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Joel Sherman reported this morning that Randy Winn’s 900K in contract incentives are predicated upon hitting certain amounts of at-bats against left handed pitching. Eariler today, Rob Abruzzese explained the reasoning behind the highly unusual contract, and clarified how the Marcus Thames deal figures into the equation:

This is where Marcus Thames comes in. Thames signed a one-year minor league deal for $900,000 – the exact same amount as Winn’s incentives. Coincidence? Maybe not. I’m starting to believe that the Yankees will use spring training to see exactly what they have in Jamie Hoffmann, Winn, and Thames.

If they like Winn against lefties and plan on using him in a way where he’ll reach all of his incentives, they could then send Thames down or release him and stick with Hoffmann. That way they’re paying off only $2 million plus the major league minimum for Hoffmann. Or if Winn isn’t overly impressive, they keep him as a defensive caddy and stick with Thames and they’re still paying out the same $2 million.

Either way, they’re only paying $2 million if Winn hits lefties.

This is an extremely creative contract, and I think Rob is spot on in explaining what the Yankees were thinking with all of these moves. This should make for an interesting spring training, as two veteran players in Winn and Thames will be fighting over the same 900,000 dollars. I would prefer to have Thames on the bench as a power bat than have Winn and Hoffmann both on the team, because the latter two have redundant skills. Carrying Thames and Winn provides a more diverse bench for Joe Girardi to utilize.

Speaking of Girardi, Brian Cashman discussed the Yankees’ 3 major 2011 free agents this morning, with Girardi being one of them:

When Brian Cashman looks at Derek Jeter, Mariano Rivera and Joe Girardi, the Yankees’ GM paints his shortstop, closer and manager with the same brush.
And with spring training opening next week in Tampa, Cashman has no plans to stray from his plan of not negotiating with them. All three contracts are in the final year.
“I don’t think you can separate one from the other,” Cashman explained. “I am not saying they are the same, but the questions will come, ‘If you did one, why didn’t you do the other?’ If this was Kansas City, it would be different — but it’s not.”

I wish they would sign these three in the near future, simply because every three game losing streak by the team or poor performance by Rivera and Jeter will cause these unsettled contract situations to be dredged up by the media. However, the club has long had a policy of not negotiating with players until their contracts have expired, such that it is unlikely that any of three will feel like he is being disrespected or treated unfairly. Hopefully, all three have good seasons and next fall’s negotiations are amicable, and we can all avoid an excruciating media frenzy.

NOTE – This was written just prior to the Thames signing, but it still works to support the addition.

The following is an excerpt from a recent ESPN article by Mathew Carruth titled “The Perils of Pinch-Hitting.”

In 2009, major league pinch-hitters hit a combined .225/.315/.353, significantly worse than their starting counterparts, who hit .264/.334/.421. That’s not a one-year fluke or a recent development, either. In 1990, guys coming off the bench hit .224/.302/.316. In 1970, they hit .226/.313/.323. Way back in 1954, their performance was a pitiful .220/.315/.323. It’s not just that the average pinch-hitter is worse than a starter, but instead, there is evidence that pinch-hitting is just really difficult. Matt Holliday has a career .552 OPS as a pinch hitter compared to a .933 mark when he starts. Joe Mauer has a .693 OPS off the bench. Even Derek Jeter is hitless in his five attempts.

Baseball consultant Tom Tango, now in the employ of the Seattle Mariners and Toronto Blue Jays, went through historical pinch-hitting situations in his book (appropriately titled “The Book”) and found that, even after accounting for the average pinch-hitter being of lesser ability and facing tougher pitchers in more important situations, pinch-hitters performed at a level roughly 10 percent lower than expected. That’s huge; a 10 percent penalty turns a .300 hitter into a .270 one. That reduction in performance would turn Evan Longoria into Skip Schumaker…

What makes pinch-hitting so hard? Repetition and routine are common agents to help calm nerves. It’s why you’ll see some ridiculous things in the batter’s box, such as Nomar Garciaparra’s infamous batting glove routine. It’s why coaches in golf stress pre-shot routines, and for every disturbance to mean a complete do-over of that routine. It’s why any athlete anywhere spends countless hours practicing. They are attempting to train their muscle memory and to develop grooves in the brain that focus on the specific task at hand and let them forget about anything else.

Pinch-hitters do not get the benefit of routine. Unlike relievers who first get to warm up in the bullpen, then warm up on the mound, and who dictate the action in the first place, pinch-hitting opportunities tend to spring up with less warning. At best, a player on the bench might get a heads-up in time to go into the cage and take a few hacks, but for the most part, he gets thrust right onto center stage sans warm up. That’s not a recipe for success, and the evidence suggests that even the best hitters in the world struggle to succeed in that situation.

Carruth’s article outlines the inherent problems with pinch-hitting as a practice, and makes an effective case for not even “wasting” a roster spot on such a hitter. Many would argue that, for the Yankees, who are in search of a right-handed bench bat, Carruth’s premise can be applied. Why sign Jonny Gomes to be a right-handed bench bat when he is likely to be an ineffective pinch-hitter? It is not his fault, rather, it is a result of the role. This is mainly why many fans wanted the Yankees to sign Reed Johnson, because, even if he struggles as a pinch-hitter (and his opportunities to pinch-hit would be rare), he has defensive value beyond that finite role. The same can be said for Rocco Baldelli.

For the Yankees, however, any right-handed bench bat they sign – not just Baldelli – to a minor-league deal will have significant value beyond that of a pinch-hitter. This is primarily due to Nick Johnson. Though Johnson’s fragile body will be protected by his position as the team’s designated hitter, if he is injured at some point this season, which is a genuine possibility, the fifth outfielder, as a result – whether it is Jonny Gomes, Rocco Baldelli, Marcus Thames, or possibly Gary Sheffield – will receive a lot more playing time (along with Randy Winn). Therefore, the Yankees are not just adding a pinch-hitter by signing a right-handed bench bat, they are injecting much needed depth into the team.

Furthermore, any right-handed bat the Yankees sign could be used, on occasion, to platoon with Brett Gardner. This, then, increases the value of such a player. With this in mind, because of his defensive prowess, Baldelli seems like a better option. Conversely, when you also consider his health concerns in conjunction with Nick Johnson’s – if Johnson is out for an extended period of time, can you trust Baldelli to remain healthy – then Gomes or Thames might seem like better options, despite their defensive limitations. This is the a give-and-take that must be adequately negotiated.

In the end, the Yankees, as I see it, still need a right-handed bench bat, however, they do not need him only as a pinch-hitter, for as Carruth points out, pinch-hitting is not necessarily a successful practice (especially when you consider the talent on the Yankees). The Yankees, instead, need a right-handed bat to spell Brett Gardner and even Curtis Granderson, now and then, and to provide solid offensive depth in the event of an injury to a starter such as Nick Johnson. This, then, is the ultimate value of bringing an extra right-handed bat on board for the 2010 season.

Photo by Ronald Martinez/Getty Images

Recently, ESPN’s Jim Caple penned a fairly questionable piece in which he labeled the run the “most neglected, underrated stat in baseball.” Caple’s argument was, essentially, that runs are the most important factor in actual games and that all other stats basically “reveal how well a player performs in areas that ultimately produce runs.” Therefore, the run – not WAR, OPS, etc. – is, according to Caple, the most telling number in terms of tangible offensive value.

Caple, of course, fails to realize and outline the manner in which lineup context, in particular, as opposed to individual production, can ultimately influence run totals. For example, Jimmy Rollins, who served as Philadelphia’s lead-off hitter in 145 games last season, scored 100 runs – more than players such as Matt Kemp, Justin Upton, Kevin Youkilis, Joey Votto, Adrian Gonzalez, Pablo Sandoval, etc. – despite hitting just .250/.296/.423. Clearly, hitting in front of Ryan Howard, Chase Utley and Jayson Werth had more to do with Rollins’ 100-run season than anything he did on his own. Thus, the argument Caple puts forth is not a very convincing one, and, at its core, is just highly unreasonable.

If run totals actually mattered with regards to player production – they are not meaningless, rather, they are incidental – then perhaps former Yankee and current free agent outfielder, Johnny Damon, would have found a new organization to call home by now. In late-October, Scott Boras talked up his soon-to-be free agent client by alluding to his run totals, as Damon has scored 410 runs while with the Yankees since 2006. However, as we have seen since then, calling upon a strict counting stat, such as runs, in order to illustrate a player’s overall value is a losing argument. Club officials and team executives presumably know this and have chosen to evaluate players through the examination of other forms of more nuanced data. Scott Boras, on the other hand, has learned this the hard way, as he has yet to pick up the pieces and find an effective selling point/message for Damon since his initial run-based argument.

In the end, although stats like home runs, rbis, runs, stolen bases, and so on and so forth are much easier to obtain and comprehend than some of the newer statistics available, that does not mean that they are the most accurate measures of a player’s worth. Understanding and assessing value in any realm, including baseball, is a complex affair. Therefore, while Jim Caple might disagree, complex explanations are often needed to address complex issues.

Photo by Jim Rogash/Getty Images

Really, I love Jamie Hoffman. As a lifelong fan of the minor league baseball, I was pretty excited to see the Yankees get a relatively unimportant 1st overall Rule V pick following the Brian Bruney trade. The Yankees have had only one Rule V pick that I can think of make their roster, and that was Josh Phelps. Hoffman has some talents – a decent Triple-A batting history and strong defensive play. That said, Marcus Thames is far and away the better player, and barring a massive Thames setback in spring training, should make the roster over Jamie Hoffman.

Matt has already taken a look at what Thames could potentially produce. I won’t rehash that here. I think the following qualitative statements are clear: Marcus Thames is a significantly worse defensive player while being a significantly better hitter against left-handed pitching, while fairing poorly against right-handed pitching. Given the current makeup of the Yankee bench / left field situation, I think that is enough to no-doubt place Thames over Hoffman.

Brett Gardner is the incumbent starting left fielder (or center fielder). He is a very strong fielder and fairly light hitter. Randy Winn is also guaranteed a bench spot, with the other non-catcher bench slot going to a light-hitting utility man like Ramiro Pena. Winn struggled against left-handed pitching last season while playing characteristically strong defense. The current makeup calls for a right-handed hitter who can play outfield to fill in the space between Winn and Gardner.

Jamie Hoffman has good career numbers against lefties in the minor. They aren’t Thames-like, but they are pretty good. He also plays defense pretty well. However, Randy Winn plays defense just as well, and hits better. Marcus Thames hits lefties better. Randy Winn fulfills the defensive / right-handed pitching niche, so any defensive ability that Hoffman has is less important. Therefore, the best left-handed batter for the most part should be given the spot, which is Marcus Thames.

Having a strong batter-LOOGY who can play the corners and 1b gives the Yankees a lot of options:

  • Pinch hit for Curtis Granderson, Robinson Cano, Francisco Cervelli, Ramiro Pena, Brett Gardner, Randy Winn
  • Start for Brett Gardner vs. LHP
  • Start for Nick Swisher (injury/rest)
  • Start for Mark Teixeira (injury/rest)

Jamie Hoffman, with Winn on the roster, gives them the following options:

  • Pinch hit for Francisco Cervelli, Ramiro Pena, and Brett Gardner, and maybe Randy Winn
  • Start for Brett Gardner vs. LHP
  • Start for Curtis Granderson vs. LHP
  • Second-tier starting if Randy Winn starts for someone, or is injured

Those are a lot fewer options. Basically, he’s not good enough to take the spotlight away from Cano or Granderson. And Winn is a better option to start for Swisher or Granderson. And to top it off, Thames can play 1st base, where only Nick Swisher serves as a backup.

Unless Thames shows up to camp fat, Jamie Hoffman should find himself an apartment back in Las Vegas.

Feb 092010

Yesterday, the Yankees signed Marcus Thames as a non-roster invitee for Spring Training. Thames stands to make $900K if he makes the Yankees’ Major League Roster. Before getting into the numbers, let’s run down what the scenario would have to be for Thames to make the team.

Basically, the Yankees would have to be very unimpressed with Jamie Hoffmann for Thames to get the last outfield bench spot that Hoffmann currently occupies. Spring Training is going to be a small and unreliable sample size, no doubt, but the Yankees can at least get a look at Jamie and what he could bring to the team. For the purposes of this article, we’ll assume Hoffmann is not on the Opening Day roster. If that happens, he either has to be returned to the Dodgers, per the rules of the Rule V Draft, or a trade could be worked out so that the Yankees could keep his rights and send him to AAA to get a little more seasoning. So, putting Marcus (back) on the Yankees, what can we expect? Let’s take a look, using the same method as my previous posts on Jorge, Curtis, Brett, and Joba.

Remember, these numbers are his projected totals and they’re not broken down by splits. If on the Yankees, Thames will likely be used only as a PH or for facing tough left handed pitching that Brett Gardner (or Curtis Granderson) may be unable to handle. Against lefties in his career, Thames sports a .360 wOBA and a .260 IsoP (thank you FanGraphs splits…seriously, how awesome is that site?); he hits lefties well. Very well. On with the projection:

The average projection for Thames is pretty funky looking. The average is low at .245, as is the OBP, coming in at .306. However, his average projected slugging percentage is a hefty .503. That means an IsoP of .258, which is just fantastic. Marcus projects to hit 20 homers in 306 ABs, which would be one every 15.3 ABs. Again, these are numbers Thames is projected to put up IF he makes the Yankees and they do not take his platoon split into account. If Thames is limited to just facing lefties, with the occasional right hander thrown in there, I’d expect him to out-hit that projection and possibly be more productive despite coming to the plate fewer times than a full time player.

I’m not in love with this deal, I would prefer someone more well-rounded than Thames, but in reality, it’s hard to dislike this deal. It’s not guaranteed and it could add some pop to the bench that is seriously lacking right now. Good luck to Marcus in camp (that’s thankfully coming soon).

Assume you’re Brian Cashman for a minute. You’ve filled your 40 man roster by this point with plenty of able candidates to assume various roles. You know that you’ll carry your 5-man starting rotation, starting positional 9, a backup Catcher, backup infielder and a 4th Outfielder. Most of your bullpen is set with Mo, either Joba/Hughes, Marte, D-Rob, Aceves and a long man in Gaudin. On a team like the Yanks, most of the roster spots are set before Spring Training even begins. So now you’re now getting down to those last few spots on the roster. You have a choice between another arm in the bullpen (mop-up man or 2nd Lefty) or a platoon hitter who will be your last man on the bench. Which way do you go?

Dave Cameron from Fangraphs recently took on this age-old debate in his usual thorough, comprehensive way. He writes:

Because of the ever increasing size of bullpens, these types of hitting specialists have fallen out of favor. The meager salaries that these guys have had to accept highlights the lack of value that teams are now placing on platoons. With only 13 of 25 roster spots dedicated to position players on most teams, it is becoming far more difficult for teams to accommodate left-right platoons and still have the necessary reserves for their starters in case of injury.

Is that a wise use of roster allocation? I’m honestly not sure. I know there’s been a backlash against the ever increasing bullpen sizes among the sabermetric community, but I haven’t seen much in the way of evidence that specializing your bench is more efficient than specializing your bullpen.

Yes, the 12th pitcher on any given team is usually not very good, often producing at a near replacement level. Even if they pitch decently, the leverage of the innings they are given is usually so low that their overall value is quite low. So a straight comparison between value of platoon guy versus value of the 12th reliever will naturally lead one to conclude that teams would be better off with a larger bench and smaller bullpen.

First, I doubt there is any one answer that will be a rule of thumb for these situations. My answer has always been “It depends on the two players” being considered and the construction of the rest of the roster. If you have a useful bat (even one with stark platoon splits if it complements an area of need elsewhere) with a serviceable glove, it could very well make sense. However, if you have an injury prone or youthful rotation that you don’t figure to get many innings out of, I’ll take the extra pitcher. Put another way, the 2008 Yankees needed the extra arm. The 2010 Yanks could use the extra bat.

A 2nd lefty in the bullpen sounds enticing in the abstract, but would barely get any work on this team and would most likely be Boone Logan, who doesn’t excite me. Further, Dave Robertson has always had a reverse platoon split throughout his professional career at every level. The Yanks figure to get loads of length out of their top 4 in the rotation. CC, Vasquez and Pettitte have been workhorses throughout their MLB careers and AJ Burnett has been durable of late, pitching 200+ innings each of the past 2 seasons. Even Joba will finally have his rules lifted this season, so if he wins the 5th spot in Spring Training and everyone stays reasonably healthy, you could see an inordinate amount of innings get chewed up by the Yankee starting 5. In this scenario, D-Rob and Aceves could be scrounging for work, much less a Mark Melancon type. Chad Gaudin would have to wait for injury or a blowout to get in a game. An 11th or 12th pitcher figures to get very few opportunities  to get in games and if those last two pitchers get any work at all, it figures to be of the very low-leverage variety as Dave Cameron stated above.

However, that last bat on the bench could be a real specialist. If they have someone coming off the bench who kills Lefties, then he could be brought in for late-inning, game changing situations. A potent bat off the bench can force an opposing manager to dig a bit deeper into his bullpen, and we all know how thin and top-heavy most MLB bullpens are. Unlike the 12th pitcher previously discussed, this would be VERY high-leverage work. The type you’d like to give a veteran slugger who’s no longer and everyday player. The late 90′s championship teams had players like Darryl Strawberry and Chili Davis filling this role, to great success.  I’ve previously advocated for Gary Sheffield to fill this role, and I’d still love to see it happen. He’s still enough of a power threat to make managers go Righty-Righty with him, and the fact of the matter is he’s always handled Righthanders well throughout his career. Even last year at age 40 he didn’t display much of a platoon split. With the Yanks having two players in Gardner and Granderson who figure to have trouble with Lefties, you can see plenty of late opportunities for Gary to come in and hopefully break a game open.

In summary, to me it’s all about filling the high-leverage need vs the low leverage. I don’t care who pitches in blowouts, were almost certain to lose those games anyway. Now that I’ve weighed in on this, it’s your turn. In building this roster, would you rather have an extra arm in the bullpen (as most teams do these days) or a pinch hitter you can use late in games?

SPECIAL NOTE: My buddy JMK from RAB has a new blog he’s doing called Mystique and Arua. If NoMaas and The Onion had a baby, it would look something like this. Check it out.

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