The news that Nomar Garciaparra retired this morning brought back an old argument that used to rage between Yankees and Red Sox fans: which club’s shortstop was better? In terms of career value, the obvious answer is Jeter, as he continues to play at a high level while Nomar is hanging up his spikes. The more interesting question is, which player was better during the time span from 1997-2004, when Nomar was manning shortstop for the Sox?
In terms of perception, the two players were fairly equal. Over the 8 year span, Jeter made 6 All-Star teams and finished in the top-10 in MVP voting 4 times, while adding one Gold Glove. Meanwhile, Nomar made 5 All-Star teams but finished in the top-10 in MVP voting 5 times. From what I recall, the perception was that Nomar was a slightly flashier offensive player, but that Jeter was close in that regard and was more dependable in the clutch and a greater winner.
In terms of statistics, however, Nomar was almost certainly the better player over the period, and likely would have been recognized as such if the current statistical revolution had occurred 5-10 years earlier. Let’s take a look at the WAR numbers on both players, courtesy of baseballprojection.com:
Jeter was worth exactly 41 wins above replacement from 1997 through 2004. Nomar was worth 41.5 wins over the span, despite playing just 21 games in 2001 and 81 games in 2004 due to injury. That means that when he was on the field, Nomar provided more value than Jeter did, with Derek’s poor defense towards the end of the period really hurting his overall WAR. However, the first part of that sentence is the real caveat here. If Nomar Garciaparra had Derek’s durability, he likely would be remembered as the better player. However, his inability to stay healthy torpedoed that legacy, and renders the comparison moot. In the end, Nomar’s story is one that engenders a discussion of “what could have been.”
What do you think about the Jeter-Nomar debate?
It is no secret that Mariano Rivera’s average velocity on both his four-seamer and his cutter was down last season. Now that he is a full year removed from shoulder surgery, an issue that seemed to hinder his arm strength for much of 2009 and cause, in part, the downturn in pitch speed, we have a reason to be optimistic about his velocity going forward. However, if his velocity remains in its current range, or falls further, there is reason to wonder about his effectiveness over the course of a new contract, which he will seek after entering free agency at the end of the year.
Some may decry the notion that Rivera’s loss in velocity impacted his year – he did pitch exceptionally well, as he usually does – but, believe it or not, Rivera’s minor decrease in pitch speed did manifest itself in his contact rates. In fact, Rivera had some of the higher contact rates in the American League a season ago. In the spirit of Alice in Wonderland, the following is a nice 3D bar chart – I love me some bar charts, man – that showcases this relationship.
Rivera’s career average velocities for his fastball (purple bar) and his cut-fastball (blue bar) are featured on the left (in mph) and, as you can see, in 2009, on the right, the two pitch speeds are down a few mph – 91.8 and 91.3 – in comparison. Conversely, but not coincidentally, the amount of contact hitters made on Rivera’s pitches outside of the zone, i.e., O-Contact% (green bar), and the amount of contact hitters made on Rivera’s pitches inside of the zone, i.e., Z-Contact% (red bar), both experienced significant increases – O-Swing of 73.2% and Z-Swing of 90.2% – when compared to the career numbers (O-Swing of 61.7% and Z-Swing of 85.9%). From this, it seems reasonable for one to then ponder a possible connection between Rivera’s downturn in velocity and his upswing in contact percentage. Essentially, when your pitches are not really as fast as they once were, there is more time for hitters to react to them.
This, of course, could relate to pitch movement, too, rather than just velocity. Rivera’s decrease in pitch speed was likely brought on by a lack of arm strength throughout the season, and this issue seemed to simultaneously lessen the movement on his fastball and cut-fastball. In 2009, according to pitch f/x, the vertical movement (up) on Rivera’s fastball was 4.83 inches and the horizontal movement (lateral, in right-handers) was 0.74 inches. Both numbers were well below average. For comparison, in 2008, Rivera’s fastball rose 7.52 inches and broke in on righties at 1.54 inches (below average but not like in 2009). That signals a significant loss of movement on the fastball which probably explains why Rivera rarely used it last season, throwing it only 7% of the time, according to FanGraphs.
The cutter, the pitch Rivera used 82% of the time last season, also experienced a loss of movement. In 2008, its vertical rise was 7.21 inches – slightly less than the average mark for that year – and its horizontal movement (in on lefties, away from righties) was 2.52 inches, a mark which was well above average. However, in 2009, its vertical rise was 6.22 inches and its vertical movement was 2.12 inches. The vertical movement was a bit below average, about an inch below, but the horizontal break was still VERY good, despite the stated loss in year-to-year movement.
This, then, the decrease in Rivera’s pitch velocity and movement explains the marked increase in his contact rates (I looked at command, too, but his BB/9 of 1.63 was still under his career mark of 2.11). The two negative trends were likely brought on by the shoulder surgery Rivera had last winter that impacted his arm strength, but I’m sure age had something to do with it, as well (to a smaller degree). Some may say, well, if his velocity and pitch movement was down, and his contact rates were up, why was he still so effective in 2009? That is a valid question, of course, and I think it is mainly because Rivera has done away with his fastball in order to use the cutter almost exclusively. Even with the lesser movement last season, the movement was still great, which says a lot about the pitch. More contact was made, a notion evidenced further by Rivera’s higher than usual line drive rate – 21.8% in 2009, up from his career mark of 16.8% – but his peripherals were still above average across the board. Rivera seemed to realize the lack of velocity issue and went with more movement instead, though the cutter had less movement than it did in the past.
As I said at the outset of this novel, if the decrease in velocity remains, or continues, it might cause some concern when Rivera enters free agency and is looking for another contract. Those concerns are understandable, as the velocity change would impact Rivera’s game, a point made by his contact rates in 2009. However, he has clearly adapted well to his current abilities, and remains as effective as ever. He’s a robot, with or without a 96 mph fastball.
Photo by Reuters
This is a guest post from friend of the blog Jamal Granger. It is a meticulous piece of research and we are proud to be running it here at TYU.
Endless thanks to Eric Seidman of Baseball Prospectus, who devoted his valuable time to supplying with me with the essential data for this post, and introduced me to the wonders of SQL (though, as I begin to immerse myself, I question whether “thanks” is the appropriate term …).
The 1975 Cincinnati Reds were the topic of a recently published novel by celebrated sports journalist Joe Posnanski. In the book, titled The Machine: The Story of the 1975 Cincinnati Reds, Posnanski “… captures all of the passion and tension, drama and glory of this extraordinary team considered to be one of the greatest ever to take the field,” says Amazon.com; however, based on a recent discussion that Mike Francesa had with his listeners on his radio show – Mike’d Up – about the greatest infield-plus-catcher units in baseball history, I decided to take a statistical look at things and discovered how the ’75 Reds arguably boasted the greatest quintet of players to ever take the baseball diamond.
Using weighted Equivalent Average (EqA), total Equivalent Runs (EqR) and Rally’s Wins Above Replacement (WAR) data that dates as far back as 1969 for the former two, a likely indubitable argument can be made that Hall of Famers Johnny Bench, Joe Morgan, Tony Perez, and All-Stars Dave Concepcion and Pete Rose combined to not only lead their 20 teammates to a 108-win season and a World Series victory over the Boston Red Sox but, statistically, became the greatest infield-plus-catcher unit, or Diamond Unit, in the past four decades.
While the aforementioned Reds squad may very well be the greatest Diamond Unit in the past forty years, arguments can be made for almost a handful of other teams. If you go by EqA, the 2009 Yankees are the best; EqR says that the 1974 Reds – with third basemen Dan Driessen replacing Pete Rose of the ’75 team – beats the bunch; Rally’s WAR has the ’75 version of The Big Red Machine as the alpha dog since 1969. While your opinions may vastly differ from mine, I say that the 1975 Reds are the top unit because WAR factors in all aspects of a player’s production – which is something that EqA and EqR do not.
By WAR, here is the leader board for the best Diamond Units since 1969:
The Year of the Green Wood Rabbit: The 1975 Cincinnati Reds – Morgan’s Magnificence
The 1975 Cincinnati Reds – led by a 12-win season by second basemen Joe Morgan – hit to the tune of a .305 EqA and 504.9 EqR, and produced a grand total of 29.4 WAR, a full three wins above the next closest quintet, the 1976 Reds. Morgan, posting career highs in batting average (.327), stolen bases (67, tied with his ’73 mark), on-base percentage (.466), weighted Runs Created (138.2) and wOBP (.463), was the near-unanimous winner for the first of consecutive NL MVP awards (Charlie Hustle stole two votes), and actually stole more bases (67) than he struck out (52). Also, not only did Morgan’s .360 EqA and 136.9 EqR pace the majors, the next closest qualifier (at least 300 plate appearances) for EqA was the Royals’ John Mayberry (.329).
Following Morgan’s stupefying campaign, Hall of Fame backstop Johnny Bench produced an astounding 6.5-win season, which, amazingly enough, is just the fourth-highest mark of his career. Bench, a MVP candidate in any other year (well, more on that later), did not produce any career-high marks but was part of a tremendous offensive trio of catchers that included Oakland’s Gene Tenace (.316 EqA and 107.4 EqR; why is he not in the Hall?) and St. Louis’s Ted Simmons (.311 and 106.4; another questionable HOF exclusion). Although Bench’s .308 EqA trailed both Tenace and Simmons for the lead amongst MLB catchers, he trailed only Joe Morgan for the team lead in what made a devastating two-three combo in Cincinnati’s lineup.
Pete Rose put up a .317/.406/.432 vital in 1975 and his 4.4-win season was just a stepping stone in a 12-year period from 1965-1976 that saw him produce at least four wins above replacement in every season but his 3.6-win campaign in 1970. Rose, known for his trademark hustle on the base paths, produce just two runs above replacement in that regard; and it makes you wonder: how much of that storied hustle actually helped his teams instead of just showing a lot of heart? Earning All-Star and Gold Glove (Total Zone had him as ten runs below replacement, but whatever) honors in 1975, Mr. Hustle was the lone National League player earn any first-place votes in the MVP race, as teammate Joe Morgan deservedly ran away with the title.
In terms of his non-offensive production, Dave Concepcion was a stalwart – his base running and defense made him produce to a level approaching that of a league-average player (17 RAR). However, Concepcion came to the plate 762 times in 1975, and as his .257 EqA and 64.5 EqR will tell you, he was a below-average hitter in every sense of the term. The beauty of analysis is that everything is relative, and in Concepcion’s case, he was among a group of shortstops (Larry Bowa of the Phillies; Bert Campaneris of the Athletics; Chris Speier of the Giants) that could lay claim to being the best offensive performers of that position in the non-Toby Harrah (.398 wOBA) division.
After enjoying a six-year stretch from 1968-1973 in which his WAR ranged from 4.2 to 6.7, Tony Perez’s 1975 campaign saw him deliver a 3.1-win campaign as the weakest link of the Machine’s Diamond Unit. Although this was in the midst of quite a prolonged decline phase, Perez’s 83.7 EqR and .288 EqA placed him in the top 33 percentile in an environment that saw the Royals’ Mayberry pace the field with a .329 EqA, 124.9 EqR and a robust .427 wOBA.
Yesterday, I looked at some of Brian Cashman’s recent trades, specifically what he and the Yankees gave up and whether or not those players would really make a difference. I ended the post with the Brian Bruney trade and now I’m going to start this on with the more major trades of the offseason. Instead of going deal by deal, like I did last night, I’m going to go player by player for today’s post.
Starting with the guy who had the biggest impact on the Major League team, we have outfielder Melky Cabrera, who was shipped to Atlanta in the Javier Vazquez deal. Melky was a nice player, especially on a team like the Yankees. He could play all outfield positions competently–at the very least–and could put up league average numbers at the plate. His switch hitting was also a nice touch. Losing Melky, though, is not the worst thing in the world for the Yankees. In fact, it’s really not a bad thing. Despite his useful skill-set, he is an easily replaceable player. One could, and will/should, argue that the Yankees have already replaced Melky with Randy Winn. Melky’s still young and could develop further, but after over 2000 plate appearances with the Yankees, the only consistent thing from Melky was inconsistency. I wish Melky luck in the National League, but I do not think I will miss him terribly.
Moving to the next Major League player traded, we come to Phil Coke, who went to Detroit in the Granderson deal. He seems like a decent enough guy, and maybe he could develop into something more than he is now, but that’s unlikely. He doesn’t have the pitches to start and his tendency to give up the gopher ball sets him back. In 2010, he would’ve been the second lefty out of the bullpen and his role would likely have been diminished. Guys like Coke are not very hard to find on the open market and we may not notice his departure all that much.
Mike Dunn, another LHP, is kind of in the same category as Coke. He’ll never be a starter, but he does have a tick more upside than Coke, simply because Dunn throws harder. He still has control issues that need to be worked out as well. Dunn’s role on the 2010 Yankees was also in question at the time of his trade. Despite Coke being traded, Dunn was still likely to be only the second lefty out of the bullpen. Again, this is a small role and it will not likely be missed.
Ian Kennedy is another player whose role on the 2010 Yankees would’ve been rather unclarified and muddy. He wouldn’t have had the innings built up to be a starter and likely would’ve been either SP depth in Scranton or a long man in the bullpen. However, the latter role is already crowded. I’m definitely going to miss Ian, though, and of all the players the Yankees traded away in 2010, he’s the one for whom I’m going to root hardest. I feel like he never got a fair shot from the fans and hopefully, he can re-turn some heads in the desert.
Now, we come to the prospects: Austin Jackson and Arodys Vizcaino. In terms of the short term, trading away these two does not do much to harm the Yankees. After all, Jackson needed at least another half a season in Scranton and Viz hasn’t yet pitched in a full season league. Long term, though, it hurts the system a bit. The Yankees are pretty short on position player talent and Jackson fits that bill. Vizcaino is a young, high upside arm and those are always nice to have. These are probably the two biggest losses of the offseason, but like every coin, these have a flip side.
Starting with Jackson, we have a player whose star has lost a bit of its shine as he moves through the minor league ranks. Ajax’s power still hasn’t quite come around and there are still questions about his plate discipline. Maybe I’m being too bearish on Jackson, but I have a feeling that he’ll become nothing more than a solid regular in his career. Now, that’s not a bad thing and it’s obviously something the Yankees would’ve wanted. However, over the next four years, I highly doubt that Austin Jackson the Tiger will be better than Curtis Granderson the Yankee.
Vizcaino is the biggest loss of the offseason. He has the most upside of the players traded and has had great results thus far. But, like I’ve repeated ad nauseum, he’s never pitched in a full season league. That definitely counts against him. There are also pitchers in front of him: Zach McAllister, Manny Banuelos, Ivan Nova, for example.
For what it’s worth, here’s my rankings of these players traded away in terms of impact:
1. A-Viz: High upside arm, but a long way off.
2. Ajax: Medium upside bat, needed more time.
3. Melky: Useful player, but easily replaceable.
4. IPK: Good SP depth, uncertain role.
5. Dunn: Some upside, but likely a LOOGY at the end of the day.
6. Coke: Dunn with a smaller upside.
All in all, Brian Cashman has not given up very much over the last year and a half or so in terms of trades. It’s also wroth discussing what he’s brought in. In guys like Hinske and Hairston, he brought in role players who helped complete a championship team. In Nick Swisher, he bought low on a very solid player, and the same could be said for Curtis Granderson. While losing Austin Jackson was not desirable, the package Detroit took for a solid player like Granderson was one the Yankees had to send off, and the same goes for the deal with Atlanta. We all hate to see young players go, but it’s a part of the game. Brain Cashman has done a good job of trading the right people for the right parts and is one of the finest trading general managers in baseball.
One of the Yankee execs most closely involved with player development was arrested and charged with DWI Monday night. Here’s the story:
Longtime Yankees executive Mark Newman was arrested and charged with driving under the influence Monday night, according to the Hillsborough County Sherriff’s Office.
Newman, in his 11th season as the Yankees’ senior vice president of baseball operations, refused to take a blood-alcohol test, according to the arrest inquiry.
“We were informed that Mark Newman was arrested last night on suspicion of driving under the influence,” the Yankees said last night in a statement. “The New York Yankees do not condone this kind of behavior. We take this situation seriously and we are looking into the matter. We will have no further comment at this time.”
The report said Newman, 60, was released Tuesdayon $500 bail.
The arrest was first reported by The Associated Press.
According to the inquiry, Newman was pulled over at 10:56 p.m. near the corner of Hudson Lane and North Dale Mabry Highway, about five miles from his office at George M. Steinbrenner Field and just over a mile from his home.
What this will mean is unclear, but it’s worth noting that a more senior exec in Steve Swindal, who was George Steinbrenner’s son in law at the time (married to Jennifer Steinbrenner) and was widely thought of at the time as being George Steinbrenner’s successor, was given the boot after his DWI arrest in February of 2007. Newman would fairly be described as being lower on the food chain. Kevin Towers, anyone?
UPDATE: The team released a statement in response to the incident last night, the NY Post has it:
“The New York Yankees do not condone this kind of behavior,” the statement said. “We take this situation seriously and we are looking into the matter. We will have no further comment at this time.”
GM Brian Cashman or Newman didn’t immediately return phone calls.
A few days ago, I wrote the following about the story connecting Alex Rodriguez to a doctor under investigation for distributing HGH:
If A-Rod had wished, he could have refused to speak with the investigators. Instead, he is being open about his connection to Galea, and has stated on a number of occasions that he has nothing to do with this and will simply be discussing “someone else.” While it is possible that A-Rod comes out of this entire situation looking bad, we have absolutely zero evidence at this point by which to make any sort of determination.
Since that point, Galea has said that he did indeed treat Alex for inflammation, and prescribed anti-inflammatories. One question that I have been asked repeatedly is that if Alex was simply getting anti-inflammatories, why obtain them from a shady doctor in Canada? Why not go through typical medical channels? To answer this question, I point to one small detail that seems to have been glossed over by those attempting to turn this into a huge story before any information is available:
The nature of A-Rod’s relationship with Galea, the Toronto physician who was arrested in October after authorities found illegal drugs in his assistant’s car during a stop at the U.S. Canadian border, is unclear. Mark Lindsay, a Canadian chiropractor who managed the Yankee third basemen’s rehabilitation after hip surgery last year, is an associate of Galea, however. Galea and Lindsay are principals at a Toronto sports medicine clinic called Affinity Health. Galea is being investigated in both Canada and the U.S.
To be clear, Dr. Lindsay and Galea worked together, and Lindsay was the doctor whom the Yankees and surgeon Dr. Marc Phillipon approved to take care of A-Rod’s rehab. Furthermore, Lindsay himself is apparently not approved to write prescriptions in the US, and needed someone such as Galea to deal with anything that required a scrip. As such, the perception that A-Rod went looking in the seedy underbelly of the medical world for treatment is silly and unfounded. He almost certainly was referred to Galea by Lindsay, who was the doctor in charge of the medical treatment related to his hip. While it may have been stupid of Alex to go to a doctor that was not directly approved by the Yankees, that does not mean that he went to Galea to get HGH.
If there was something illicit going on between Alex and Galea, it will be exposed in time. Until that time, let’s not jump to conclusions that are not supported by the available information.
According to George King of the NY Post, while it’s clear that right-handers, Phil Hughes and Joba Chamberlain, “are the favorites,” or at least the two early finalists, vying for the fifth rotation spot this spring, “there are voices within the organization who want Chamberlain and Hughes in the pen.” GM Brian Cashman discussed this very issue last week with the lovable Mike Francesa, pointing out that such a pitching configuration, one which would feature Alfredo Aceves, Chad Gaudin, or Sergio Mitre as the fifth starter – an option that many more are pondering today after a small sample of recent innings from both Mitre and Aceves – would certainly be to the Yankees’ short-term benefit.
However, Cashman noted that, long-term, such a situation is neither efficient or pragmatic. As stated by Joe Pawlikowski of River Ave Blues, the Yankees need to cultivate at least one of their two young arms and inserting both into the team’s bullpen just does not work towards that goal. “The Yankees need to replace two starting pitchers next year,” Joe writes. “They’d be better serves in 2011, then, by having at least one of Hughes and Chamberlain starting in 2010” (to build innings, etc.). Yankees skipper, Joe Girardi, also made a similar point several weeks ago.
Putting both Hughes and Chamberlain would help the bullpen this season, but it would come at the expense of future starting rotations. In the end, potential long-term benefits, especially with regards to young pitchers, should trump the short-term stuff, right (I say that, but it does not always occur—see Joba Chamberlain’s emergence in 2007)?
Photo by Reuters
Via Bryan Hoch, the Yankees have traded right-handed reliever, Edwar Ramirez, to the Texas Rangers for “cash considerations.” Edwar was recently designated for assignment in order to make room on the roster for Chan Ho Park. The slender 28-year old ends his disappointing New York tenure with a 5.22 ERA (ERA+ of 85) and 1.955 WHIP over 98 1/3 innings pitched (his K/9 of 10.6 was a bright spot).
Last week, Steve throughly and cogently argued the case for Alfredo Aceves winning the competition for the Yankees’ lone available rotation slot. Today, I present 5 reasons why I believe that Joba Chamberlain is the only logical choice for that role.
1) Joba has the highest upside: Quite simply, Joba Chamberlain has the highest ceiling of the five options. While Aceves or even Gaudin might provide more predictable performance, only Joba (and to a lesser extent, Hughes) has the capability to turn into something much greater than a 5th starter type. For a team with 4 starters that have thrown at least 200 innings more than a few times over recent years, it makes sense to go with upside over stability in that 5th starter role.
2) There is more to lose if Joba is not in the rotation: Starting Aceves rather than Joba carries a much greater risk than allowing Joba to start. If Joba is put into the rotation and fails, he can simply be replaced with one of the other options, with no real long-term repercussions to follow. There is no real negative consequence to moving Aceves back and forth between roles. Conversely, if Joba starts the season in the bullpen, he is unlikely to pitch enough innings to allow him to properly continue his development, even if he was returned to the rotation mid-season. He would likely finish with a maximum of 100-110 innings, and would almost certainly be on an innings limit in 2011, which leads me to my next point.
3) The Yankees will likely be searching for starters next offseason: The only Yankee starters that are locked in to the 2011 rotation are CC Sabathia and AJ Burnett. Depending on the performance and contract demands of Andy Pettitte and Javier Vazquez, the Yankees will be looking for anywhere from 1-3 starters next offseason. Having Joba Chamberlain established as a starter would go a long way towards allowing the Yankees to efficiently fill those empty slots. If the Yankees could have Joba Chamberlain and Phil Hughes providing quality innings at a low cost, it would allow them to invest in a player such as Cliff Lee. A rotation of Sabathia, Burnett, Vazquez or Lee, Chamberlain, and Hughes (on an innings limit) would be expensive but dominant at the top and cost efficient and effective at the bottom.
4) He may be the best of the five right now: While Joba was inconsistent and occasionally awful last season, his overall body of work as a starter suggests that even if you ignore upside, he may be the best option of the five right now. Matt looked at the projections for Chamberlain, and found that the average projection has him notching a 4.10 ERA, 1.4332 WHIP, and 3.95 FIP in 2010. I have a hard time believing that any of the others would beat that line. Of course, some might argue that putting Joba in the bullpen will also improve that area of the team, but I think that it really would not make for an appreciable difference. Having Joba and Hughes in the bullpen at the expense of the rotation seems to be a bit of overkill. A bullpen with Rivera, Hughes, Marte, Park, Robertson, and Aceves should be excellent, and throwing Joba in there at the expense of his development is uneccessary.
5) What Were The Joba Rules For?: The Yankees have carefully managed Chamberlain’s workload for three seasons to reach the moment where he can freely pitch as many innings as the club needs from him. Now that they have reached that moment, it seems silly to stick him back in the bullpen or send the minors. I am not suggesting that the Yankees stick with their plan for Joba blindly. Rather, I believe that the fact that 1) Joba still has the greatest upside and 2) might actually be the best pitcher for the job in 2010, makes sticking with the development plan the most logical and prudent choice. It is time to see whether Joba Chamberlain can be a long-term answer in the Yankees rotation.
Do you agree?
Yesterday in the comments of Chris’s article on Brian Cashman and Kei Igawa, a discussion about whom the Yankees have traded in the past two seasons started. I’m of the opinion that with a few exceptions, the players Brian Cashman has traded have been nothing incredibly special and losing them will not hurt the team in the long term. So, let’s take a look at the last year and a half or so of Brian Cashman’s trades to see what the Yankees gave up.
Let’s start with the “deadline” deal of Ross Ohlendorf, Jose Tabata, Jeff Karstens, and Daniel McCutchen for Xavier Nady and Damaso Marte. What did the Yankees give up here? With the exception of Tabata, nothing special. Though Ohlendorf pitched well for the Pirates in 2009, he would not have played a big role for the 2009 Yankees and likely would have had just as small a role for the 2010 Yankees. Karstens did poorly in 39 games–13 starts–with the Bucs. McCutchen held his own (98 ERA+) and showed decent control (2.97 BB/9) in ‘09, but like the other two pitchers in this deal, he’d have no real place on the Yankees moving forward. There are plenty of guys ahead of him.
Jose Tabata was really the only player of consequence the Yankees forfeited in this deal with the Pirates. At the time of the trade, his OPS in the Eastern League was a meager .630. He raked once joining Altoona (.964), but 2009 was less spectacular (.763 OPS between AA and AAA). In a system that’s hurting for position player prospects, losing Tabata hurt, but Jose’s production had dropped year to year and level to level with the Yankees and there were apparently character issues. Perhaps all he needed was a change of scenery. It’s worth noting that Tabata’s star has taken a bit of a hit in recent years; he was rated the 27th best prospect in baseball pre-2007, the #37 pre-2008, and the #75 pre-2009.
The next trade of any importance was the December 2008 trade fleecing of Kenny Williams in the Nick Swisher deal. Cashman traded away Jeff Marquez–who’d seemingly stalled in his development and subsequently bombed with the Sox AAA team in 2009–Wilson Betemit–who was eventually DFA’d–and Jhonny Nunez who did poorly in a 5.2 inning stint with the Sox, but performed very well in the minors. This deal was absolutely great for the Yankees. They bought low on a very good cost controlled player and payed an incredibly small price.
In February of last year, Cashman traded Chase Wright to the Brewers for Eric Fryer; Fryer was eventually included with Casey Erickson in a deal for Eric Hinske. While Hinske didn’t have a huge impact on the Yankees, he added much more than either player would have now, or in the future. It’s also worth noting that the Pirates paid for Hinske’s time with the Yankees.
In other relatively minor trades, Cashman traded Chase Weems to the Reds for Jerry Hairston, Jr., who proved useful off the bench down the stretch and in the playoffs. Again, what Hairston added last year was more than Weems would likely add in the future. Weems would have been stuck behind any number of Yankee catching prospects and it’s likely that he’d never even make the Major League team.
For literally nothing but money, Brian acquired Chad Gaudin, who could be useful as a swingman out of the bullpen in 2010.
A brief review: so far out of these trades, the only remotely useful piece given up was Jose Tabata, and he was likely still at least a year and a half away from being in the Majors at the time of his trade.
The trades of which we’re unsure are the ones made in this offseason. However, that doesn’t mean we can’t judge them now.
The first trade made in 2010 was trading Brian Bruney to the Nationals for a player to be named later, Jamie Hoffmann. It appears that the Yankees grew tired of giving the oft-injured and inconsistent Bruney second chances and tried to turn him into a useful bench piece. If Hoffmann doesn’t make the team and must be returned to the Dodgers, as he’s a Rule V pick, then this trade looks a little worse. If he does stick with the team, this trade looks about equal: marginal piece for marginal piece.
This post is running a bit long and the other, more “major” players traded early in 2010 require a separate post that I’ll put up tomorrow. That one will feature my thoughts on Phil Coke, Mike Dunn, Melky Cabrera, Arodys Vizcaino, Ian Kennedy, and Austin Jackson.
