight of these pitches were sliders, and the other seven were fastballs. Jeter went one for three off Lewis, striking out twice and getting an infield single off Lewis. Rodriguez was worse, going 0-3 with a flyout, groundout and popout. Lewis did exactly as advertised against the two of them, feeding them both fastballs and sliders and getting great results.
Against left-handed pitchers, Lewis relied a bit more on the curveball in Game 2 than he did in 2010. He threw 37 fastballs, 24 curveballs, 14 sliders and only 3 changeups. He commanded the fastball, curveball and slider well and got good swings and misses on the slider in particular. Both of the runs were caused by lefties. In the fourth inning, Cano doubled on an 88 mph fastball down in the zone. After Swisher struck out on a fastball and Posada on a slider, Berkman singled home Cano on a slider (and was promptly thrown out at second base). In the sixth inning Cano again hit Lewis hard, knocking a hanging slider into the upper deck in Arlington.
Lewis’ patterns are fairly clear at this point. Right-handed hitters can expect virtually nothing but sliders and fastballs. Even though this is predictable, it’s difficult because Lewis’ slider is a very good pitch and comes in only 4-5 mph slower than his high-80s, low-90s fastball. To lefties Lewis is slightly less predictable, mixing in a curveball and a slider to complement the fastball. The Yankees have now seen everything Lewis has to offer. Unfamiliarity is not an obstacle in Game 6. The question will be whether predictability translates into runs this time around.
Oct 222010
Yesterday while driving to work, I heard Michael Kay briefly talking about technology and Twitter and baseball and the like. I wasn’t listening very intently, but I did hear some ‘mother’s basement’ comment, so I’m glad I wasn’t that into what was being said. I wanted to take this opportunity to reflect on just how plugged in many of us are while watching a baseball game.
During a game, many things are going on around me. Most of the time, I’m plopped down on our couch downstairs, the TV a mere 10 feet away. My dad is on his chair to my right, the cat is walking around somewhere as is my mom, and this very laptop is on my lap or the coffee table in front of me. I usually have at least two windows open: Twitter and River Ave. Blues to follow the game thread. As the announcers make claims and spit out information, I open up Baseball Reference or FanGraphs to check their information. When there’s a questionable call on a pitch, I go to Brooks Baseball or MLB Gameday to see what Pitch FX thought of the pitch. If there’s another interesting game on, I either pull it up on Gameday or MLB.tv or switch to MLB Network for a second to see if they have an update. I cannot think of a better way–aside from spending a game at the park itself–to watch a game.
That I can keep up with 130+ people on Twitter who are watching the same game I am is just incredible to me. That number grows even more when including the people using the Game Threads on River Ave. Blues. Here we all are, hundreds of people, all enjoying the same exact game at the same exact time. It’s like being at a giant sports bar, but there’s no high priced alcohol or obnoxious smell. And the best part: most of the people I talk to will actually appreciate my snarky comments and my advanced statistics.
Above everything else, excepting access to a metric ton of information that was never so easily available, technology and its uses–such as this blog and others like it, along with Twitter–has helped you and me in the way intended: connections. Because of writing this blog, because of visiting other sites, because of Tweeting, I have gotten to “know” a lot of people that I never would have before. Yes, I use the term “know” lightly because chances are I’ll never meet most of the people I talk to on here, but that’s missing the point. As if we met at a bar or a party or through a mutual friend, we all come together at game time and discuss a common love: baseball and the Yankees.
Oct 222010
Photo courtesy of the New York Times
Frank Piliere of MLB fanhouse recently did a breakdown of what went wrong with Phil Hughes’ last outing in Texas and why. The Rangers are simply too good a fastball hitting team to rely too heavily on the pitch, and his inability to locate the curve and cutter had them sitting on #1. He writes:
The big issue, however, was that Hughes was unable to locate those pitches. On top of that, the fastball command he had against the Twins was also gone. Working at 93-94 mph with his short arm action, he still had more than enough to miss bats early. But, as the game rolled along the Rangers made the adjustment Hughes had to know they’d eventually make. They began to sit on the fastball early in the count as it was more than evident that Hughes had nothing else to offer them.
The fastball command — or lack of fastball command, in this case — was surprising compared to Hughes’ last outing, but what shouldn’t have come as much of surprise was his lack of feel for the secondary pitches. Looking back at that Division Series outing, Hughes did establish his curveball but never proved he could routinely locate it in any quadrant of the strike zone.
The Rangers’ lineup requires far more than simply showing them a secondary pitch. If you’re going to beat them, much like with the Yankees lineup, you need to locate at least one secondary pitch in the strike zone. Hughes never really came close to doing that in this one, but of course the question is why.
When it comes to his curveball, his command of it has been a recurring problem for Hughes despite his strong 2010 campaign. Sometimes he lacks the extension he needs and begins to push his pitches. You’ll see his fastball command suffer from that and you’ll also see a lot of bouncing curveballs. And, we saw quite a bit of that on Saturday afternoon.
The Rangers (like the Yanks) are simply too good against the fastball to rely too heavily on it. The Cutter is there to keep the lefty batters honest and maybe get a ground ball from a righty here and there. The key is the curveball, and his ability to throw it for strikes early in the count. Once ahead in the count he can expand the zone with the fastball/cutter and use the curve as a swing and miss pitch that he can bury out of the zone. But when behind in the count the hitters lay off the breaking balls and he has to go back to the fastball. That’s where the long layoff between the ALDS and ALCS likely hurt Phil. He couldn’t get the feel for the curve, and the Texas hitters just sat on his fastball early in the count and smacked him around.
But there’s a reason why Hughes had success facing the Rangers prior to his rough Game 2 outing. The Rangers should be a good match up for Phil. It’s an aggressive righty-heavy lineup and Hughes should do well against them. Check out his 2010 platoon splits from BR:
Split G PA AB R H 2B 3B HR SB CS BB SO SO/BB BA OBP SLG OPS TB GDP HBP SH SF IBB ROE BAbip tOPS+ sOPS+ vs RHB as RHP 31 343 320 37 81 15 1 8 0 0 19 69 3.63 .253 .292 .381 .674 122 6 0 1 3 1 0 .297 92 89 vs LHB as RHP 31 387 345 42 81 12 0 17 0 0 39 77 1.97 .235 .311 .417 .728 144 5 0 1 2 0 1 .253 107 93
His SO/BB rate is almost double facing righties than lefties, so when he’s on his game he should be mowing them down like he did in the 7 inning no-hitter from 2007. Staying on turn should help his command and feel for the breaking ball. But watch the curve, whether he’s bouncing it, locating it well and or getting strikes from the home plate umpire. That can be the difference between a dominating performance that sends the Yanks to Game 7, or another rough outing that will end their season.
