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Really, its greatIn attempt to make one last pre-season push for Yankees Annual 2009, Maple Street Press has put my article online for free. While you should still buy Yankees Annual 2009, you can read my entire article here.

It is a great honor to have my article selected to represent the magazine, and it means that I can now share the entire article with you.

Why should you still buy the magazine even after reading my article? My favorite part is the player scouting reports. Want to know how often C.C.Sabathia throws down and away to left handed batters? Or how Mark Teixeira bats on cureveballs from right-handed pitchers? The Annual contains full hit zone, spray, and scouting report charts for every Yankee player. This is unique data that you’ll rarely see online. It also contains great articles by Peter Abraham on Chien-Ming Wang, the story of Brian Cashman by The Record’s Pete Caldera, and an honest analysis of the problems that plagued the 2008 Yankees by the Star-Ledger’s Dan Graziano.

An excerpt:

Oppenheimer came in with a resume well-suited for the job. He was a protégé of Gene Michael, architect of the Yankees’ 1990s dynasty. Oppenheimer started his career as a scout for the San Diego Padres following an unremarkable career in NCAA baseball. He signed on as a cross-checker for the Yankees in 1994, and quickly made his way to the major league advanced scouting team. There he worked with Gene Michael. Michael, renowned for his good judgment and attention to detail when scouting young players, no doubt shaped Oppenheimer’s career. Oppenheimer worked his way through the often-treacherous politics of George Steinbrenner’s Tampa operation in the 90s. He displayed a hybrid style of scouting, using knowledge gained from the artistry of Gene Michael combined with newly popular “Moneyball” techniques among baseball organizations.

The result was that when Oppenheimer was elevated to the position of Director of Player Development in 2005, he was ready to dramatically change the organization’s approach. The Yankees had previously kept their scouting department on a tight budget in order to save money for the major league team, but Cashman gave Oppenheimer a virtual blank check for the draft with a unique directive.

Most Major League Baseball teams are risk averse at the draft. They run to safety, not wanting to waste their limited amateur budget trying to draft a player who is likely to wash out or go elsewhere. The Yankees were not interested in searching just for “safe” players, but instead decided to use their limitless pocketbook to take as many risks as possible. Teams will often pass on drafting a player whom they believe will cost too much to sign, who might opt for college, or whose health is considered a risk. These players are first-round caliber talent, but are available in the later rounds for the same price. Paying 1st-round bonuses to later round picks is called going “over-slot”.

I promise that this is my last attempt at shameless self-promotion until this time next year.

One of the various reasons given when people pick the Yankees to finish out of the money in 2009 is that their defense is bad. Like the claim that the Yankees bullpen is weak, this claim has no factual or statistical support. ESPN posted two articles on defense today, with the first touching on the importance of defense and how the lack of it has hurt the Yankees for the last 8 seasons:

There are a variety of reasons the Yankees have not won a World Series since 2000, but it’s clear that the demise of their defense has been a major factor. As a team, they didn’t crack the top 20 in defensive efficiency (percentage of batted balls in play converted into outs) from 2001 to 2005, and a look at their rosters from this era can’t help but leave you with the feeling that the front office was ignoring defense…..

It’s not uncommon to see a one-dimensional team of sluggers — like the early 2000s Yankees — mash its way to the postseason. But once those Bronx Bombers reached October, they had nothing to fall back on at the first sign of a slump. Everyone always thought they were going to simply overpower their playoff competition, but it always seems to be forgotten that much of their regular season record was based upon pounding teams like the Tampa Bay Devil Rays and Baltimore Orioles into submission. The pitching and defenses the Yankees faced in the postseason were always a lot tougher.

Defense is vital to a club against better teams, as it is harder to cover up mistakes in the field when you cannot slug the opposition into submission. In the second article, Nate Silver uses PECOTA to project an improvement in defense for the Yankees in 2009:

Yankees (2008 FRAA: –26 | 2009 Projection: +9)
First basemen are rarely impact defenders, but two-time Gold Glove winner Mark Teixeira is a significant exception. Plus he replaces Jason Giambi, who had only slightly less range than the Miller Huggins monument at Yankee Stadium. If Jorge Posada has trouble coming back from right shoulder surgery, take note: Backup José Molina, one of the best defensive catchers in the game, threw out 44% of potential basestealers last year.

The Yankees defense projects to be on the positive side of the ledger in 2009. Replacing Giambi with Teixeira, Cabrera with Gardner, and Abreu with Nady/Swisher should have a huge effect, such that the Yankees will be, at worst, a slightly below average defensive team even if players like Cano and Posada do not bounce back in the field. The Yankees being a poor defensive team is a thing of the past.

Mar 312009

I’m testing out a new format for prospect profiles. What do you think?

Ramiro Pena

Age: 23
Height: 5’11″
Weight: 165 lbs
Position: Shortstop
Bats: Switch

2008 Team: Trenton Thunder
Current Team: Major League Camp

The Good: Any discussion about Ramiro Pena begins with his superb defense. Pena’s reputation, with some quantative backing, is of a gold glove caliber defensive shortstop. He has excellent range and a strong arm. Pena has played every game in his minor league career at shortstop, but has enough natural ability that he could probably slot in at 2nd and 3rd as a fill-in. Pena has some speed, although it hasn’t translated much to stealing bases.

The Bad: Ramiro Pena hit .266/.330/.357 at Trenton this season (his third prolonged stop at Double-A), and it was the best hitting season of his professional career. That should tell you something about how bad of a hitter he is. Does he have survival skills wtih the bat? Probably not. Pena will likely not break a .300 OBP in the major leagues any time soon. As mentioned before, Pena has showed little ability to steal bases despite having speed.

Projection: While Pena still hasn’t played at Triple-A, there is little reason to believe he has much left to project. Pena is what he is: a defensive wizard with no bat. If the Yankees have to rely on him to start more than a handful of games, they are in trouble. At best, we’re talking about a worse version of Adam Everett.

Reasons to be optimistic: Pena’s .266/.330/.357 line may be more representative of his ability than his prior seasons because he was rushed up the minor leagues. The Yankees valued his defense following their strong pitchers, and Pena found himself at 20 years old as one of the youngest players in Double-A in 2006. If the Yankees had been more concerned about developing him, Pena would have been held back in A ball for another year or two. If his recently improved hitting is representative, he could stick in the major leagues as a useful bench player.

Reasons to be pessimistic: Pena was rushed, but he didn’t begin to hit until his third attempt at Double-A. Players with major league caliber hitting skills adjust much quicker than that. His BABIP was .344. He still struck out 86 times in 111 games, which is unacceptable for a guy with no power or patience.

Bottom Line: He’s a very fringe prospect, who is probably best suited to scooping up our young pitcher’s ground balls in the minors, or as a 25th man defensive replacement who never gets to hit.

Interesting post from RAB, here, regarding the hallowed Fielding Bible and it’s comments on Derek Jeter’s defensive play. FB declares that DJ had the least defensive misplays in all of baseball last year (for shortstops), though his range was near the bottom (despite UZR’s insistence he was nearly average last season). It’s a great read.

I was listening to Friday’s ESPN Baseball Today’s podcast and was less than shocked to discover they had predicted the Yankees to finish third in the A.L. East. Now, I have no problem with anyone picking the Yankees behind Tampa or Boston. They are both tremendous clubs, and I think it’s pretty much a toss up between which of the three mega-powers will emerge from the division. I did have a problem, however, with the ignorant reasoning that went along with their prediction.  There are two specific issues I want to address.

#1: The Yankees were predicted to win 87 or 88 games. What!!!??? This is just sheer lazy thought. All Karabell and Pascarelli had to do was look at the records last year to find that the Yanks won 89 games with 2 decent starters but now, with 5 starters ranging from solid to studly, the Pinstripers will somehow win LESS!? They offer zero explanation for why they will win less games despite substantial upgrades at catcher, first base and each rotation spot.  Additionally, every major statistical projection model in existence has the Yankees winning at least 90+ games, and there’s a good reason for that: these models actually look at statistics!

#2: The Yankees have a shaky bullpen which is much worse than Boston’s. This is more lazy, unprepared commentary that is a typical belief among the media types who don’t bother looking at statistics. One easy glance at the rankings last year will show that the Yanks had the 5th best pen in the A.L. which was two spots BETTER than Boston, despite having to pitch over 60 more innings!!  Anyone with any knowledge of the game will tell you that overextending a bullpen due to poor starting pitching will wreak havoc on bullpen stats, yet the Bombers were a solid fifth despite pitching the third most innings in the A.L.  They’ve also fortified the pen by having Marte and Coke available all year, which should make them among the most versatile relief corps in all of baseball.  Add in probable appearances by young studs like Melancon and Robertson by mid-season and there’s little question that the pen should be better, yet somehow Pascarelli and Karabell insist that it’s sooo much worse than Boston’s?  How does that make any sense?

I would have some sympathy for these guys because they have to cover all of baseball and can’t be expected to have detailed knowledge of the vagaries of every single club, but this wasn’t an off-the-cuff series of answers to some live q & a session.  This was a prepared segment in which they had time to do research in advance.  They knew they were previewing the A.L. East and had plenty of time to take a long look at all the relevant stats, but they clearly did not do so.  These are the clearest and most obvious stats to look at, so they obviously did absolutely no research at all.  They just lazily mailed in their performance without even trying.  Come on guys, I know the podcast is free, but take some pride in your work.

Mar 312009

For the second straight season, Jon Albaladejo will be the final reliever to make the Yankees Opening Day roster. Brett Tomko, Dan Giese, and Al Aceves were all sent down, with Tomko being the hard-luck loser in this race.

The Yankees won a lot of games during the Joe Torre era. When you win a lot of games, you tend to default to the “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” strategy for roster building. The Yankees happened to win with guys like Luis Sojo, Billy Traber, Enrique Wilson, Ruben Sierra, and Joe Torre. I could name more Torre-era mistakes, but that’s not important. It took a new manager and a loosing season for the Yankees to break old conventions and establish a smarter strategy.

The Yankees do not need a long reliever. They have five healthy starting pitchers and seven versatile relief pitchers. None of their relief pitchers are Mike Myers types – one-out guys who will put a burden on others around them. There is no reason to believe that some combination of Coke, Albaladejo, and Ramirez can’t put together 3-4 innings of relief work when a starter gets blown out in the 3rd inning.

Tomko was very tempting. His spring training performance was extraordinary. His 1.17 ERA over 15 1/3 innings with 12 strikeouts against 2 walks was as good as you could ask for him to pitch. The Yankees however looked at his greater body of work -  a 4.68 ERA over 1741 major league innings, and an ERA close to 6.00 over the past two years – and realized that Tomko would be a liability in the bullpen. There is no reason for a team that is sending Mark Melancon, David Robertson, Dan Giese, Alfredo Aceves, and Phil Hughes to the minors to give a spot to a guy who will almost surely pitch below-average innings during his tenure with the Yankees.

Brett Gardner is another great example of a smart, heartless move by the Yankees. Melky Cabrera had a very good spring. He hit almost as well as Gardner, and much better in the latter half of March. He is out of options. He is an established major league player with strong ties to the team. He also plays much worse defense than Gardner and pulled off just a .301 OBP last season. Gardner is clearly the right choice, and would have been the right choice even he didn’t hit like Lou Gehrig in the grapefruit league.

The Yankees kept Joba in the rotation. They held on to Hughes and Kennedy. They held off on Johan Santana and then went out and got C.C. Sabathia. They were patient after Alex Rodriguez’s injury and went with their replacement player. Time and again, the Yankees have made the tougher decision in terms of politics, publicity, and tradition while improving their roster. The team has been outsmarted by Theo Epstein and the Red Sox management for years, but they seem to be turning it around.

The last decision, between Ramiro Pena and Angel Berroa, is not nearly as clear. I’m not sure who the player to add to the roster is. We’ve had a healthy debate here. We’ll see what the Yankees pick.

According to MLBTR, the Tigers released Gary Sheffield today, eating the 14 million dollars he is owed for 2009 rather than have him remain on the roster. This got me to thinking about the trade that the Yankees made with the Tigers after the 2006 season, in which the Yankees sent Sheff to Detroit for Humberto Sanchez, Kevin Whelan, and Anthony Claggett.

The Yankees had traded for Bobby Abreu close to the trade deadline in 2006, a season in which Sheff played 39 games. This made Sheffield a spare part, and many believed the Yankees would decline the 13M dollar option that they had on Gary. Instead, Brian Cashman picked up the option so as to get something for a proven commodity like Sheffield. One week later, the deal with the Tigers was done. Here is what Keith Law had to say at the time about the three guys the Yankees got:

In exchange for Sheffield, the Yankees get some much-needed pitching depth in their farm system, acquiring three power arms who all rank among the hardest throwers in the Yankee organization. Humberto Sanchez was considered the Tigers’ most tradeable young asset back in July, but elbow inflammation ended his season a few days before the trading deadline. He’d been throwing at the Tigers’ complex in Lakeland, and the Yankees are satisfied that he’s healthy. At the Futures Game, Sanchez showed a solid-average fastball touching plus at 91-94 and an average slider at 80-82, throwing one split at 84. He’s a heavyset guy with some effort in his delivery, although part of what boosted his stock this year was a newfound commitment to staying in shape (word is that the rapid ascension of his buddy Joel Zumaya lit a fire under him). He’s worked as a starter so far, but it’s more likely that he’ll at least start his major league career in the bullpen.

Kevin Whelan is the potential diamond in the rough for the Yanks, although that’s no slight to Sanchez. Whelan is a converted catcher who has only been pitching since 2003, but he’s got two things that converted guys often don’t have: great feel and a quality offspeed pitch. He pairs a mid-90s fastball (touching 95-96) with a filthy splitter, 84-86 mph with a sharp tumble and great bottom to it. He still has below-average control, but that’s not a surprise in a kid with so little pitching experience, and he won’t advance quickly until he throws more strikes.

The third pitcher in the deal, Anthony Claggett, is another converted position player, this one a shortstop, and he shares Whelan’s characteristic of an above-average secondary pitch, this one a hard slider, to go with a low-90s fastball. He’s also given up just one home run in 82 pro innings. He’s a long way off and is a low-probability prospect, but he has upside and the Yanks just didn’t have a lot of upside in their farm system before this trade.

The trade has not worked out very well for either team. Sheffield did not play more than 133 games in either of his seasons with the Tigers, and did more talking off the field than producing on it. For the Yankees, while they did get something for a player they were going to let leave, the prospects they obtained have struggled. Sanchez has fought injuries and ineffectiveness, while Whelan still shows an inability to hit the strike zone with his awesome stuff. Claggett is probably the best prospect of the three at this point, as he projects to be a solid reliever. You would typically hope for a better return on a player like Gary Sheffield.

What do you think about the trade?

Tyler Kepner has a piece in today’s New York Times detailing the cost effective job Brian Cashman has done in building this years relief corps. He begins:

On a team that spends more than $200 million on its roster, the Yankees’ bullpen is a bargain. Only one of Rivera’s setup men will earn more than $1.25 million this season. That is Dámaso Marte, a left-hander whose first team, the Seattle Mariners, let him go as a minor leaguer in 2000.

And an effective Lefty specialist is cheap at any price, especially when you consider that since 2002 the Yanks have trotted out. . . . brace yourself. . . . Mike Stanton, Randy Choate, Sterling Hitchcock, Chris Hammond, Felix Heredia, Gabe White, Jesse Orosco, Alex Graman, CJ Nitkowski, Donovan Osborne, Al Leiter, Buddy Groom, Alan Embree, Mike Stanton-part deux, Wayne Franklin, Sean Henn, Ron Villone, Mike Myers, Matt Smith, Kei Igawa,  and the immortal Billy Traber.

Ahhh . . . . memories. More from Kepner:

The other relievers have much less experience, but the Yankees’ bullpen had a 3.79 earned run average last season, seventh best in baseball. Of the six relievers likely to set up for Rivera, only Phil Coke was drafted by the Yankees. The others came from discount bins.

Not only is the Yankee bullpen effective, it is flexible as well. Some of them are arb guys and others are rookies who still have options. Worst case scenario, if someone is injured or ineffective you’d simply cut them loose. You couldn’t do that when you were paying big bucks to guys like Kyle Farnsworth or Steve Karsay.

Joe Girardi deserves some of the credit as well. After years of bullpen mismanagement by Joe Torre and his overuse of a few guys who he fell in love with, Girardi is spreading the workload around. Girardi’s approach keeps everyone sharp, and by paying attention to matchup details (which is a manager’s job) Girardi’s relief corps last year was both deep and effective. Torre ended more careers than Donald Trump.

“It’s been a long process since Veras has been a Yankee, but the fact that he had one power tool made him intriguing to keep an eye on,” Cashman said, referring to Veras’s fastball. “Brian Bruney also had a big power tool, so we gave him a shot.

“Our scouts gravitate toward tools, so even if they don’t see success, they’ll think, ‘We should give this guy a chance to keep trying.’ ”

For all the criticism Brian Cashman has received over the years for his pitching decisions, this years bullpen is a feather in his cap. Fans are seeing the dividends of his renewed focus on scouting and player development since he took full control of Baseball ops in 2005. Maybe the best news of all is that with Melancon, Robertson, Sanchez and Aceves in AAA, there’s even more help on the way.  You can hire anyone to give CC Sabathia and AJ Burnett truckloads of money, but efficiency and flexibility is much harder to acheive. Cashman has done just that.

Mar 302009

Jonathan Albaladejo appears to have a stranglehold over the final bullpen spot after a strong spring. Obviously, if he makes the team, that would mean that the Yankees would not carry a long reliever (despite Joba’s innings cap).

Now, Albaladejo is a solid option, however, I wonder why he would make the team over someone like David Robertson. This spring, Albaladejo has struck out 8 and given up 1 ER over 9 2/3 IP (1 BB). Meanwhile, over 6 2/3 IP Robertson struck out 10 and gave up 1 ER (3 BB). Albaladejo’s numbers are certainly better, overall, but Robertson’s stuff is undeniable. Also, Albaladejo has only been with the team for a season yet has been given ample opportunities to excel while Robertson has been with the Yankees since 2007 and, at least for now, is destined to toil away in Scranton.

At this point, in order to maintain depth, I guess you can afford to leave Robertson in the minors (he’ll be 24 this year) and go with the older Albaladejo (26). Nonetheless, regardless of whether or not Albaladejo makes the team, I’m sure we’ll see Robertson again, at some point, in 2009.

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