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Jan 222010

According to Newsday’s Ken Davidoff, the Yankees “went after [John] Smoltz hard before they acquired Javier Vazquez.” Given the lack of solid options available on the current free agent market, Smoltz, 42, would have been a nice pickup had the Yankees not acquired Vazquez. I would rather have his low-cost upside – 8.42 K/9, 4.06 K/BB, 3.87 FIP last season – than, say, Joel Pineiro at two-years and $16 million. Plus, by adding Smoltz, the Yankees probably would have signed Johnny Damon by now (though I wonder what would have happened to Melky/Gardner). So, while Vazquez is a much better option, signing Smoltz would not have been a bad move, all things considered.

Photo by Ronald Martinez/Getty Images

Jan 222010

The Yankees have reportedly contacted the returning Jim Edmonds about a possible stint in the Bronx.

From Rob Raines of the St. Louis Globe-Democrat (h/t to MLBTR):

While Edmonds said in a radio interview on 1380 AM in St. Louis Thursday that he wants to play for the Cardinals, he also revealed that within the first couple of days of the word getting out that he wanted to play in 2010, his agent had heard from three or four other clubs, including the New York Yankees.


Edmonds does believe the Yankees are serious in their interest. They have an opening for an everyday left fielder. “That’s a pretty nice situation over there,” he said. “It’s going to be a tough scenario.”

Edmonds, a career .284/.377/.528 hitter with 382 home runs to his name, was once a great player, however, at 39, those days appear to be gone (he did manage to post a 134 OPS+ while in Chicago in ’08, although that was as a platoon player). He would be an inexpensive addition to say the least, so it can’t hurt to offer him a no-risk contract, but I don’t really see the interest beyond that. If he were a right-handed hitter it might make more sense for the Yankees.

Photo by Jonathan Daniel/Getty Images

A Mauer Musing

Posted by Chris H. at 3:00 pm 14 Responses »
Jan 222010

From Jeff Passan of Yahoo! Sports:

Two winters ago, Mark Teixeira, the top free agent on the market, listened to Baltimore’s offer and scoffed at it. He ended up signing with the New York Yankees for $180 million, and Baltimore, as usual, played second fiddle..

“We were legit on Teixeira,” MacPhail said. “If you superimposed him on our lineup now, 28, with great work habits, played a position where you could expect him to perform over a long-term deal, local kid. He really would be somebody you could go out for. But if you’re wrong …”

Now, this post is not about the blossoming Orioles, nor is it about Mark Teixeira’s perfectly understandable decision to join the Yankees on an 8-year contract. Instead, Andy MacPhail’s comment, that Teixeira “played a position where you could expect him to perform over a long-term deal,” is what interests me the most for this particular post.

This year, the Yankees were unwilling to spend big dollars on arguably the best and most complete corner outfielder in baseball, Matt Holliday. The Yankees’ decision, it seems, was driven by the fact that Holliday was a left fielder and, while he is possibly the best left fielder in the game, there are still a number of players that can man the position at a much lower cost and many of them would do so admirably. However, in addition to that, providing a long-term contract to a left fielder, or to any outfielder, really, can be a dangerous proposition. As we have seen with Hideki Matsui throughout the course of his 4-year deal which ended this year – whether we are discussing his knees or his gruesome wrist injury from 2006 – health concerns can arise and may severely limit an outfielder’s overall value and production. Outfielders are constantly on the move, sprinting relatively long distances in the outfield, diving and making abrupt stops. Therefore, placing a $100 million dollar investment in the outfield can ultimately prove to be a parlous decision, especially when one considers the steady stream of corner OFs available on a year-to-year basis.

This is why – or, I should say, this is partially why – the Yankees chose to sign Mark Teixeira a year ago rather than Matt Holliday now. The Yankees felt a certain level of comfort investing $180 million in Teixeira because he is not a corner outfielder. They know that the wear and tear a player’s body experiences at first base is generally not as damaging as the daily outfield grind. Teixeira, then, can be expected to perform at his position for an 8-year period.

This, though, brings me to another position, one which is even more physically demanding than the role of any outfielder, and that is the catcher’s position. Given the way that Jorge Posada’s two-year tenure has played out since resigning with the Yankees after his stellar 2007 campaign, it is clear that while catcher investments with players worthy of investment can be extremely rewarding, they are are, from a contractual/financial perspective, also extremely dangerous. When one considers MacPhail’s statement about manning a position where a player can be expected to perform over the life of a long-term deal, catchers are understandably absent from that conversation.

For this reason, assuming he doesn’t sign an extension and enters free agency after the 2010 season, I wonder what will happen with Minnesota’s Joe Mauer. While he is certainly deserving of a deal like Teixeira’s (and will probably receive one similar to it), Mauer’s position is both a gift and a curse in that the superior production he provides behind the plate is why he will receive a huge deal, however, the position itself also forces teams to question investing in him on a long-term basis. On top of that, Mauer’s medical history is hardly clean, which adds to the concern of providing him a seven or eight year contract. If he becomes a free agent, the Yankees will definitely go after him – that is a foregone conclusion – though, I wonder if they will be or perhaps should be hesitant to sign the young MVP given the investment’s many inherent red flags (after a few years, Mauer could switch positions in order to preserve his body, although such an idea diminishes his value). After all, such was the case with Holliday. Of course, Mauer is different from Holliday in that his overall production is better (and is more proven in the American League) and such production at catcher – a premium, up-the-middle position – is essentially impossible to find elsewhere.

In the end, it may all come down to risk versus reward. Regardless of what I have written here pertaining to potentially perilous positional investments, the rewards Joe Mauer can provide (offensively, defensively, personality-wise) are likely too great to pass up. With the Yankees’ catcher contract track record in mind – they gave Posada a 4-year deal worth $52.4 million when he was 36-years old – and if given an opportunity to pursue him as a free agent, I believe the Yankees would eventually deem the risk and uncertainty of a long-term deal for a 28-year old catcher of Mauer’s abilities as both secondary and worthwhile given the possible benefits involved. He may not play a position where “you could expect him to perform over a long-term deal,” however, that is ultimately why he is so valuable, right?

Photo by Jim McIsaac/Getty Images

We know the Yankees have a potent offense. Just last week, ESPN’s Keith Law said that the Yankees offense would be fine, even if they put a wooden stick in left field. Some fans believe that Brett Gardner’s offense will amount to little more than a wooden stick’s offense would. I’m not that low on Gardner, but I’m also not terribly high. So long as he can maintain an on base percentage of about .340-.350, I’ll be happy–especially if his defense stays strong…but I digress.

Using the Lineup Analysis tool from Baseball Musings, let’s try to predict how many runs the Yankees could score this season. I’ve run this simulation before during this offseason, back when I was at BBD. However, since time’s passed, and the lineup is pretty set, it seems appropriate to once again run this simulation.

Now, before we get fully started, I’ll say that it’s unlikely that the Yankees actually use the lineups put forth by this analysis. Some of them will have names in spots in which we’re not used to seeing them. The difference, though, between an “optimized” lineup and a non-optimized lineup is not that great. I’ll give the results best run scoring lineup, the worst run scoring lineup, the average, and the one that most closely resembles the lineup I think the Yankees will roll with, which is:

Jeter
Johnson
Teixeira
Rodriguez
Posada
Granderson
Cano
Swisher
Gardner

Anyway, here goes.

The average lineup containing these nine players, in any order, is 5.766 runs, which is equal to about 935 in a 162 game season. That’s pretty awesome if you ask me–or anyone.

The most possible runs this team could score would be 5.887 a game, or 954 over a season. This lineup looks different, but it’s definitely plausible:

Johnson
A-Rod
Jeter
Tex
Swisher
Cano
Granderson
Posada
Gardner

Gardner remains at the same, but Johnson and his supreme OBP skills get bumped up to the leadoff spot. Putting A-Rod in the two hole would be great, too, because it would get him more at bats, and more chances to hit the ball out of the park. Of all the lineups under the “best” category, which range from 5.873 (951) to 5.887 (953), one of Jeter or Johnson is in the leadoff spot.

What’s very encouraging is that even the worst configuration of the Yankees offense projects to score 5.533 per game, which would be about 900 runs over the course of the season. That lineup is:

Cano
Posada
Granderson
Gardner
Swisher
Johnson
Jeter
A-Rod
Tex

I think it’s pretty self-explanatory as to why that lineup wouldn’t score as many runs as a normal lineup.

All of the best/worst lineups can be found here. I didn’t include the probable Yankee lineup–or something close to it–because none of the presented models had that. Of course, this tool isn’t exact, and neither are the projected OBPs/SLGs that I’m using (CHONE projections). Regardless, it’s still something fun to play around with and to waste time on while we wait (im)patiently for Spring Training to begin.

Tom Verducci recently ran an “efficiency” study to determine which MLB teams get the biggest bang for their buck. Essentially, he figured out cost per win (Opening Day payroll divided by wins) and used that number as his starting point. From there, it got a bit more complicated:

Cost Per Win is good, but it’s only a start. CPW doesn’t consider what a team achieved, and because the gap in payrolls is far greater than the gap in wins, CPW skews toward small-market teams who don’t spend and don’t contend often. The goal in pro sports is to win titles, not just games.
That brings us to Step 2: what did the team achieve in the past decade? There are five levels of achievement in baseball:
1. Give your fans a pennant race (defined here are finishing within five games of a playoff spot).
2. Make the postseason.
3. Win a postseason series.
4. Win the pennant.
5. Win the World Series.
Now comes the fun part. I assigned teams what I call Achievement Points for every level reached, with graduating values the more they advanced through the five levels: one point for being in a pennant race, two points for making the playoffs, three for winning each postseason series, four for winning a pennant, and five for winning a World Series. A team could accrue a maximum of 21 points for a world championship season.

Verducci finds that by his measure, the Yankees are the 23rd most efficient club in the sport. I have had a general discussion on this issue in the past with Maury Brown, reprinted here. While the broader issues are the same, Verducci’s study has much greater flaws and will be widely disseminated, to the point where Yankee fans will probably be forced to spend time parrying with people citing these results. As such, I wanted to address a number of flaws with the study.

1) The most obvious problem with the study is that it creates a false relationship between efficiency and winning, suggesting that efficiency is based directly on the fortunes of the club. However, this simply ignores the fact that baseball is a business. As such, the goal is not simply to win, but rather to make money, with winning being the easiest way to achieve those ends. The most efficient clubs are not those that win on the cheap, but are those that maximize profits.

2) Building off the previous point, clubs may make decisions that are not considered efficient by Verducci’s standards but help make them more profitable. For example, the Yankees may bring in big names rather than depend on prospects because it is better for their bottom line in terms of merchandising and their TV network. Signing superstars helps extend the brand, and has helped the Yankees turn from a powerful team into an international conglomerate, despite the fact that the club stopped winning championships as this transition was taking place. Even if the spending is not entirely “baseball” efficient, big time free agents bring people to the ballpark and makes them turn on their TV sets. I would guess that if you compared payroll to increase in total profits since the mid 90’s, you might find that the Yankees as an enterprise do better than everyone else. Quite simply, some of the things that they do that may be inefficient from a baseball perspective are profitable, and are therefore efficient in terms of their overall business.

3) The study ignores the fact that some clubs have a lot more money than others, and therefore are acting more efficiently by signing a sure thing to a big money deal rather than depending on cheaper players who generally have a lesser track record. Revenues need to be included in the equation.

4) It also glosses over the fact that not every situation is created equal, in that it ignores the competitiveness of the team’s division. Clubs in the NL West know that they do not need to spend to build a 100 win club, as they can win the division at 92 or so. Those in the AL East are not quite as lucky. Context is extremely important, and this study ignores it until the very end of the article, at which point it references this issue but makes no suggestions as to how to properly adjust the data.

5) The scaling of how much a playoff run is worth v. a series win v a WS win, etc is asinine, and does not reflect that the primary goal is to make money. The numbers are arbitrary and have no relation to reality, and then are arbitrarily subtracted from cost per win. Basically, the math in the study makes absolutely no sense, and renders the results meaningless.

I am not trying to suggest that the Yankees have been run perfectly, because there have certainly been some inefficient decisions. However, the Yankees have become a billion dollar conglomerate over the last 10 years, and have parlayed their method of operation into constant contention, a handful of championships, and more money than any franchise in the sport. Baseball is a business, and the bottom line is what matters to those running the club. By that measure, the Yankees are far from inefficient.

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