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Who Was Better, Nomar Or Derek?

Posted by Moshe Mandel at 7:00 pm 36 Responses »
Mar 102010

The news that Nomar Garciaparra retired this morning brought back an old argument that used to rage between Yankees and Red Sox fans: which club’s shortstop was better? In terms of career value, the obvious answer is Jeter, as he continues to play at a high level while Nomar is hanging up his spikes. The more interesting question is, which player was better during the time span from 1997-2004, when Nomar was manning shortstop for the Sox?

In terms of perception, the two players were fairly equal. Over the 8 year span, Jeter made 6 All-Star teams and finished in the top-10 in MVP voting 4 times, while adding one Gold Glove. Meanwhile, Nomar made 5 All-Star teams but finished in the top-10 in MVP voting 5 times. From what I recall, the perception was that Nomar was a slightly flashier offensive player, but that Jeter was close in that regard and was more dependable in the clutch and a greater winner.

In terms of statistics, however, Nomar was almost certainly the better player over the period, and likely would have been recognized as such if the current statistical revolution had occurred 5-10 years earlier. Let’s take a look at the WAR numbers on both players, courtesy of baseballprojection.com:

Derek Jeter:

Nomar Garciaparra:

Jeter was worth exactly 41 wins above replacement from 1997 through 2004. Nomar was worth 41.5 wins over the span, despite playing just 21 games in 2001 and 81 games in 2004 due to injury. That means that when he was on the field, Nomar provided more value than Jeter did, with Derek’s poor defense towards the end of the period really hurting his overall WAR. However, the first part of that sentence is the real caveat here. If Nomar Garciaparra had Derek’s durability, he likely would be remembered as the better player. However, his inability to stay healthy torpedoed that legacy, and renders the comparison moot. In the end, Nomar’s story is one that engenders a discussion of “what could have been.”

What do you think about the Jeter-Nomar debate?

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Explaining Mariano's contact rates from 2009

Posted by Chris H. at 3:00 pm 2 Responses »
Mar 102010

It is no secret that Mariano Rivera’s average velocity on both his four-seamer and his cutter was down last season. Now that he is a full year removed from shoulder surgery, an issue that seemed to hinder his arm strength for much of 2009 and cause, in part, the downturn in pitch speed, we have a reason to be optimistic about his velocity going forward. However, if his velocity remains in its current range, or falls further, there is reason to wonder about his effectiveness over the course of a new contract, which he will seek after entering free agency at the end of the year.

Some may decry the notion that Rivera’s loss in velocity impacted his year – he did pitch exceptionally well, as he usually does – but, believe it or not, Rivera’s minor decrease in pitch speed did manifest itself in his contact rates. In fact, Rivera had some of the higher contact rates in the American League a season ago. In the spirit of Alice in Wonderland, the following is a nice 3D bar chart – I love me some bar charts, man – that showcases this relationship.

Rivera’s career average velocities for his fastball (purple bar) and his cut-fastball (blue bar) are featured on the left (in mph) and, as you can see, in 2009, on the right, the two pitch speeds are down a few mph – 91.8 and 91.3 – in comparison. Conversely, but not coincidentally, the amount of contact hitters made on Rivera’s pitches outside of the zone, i.e., O-Contact% (green bar), and the amount of contact hitters made on Rivera’s pitches inside of the zone, i.e., Z-Contact% (red bar), both experienced significant increases – O-Swing of 73.2% and Z-Swing of 90.2% – when compared to the career numbers (O-Swing of 61.7% and Z-Swing of 85.9%). From this, it seems reasonable for one to then ponder a possible connection between Rivera’s downturn in velocity and his upswing in contact percentage. Essentially, when your pitches are not really as fast as they once were, there is more time for hitters to react to them.

This, of course, could relate to pitch movement, too, rather than just velocity. Rivera’s decrease in pitch speed was likely brought on by a lack of arm strength throughout the season, and this issue seemed to simultaneously lessen the movement on his fastball and cut-fastball. In 2009, according to pitch f/x, the vertical movement (up) on Rivera’s fastball was 4.83 inches and the horizontal movement (lateral, in right-handers) was 0.74 inches. Both numbers were well below average. For comparison, in 2008, Rivera’s fastball rose 7.52 inches and broke in on righties at 1.54 inches (below average but not like in 2009). That signals a significant loss of movement on the fastball which probably explains why Rivera rarely used it last season, throwing it only 7% of the time, according to FanGraphs.

The cutter, the pitch Rivera used 82% of the time last season, also experienced a loss of movement. In 2008, its vertical rise was 7.21 inches – slightly less than the average mark for that year – and its horizontal movement (in on lefties, away from righties) was 2.52 inches, a mark which was well above average. However, in 2009, its vertical rise was 6.22 inches and its vertical movement was 2.12 inches. The vertical movement was a bit below average, about an inch below, but the horizontal break was still VERY good, despite the stated loss in year-to-year movement.

This, then, the decrease in Rivera’s pitch velocity and movement explains the marked increase in his contact rates (I looked at command, too, but his BB/9 of 1.63 was still under his career mark of 2.11). The two negative trends were likely brought on by the shoulder surgery Rivera had last winter that impacted his arm strength, but I’m sure age had something to do with it, as well (to a smaller degree). Some may say, well, if his velocity and pitch movement was down, and his contact rates were up, why was he still so effective in 2009? That is a valid question, of course, and I think it is mainly because Rivera has done away with his fastball in order to use the cutter almost exclusively. Even with the lesser movement last season, the movement was still great, which says a lot about the pitch. More contact was made, a notion evidenced further by Rivera’s higher than usual line drive rate – 21.8% in 2009, up from his career mark of 16.8% – but his peripherals were still above average across the board. Rivera seemed to realize the lack of velocity issue and went with more movement instead, though the cutter had less movement than it did in the past.

As I said at the outset of this novel, if the decrease in velocity remains, or continues, it might cause some concern when Rivera enters free agency and is looking for another contract. Those concerns are understandable, as the velocity change would impact Rivera’s game, a point made by his contact rates in 2009. However, he has clearly adapted well to his current abilities, and remains as effective as ever. He’s a robot, with or without a 96 mph fastball.

Photo by Reuters

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Guest Post: Did the 2009 Yankees Produce the Greatest Infield (Plus Catcher) in MLB History? (UPDATED)

Posted by Moshe Mandel at 1:00 pm 20 Responses »
Mar 102010


This is a guest post from friend of the blog Jamal Granger. It is a meticulous piece of research and we are proud to be running it here at TYU.

Endless thanks to Eric Seidman of Baseball Prospectus, who devoted his valuable time to supplying with me with the essential data for this post, and introduced me to the wonders of SQL (though, as I begin to immerse myself, I question whether “thanks” is the appropriate term …).

The 1975 Cincinnati Reds were the topic of a recently published novel by celebrated sports journalist Joe Posnanski. In the book, titled The Machine: The Story of the 1975 Cincinnati Reds, Posnanski “… captures all of the passion and tension, drama and glory of this extraordinary team considered to be one of the greatest ever to take the field,” says Amazon.com; however, based on a recent discussion that Mike Francesa had with his listeners on his radio show – Mike’d Up – about the greatest infield-plus-catcher units in baseball history, I decided to take a statistical look at things and discovered how the ’75 Reds arguably boasted the greatest quintet of players to ever take the baseball diamond.

Using weighted Equivalent Average (EqA), total Equivalent Runs (EqR) and Rally’s Wins Above Replacement (WAR) data that dates as far back as 1969 for the former two, a likely indubitable argument can be made that Hall of Famers Johnny Bench, Joe Morgan, Tony Perez, and All-Stars Dave Concepcion and Pete Rose combined to not only lead their 20 teammates to a 108-win season and a World Series victory over the Boston Red Sox but, statistically, became the greatest infield-plus-catcher unit, or Diamond Unit,  in the past four decades.

While the aforementioned Reds squad may very well be the greatest Diamond Unit in the past forty years, arguments can be made for almost a handful of other teams. If you go by EqA, the 2009 Yankees are the best; EqR says that the 1974 Reds – with third basemen Dan Driessen replacing Pete Rose of the ’75 team – beats the bunch; Rally’s WAR has the ’75 version of The Big Red Machine as the alpha dog since 1969. While your opinions may vastly differ from mine, I say that the 1975 Reds are the top unit because WAR factors in all aspects of a player’s production – which is something that EqA and EqR do not.

By WAR, here is the leader board for the best Diamond Units since 1969:

The Year of the Green Wood Rabbit: The 1975 Cincinnati Reds – Morgan’s Magnificence

The 1975 Cincinnati Reds – led by a 12-win season by second basemen Joe Morgan – hit to the tune of a .305 EqA and 504.9 EqR, and produced a grand total of 29.4 WAR, a full three wins above the next closest quintet, the 1976 Reds. Morgan, posting career highs in batting average (.327), stolen bases (67, tied with his ’73 mark), on-base percentage (.466), weighted Runs Created (138.2) and wOBP (.463), was the near-unanimous winner for the first of consecutive NL MVP awards (Charlie Hustle stole two votes), and actually stole more bases (67) than he struck out (52). Also, not only did Morgan’s .360 EqA and 136.9 EqR pace the majors, the next closest qualifier (at least 300 plate appearances) for EqA was the Royals’ John Mayberry (.329).

Following Morgan’s stupefying campaign, Hall of Fame backstop Johnny Bench produced an astounding 6.5-win season, which, amazingly enough, is just the fourth-highest mark of his career. Bench, a MVP candidate in any other year (well, more on that later), did not produce any career-high marks but was part of a tremendous offensive trio of catchers that included Oakland’s Gene Tenace (.316 EqA and 107.4 EqR; why is he not in the Hall?) and St. Louis’s Ted Simmons (.311 and 106.4; another questionable HOF exclusion). Although Bench’s .308 EqA trailed both Tenace and Simmons for the lead amongst MLB catchers, he trailed only Joe Morgan for the team lead in what made a devastating two-three combo in Cincinnati’s lineup.

Pete Rose put up a .317/.406/.432 vital in 1975 and his 4.4-win season was just a stepping stone in a 12-year period from 1965-1976 that saw him produce at least four wins above replacement in every season but his 3.6-win campaign in 1970. Rose, known for his trademark hustle on the base paths, produce just two runs above replacement in that regard; and it makes you wonder: how much of that storied hustle actually helped his teams instead of just showing a lot of heart? Earning All-Star and Gold Glove (Total Zone had him as ten runs below replacement, but whatever) honors in 1975, Mr. Hustle was the lone National League player earn any first-place votes in the MVP race, as teammate Joe Morgan deservedly ran away with the title.

In terms of his non-offensive production, Dave Concepcion was a stalwart – his base running and defense made him produce to a level approaching that of a league-average player (17 RAR). However, Concepcion came to the plate 762 times in 1975, and as his .257 EqA and 64.5 EqR will tell you, he was a below-average hitter in every sense of the term. The beauty of analysis is that everything is relative, and in Concepcion’s case, he was among a group of shortstops (Larry Bowa of the Phillies; Bert Campaneris of the Athletics; Chris Speier of the Giants) that could lay claim to being the best offensive performers of that position in the non-Toby Harrah (.398 wOBA) division.

After enjoying a six-year stretch from 1968-1973 in which his WAR ranged from 4.2 to 6.7, Tony Perez’s 1975 campaign saw him deliver a 3.1-win campaign as the weakest link of the Machine’s Diamond Unit. Although this was in the midst of quite a prolonged decline phase, Perez’s 83.7 EqR and .288 EqA placed him in the top 33 percentile in an environment that saw the Royals’ Mayberry pace the field with a .329 EqA, 124.9 EqR and a robust .427 wOBA. Continue reading »

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The Dear Departed, Part Two

Posted by Matt Imbrogno at 11:00 am No Responses »
Mar 102010

Brian Cashman

Yesterday, I looked at some of Brian Cashman’s recent trades, specifically what he and the Yankees gave up and whether or not those players would really make a difference. I ended the post with the Brian Bruney trade and now I’m going to start this on with the more major trades of the offseason. Instead of going deal by deal, like I did last night, I’m going to go player by player for today’s post.

Starting with the guy who had the biggest impact on the Major League team, we have outfielder Melky Cabrera, who was shipped to Atlanta in the Javier Vazquez deal. Melky was a nice player, especially on a team like the Yankees. He could play all outfield positions competently–at the very least–and could put up league average numbers at the plate. His switch hitting was also a nice touch. Losing Melky, though, is not the worst thing in the world for the Yankees. In fact, it’s really not a bad thing. Despite his useful skill-set, he is an easily replaceable player. One could, and will/should, argue that the Yankees have already replaced Melky with Randy Winn. Melky’s still young and could develop further, but after over 2000 plate appearances with the Yankees, the only consistent thing from Melky was inconsistency. I wish Melky luck in the National League, but I do not think I will miss him terribly.

Moving to the next Major League player traded, we come to Phil Coke, who went to Detroit in the Granderson deal. He seems like a decent enough guy, and maybe he could develop into something more than he is now, but that’s unlikely. He doesn’t have the pitches to start and his tendency to give up the gopher ball sets him back. In 2010, he would’ve been the second lefty out of the bullpen and his role would likely have been diminished. Guys like Coke are not very hard to find on the open market and we may not notice his departure all that much.

Mike Dunn, another LHP, is kind of in the same category as Coke. He’ll never be a starter, but he does have a tick more upside than Coke, simply because Dunn throws harder. He still has control issues that need to be worked out as well. Dunn’s role on the 2010 Yankees was also in question at the time of his trade. Despite Coke being traded, Dunn was still likely to be only the second lefty out of the bullpen. Again, this is a small role and it will not likely be missed.

Ian Kennedy is another player whose role on the 2010 Yankees would’ve been rather unclarified and muddy. He wouldn’t have had the innings built up to be a starter and likely would’ve been either SP depth in Scranton or a long man in the bullpen. However, the latter role is already crowded. I’m definitely going to miss Ian, though, and of all the players the Yankees traded away in 2010, he’s the one for whom I’m going to root hardest. I feel like he never got a fair shot from the fans and hopefully, he can re-turn some heads in the desert.

Now, we come to the prospects: Austin Jackson and Arodys Vizcaino. In terms of the short term, trading away these two does not do much to harm the Yankees. After all, Jackson needed at least another half a season in Scranton and Viz hasn’t yet pitched in a full season league. Long term, though, it hurts the system a bit. The Yankees are pretty short on position player talent and Jackson fits that bill. Vizcaino is a young, high upside arm and those are always nice to have. These are probably the two biggest losses of the offseason, but like every coin, these have a flip side.

Starting with Jackson, we have a player whose star has lost a bit of its shine as he moves through the minor league ranks. Ajax’s power still hasn’t quite come around and there are still questions about his plate discipline. Maybe I’m being too bearish on Jackson, but I have a feeling that he’ll become nothing more than a solid regular in his career. Now, that’s not a bad thing and it’s obviously something the Yankees would’ve wanted. However, over the next four years, I highly doubt that Austin Jackson the Tiger will be better than Curtis Granderson the Yankee.

Vizcaino is the biggest loss of the offseason. He has the most upside of the players traded and has had great results thus far. But, like I’ve repeated ad nauseum, he’s never pitched in a full season league. That definitely counts against him. There are also pitchers in front of him: Zach McAllister, Manny Banuelos, Ivan Nova, for example.

For what it’s worth, here’s my rankings of these players traded away in terms of impact:

1. A-Viz: High upside arm, but a long way off.
2. Ajax: Medium upside bat, needed more time.
3. Melky: Useful player, but easily replaceable.
4. IPK: Good SP depth, uncertain role.
5. Dunn: Some upside, but likely a LOOGY at the end of the day.
6. Coke: Dunn with a smaller upside.

All in all, Brian Cashman has not given up very much over the last year and a half or so in terms of trades. It’s also wroth discussing what he’s brought in. In guys like Hinske and Hairston, he brought in role players who helped complete a championship team. In Nick Swisher, he bought low on a very solid player, and the same could be said for Curtis Granderson. While losing Austin Jackson was not desirable, the package Detroit took for a solid player like Granderson was one the Yankees had to send off, and the same goes for the deal with Atlanta. We all hate to see young players go, but it’s a part of the game. Brain Cashman has done a good job of trading the right people for the right parts and is one of the finest trading general managers in baseball.

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