The last of our guest posts was done by (sic). Some of you might recognize him from RAB as “the artist formerly known as (sic)” or from twitter as @tafkasic, and you can read more of his work at thebatshatters.blogspot.com. He took a look at the 2011 free agent market and the Yankees’ place within it. It is an entertaining read that I think you will enjoy.

The 2010-2011 offseason could be one of the most exciting Hot Stove periods in recent memory for Yankees fans. Derek Jeter and Mariano Rivera will both become free agents, and the contracts of Andy Pettitte and Javier Vazquez will both expire. Additionally, Cliff Lee, Josh Beckett, Carl Crawford, Manny Ramirez, Ted Lilly and Brandon Webb will all become free agents. Will CC and Cliff Lee stand side-by-side in pinstripes as the new New York Knick LeBron James throws out the first pitch of the 2011 season, causing the entire city of Cleveland to light itself on fire? Will they go for shorter contracts on pitchers, and pursue speedster Carl Crawford? Will they package IPK and Melky for Johan Santana? Wait…what?

There are a lot of moving parts, so the best way to attack this is to determine how much cash the Yankees will have to spend, try to hazard a guess at how much Lee and Crawford will earn on the open market, and see if there are any scenarios in which one, or both, fit into the Yankees 2011 payroll.

For the sake of simplicity, I’m going to be making several assumptions. First, I’m assuming that the Yankees resign Jeter for something close to $100M over 5 years. I’m also assuming the Rivera is resigned for $30M over 2 years. Finally, I’m assuming that the 2011 payroll will be in the $200-210M range. The first two are huge assumptions, obviously, but I can’t see those two leaving. The money may be different, but hopefully won’t be too much in excess of what I’m envisioning.

2011 Salary Commitments
Thanks to the invaluable tool at Cot’s Baseball Contracts, we see that New York already has $144M committed to the 2011 payroll. When you add my proposed $20M to Jeter and $15M to Rivera, and the payroll is already at $179M. From there, you have to factor in raises for Joba Chamberlain and Phil Hughes, who will become eligible for arbitration for the first time. Using Liriano as a comparison, it won’t be unexpected to see them both pull in $1.5M apiece. This bumps the payroll up to $182M, and I’m going to round it up to $183M to cover raises for Boone Logan, if he’s still around, and for the pre-arb guys like DRob, Aceves and others.

With a budget of $183M, the Yankees will have, at the most, $17-27M to spend.

2011 Free Agents
The premier OF free agent in 2011 will be Carl Crawford. Crawford will be 28 years old at the time of his next deal, and is the owner of a career tripleslash of .295/.335.437, an OPS of .772. This line is a bit misleading, because its weighed down by his first two seasons as a 20 and 21 year old when he posted a line of .274/.304/.364. If you remove that, he’s good for a .300/.342/.456 line. Crawford has averaged 50 steals per year over 7 full seasons and has posted phenomenal defensive numbers over the course of his career in LF.

I can’t envision Crawford earning as much as Holliday, who scored a $120M/7 year deal from the Cardinals. A better comparison might be Jason Bay, even though Crawford and Bay are as different as they come in LF. Bay received a 4 year deal worth $66M, with a $17M vesting option for the 5th year from the Mets, a total value of 83M over 5 years. Still, I expect Crawford’s lack of power to keep the value of his deal low, and I wouldn’t be surprised to see him find a new home for a contract of 5 years and 65M, an AAV of 13M. His age, his defense, and his speed will work in his favor, but his lack of power ought to prevent him from earning an eight-digit deal.

Cliff Lee is the biggest starting pitcher to hit the market in 2011. He’s the owner of a career ERA+ of 109, but has seemingly put it all together to become one of the best pitchers in the game. In his last two years, he’s posted a 2.89 ERA over 455 IP, striking out 6.9 batters per nine and walking only 1.5 per nine. His K/BB ratio over that period is one of the best, 4.56. That’s superb. The risk with Lee is his somewhat low K/9, and his age. As a 31 year old free agent, it’s hard to see Lee getting more than five or six years guaranteed, despite the Phillies’ claims that he is looking for “Sabathia-type” money. Instead, I look for Lee to receive a six year deal worth $100M, an AAV of $16.67M. It’s expensive, but it is becoming increasingly rare to see bona fide aces hit the open market in free agency, and Lee’s price may go up even further if the Red Sox sign Josh Beckett to an extension.

Roster Analysis
The most obvious holes in the 2011 roster are starting pitching and LF. Here’s where it gets dicey (as if it weren’t already confusing):

Scenario 1: Phil Hughes and Joba Chamberlain have successful, injury-free 2010 campaigns, and are considered locks for the 2011 rotation.
In this scenario, the Yankees can simply resign Pettitte to another one-year deal worth around $11M. This would bump payroll to around $194M, and leave around $6-14M to spend elsewhere. With a full rotation, the Yankees could become players for Crawford. Signing him to a $13M AAV deal would max out the payroll for 2011.

Scenario 2: Either Hughes or Joba gets injured or very ineffective in 2010, and is slotted for a spot in the bullpen in 2011.
Here, the Yankees will only have 3 starters under contract for 2011. If they bring back Pettitte for around $11M, they’ll have $6-14M to spend elsewhere, and will need a fifth starter. The Yankees could attempt to pursue Lee, creating a formidable rotation of Sabathia-Lee-Burnett-Pettitte-Joba/Hughes. This would leave them unable to sign Crawford and completely maxed out on budget.

Scenario 3: The Andy Pettitte Era ends
If Pettitte decides to retire, or the Yankees decide to go in a different direction, then any number of things could happen. With a healthy Joba and Hughes in the rotation, the Yankees could bring in Lee for $16.67M per and sit right at the $200M threshold. This would give them a rotation of Sabathia-Lee-Burnett-Chamberlain-Hughes, and leave them with up to $10M to spend elsewhere.

Scenario 4: The Andy Pettitte Era ends and only Joba or Hughes is in the bullpen
If one of Chamberlain or Hughes is in the bullpen, or injured, then the Yankees would still need a fifth starter in addition to Sabathia, Lee, Burnett and Hughes/Joba. Here, we might see the Yankees use Zach McAllister in the 5 spot, or attempt to bring back Vazquez for $10M per year. Other alternatives include Lilly or Webb.

Scenario 5: The Twins fail to resign Joe Mauer
Twins fans, avert your eyes! If Mauer hits the market, all bets are off with Lee and Crawford. The Yankees could offer Mauer a deal of $180M over 8 years, an AAV of $22.5M. Assuming they were able to outbid the Red Sox and ink him to a deal like this, no sure thing, they would see their budget rise to around $205-207M. Accordingly, they would need Joba and Hughes to man the 3 and 4 spots in the rotation, and then attempt to get a 5th starter for cheap. Signing Mauer would also mean the end of the Jesus Montero experiment at catcher, and so the Yankees could shift him to LF and have him split time with Posada at DH. Scenarios like this are why non-Yankee fans hate us so very, very much.

Summary
Personally, I think Scenario 5 is very unlikely. I think the Twins will pony up the dough they’re about to get from their new stadium and sign him to an extension, allowing Twins fans everywhere to come back in off the ledge. That said, I can’t see the Yankees landing both Crawford and Lee. Their payroll is already precipitously high, and management shows no inclination to blow past the $210M ceiling. Of the four remaining scenarios outlined above, I’m fairly excited about #3, even though it involves saying farewell to Andy Pettitte. Signing Lee would provide them with a second ace, and a good hedge against the risk of Sabathia leaving after 2011. The best thing that can happen to the Yankees in the meantime is Joba and Hughes putting together successful 2010 campaigns, which will give the Yankees more flexibility and more options going into the 2010-2011 Hot Stove.

(I know, terrible headline. The NY Post would be proud).
As I am sure most of you know by now, Elijah Dukes was released by the Nationals yesterday. The Nats stated clearly that Elijah had not done anything wrong in terms of behavior, and that this was purely a baseball decision. The first question on the mind of many Yankee fans was, should the Yankees pursue Dukes?

Last offseason, I felt fairly strongly that the Yankees should try and trade for Elijah:

If I were Brian Cashman, I would strongly consider swinging a deal for Dukes. The Nats have a very weak farm system, so that the Yankees may be able to put together a package of pitchers enticing enough to aquire the mercurial outfielder. He would fill the Melky Cabrera role in 2009, as he is a much better bat than Melky, is not appreciably worse in the field, and runs as well as, if not better than, Cabrera. He would allow the Yankees to field offers on Xavier Nady at the deadline, and could slot into left field in 2010 when Damon and Nady leave. At worst, he would give the Yankees the ability to walk away from Matt Holliday, Jason Bay, and Manny Ramirez if the cost got too high.

I turned out to be wrong about Melky, and he put up a strong year while Dukes regressed mightily. The regression was such that if Dukes would cost prospects now I would definitely stay away from him. However, being that he is now a free agent likely to command a minor league deal or something close to the minimum, he becomes a more interesting option. Let’s take a look at the pros and cons:

Pros
1) He has plenty of talent: He had a poor 2009 that was marred by injury and a strange loss of power, but his 2008 was fantastic. I’ll let JMK at Mystique and Aura explain:

Dukes mostly destroyed the minors in the Tampa Bay system, then struggled mightily in his 2007 callup, and was shuttled off to Washington, where he rebounded to hit a line of .264/.386/.478/.864, an OPS+ of 127 in 81 games. His power numbers were excellent with .214 ISO, and he posted a strong UZR in RF (11.2), albeit in a very small sample. He snagged a few bags, too. All in all, Dukes was one of the few bright spots in Washington that year with his 2.8 WAR.

Those numbers from 2008 represent those of a star in the making. I am not really sure why he fell of a cliff in 2009, but it is clear that he has the skills and athleticism to be an above average player with the bat and adequate with the glove.

2) He projects to be better than the Yankees current options at 4th and 5th outfielder, and may be better than Brett Gardner: His projected wOBA based on an average of four projection systems is .346, significantly better than that of Jaime Hoffmann, Marcus Thames, and Randy Winn. Brett Gardner would likely remain the starter as he is a bit closer with the bat than the others and is much stronger with the glove than Dukes, but it is not hard to envision Dukes wresting the job from Brett at some point. Dukes is also a right-handed bat, so he provides the same advantages that a guy like Thames or Hoffmann does. From a purely baseball standpoint, this is a logical move that would improve the ballclub.

3) This is a good fit for Dukes: While he may not start right away, New York is likely his best shot to play in a winning environment for the first time while also affording him a reasonable chance of grabbing a starting spot. Being that Dukes has played for two awful franchises thus far, it might be a strong motivator for him to play with regularity for a winner.

4) He’s cheap, you can cut ties immediately if there is a problem, and he gives them options next offseason: Dukes will likely require less than a million dollars to sign, and can be stashed in the minors if he does not make the team immediately. Furthermore, there is no real downside here. If he acts up or plays poorly, he can simply be cut or traded without any repercussions. On the flip side, if he plays well and behaves, he can allow the Yankees to pass on an expensive left fielder such as Jayson Werth or Carl Crawford this offseason. It is the very definition of low risk, high reward.

Cons

1) His performance dropped in 2009, and he cannot stay healthy: His performance in 2009 was fairly shoddy, and he gained a reputation amongst National fans for having poor baseball instincts in the field and on the basepaths. The article quoted above from M & A suggests that pitchers were picking on him by throwing significantly more breaking pitches, and the Fangraphs data does support the idea that pitchers were cutting down on fastballs to Dukes. Furthermore, Dukes has had trouble staying on the field, with 4 stints on the DL over the last 2 seasons. Then again, if he gets hurt, the Yankees would simply be right back where they are right now.

2) There are some very serious behavioral issues. I do not want to sweep these under the rug, because Elijah has had some serious issues that include multiple arrests and prompted the Nationals to hire someone to follow him around and keep him out of trouble. Furthermore, dropping that a player with that sort of history into the shark tank that is the NY media frenzy may not be the brightest of ideas.

That said, I think that the Yankee clubhouse might be the best place for Dukes, as it is a tight-knit group filled with professionals who can set a positive example. Dukes is unlikely to disrupt such a veteran clubhouse, and as Mike Axisa explains, it might be the right place for Dukes to learn how to be a positive asset to a baseball team:

I think this is exactly the kind of support system that could help him thrive. Joe Girardi and Jorge Posada provide the tough love, A.J. Burnett and Nick Swisher would allow him to loosen up and be himself, and even guys like Alex Rodriguez and Joba Chamberlain, who’ve had their fair share of off-the-field troubles, can help him relate. I hate to bring race into it, but CC Sabathia and Curtis Granderson are two African American guys widely considered to be class acts and great people, and I can’t help but think they would be a positive influence on Dukes.

Might that be wishful thinking? Certainly. But once again, if he does something stupid and becomes a distraction, the Yankees can simply cut him. While it may add to the media circus around the Yankees, that should be irrelevant to the club, as they are certainly used to that sort of thing. I think that this is a risk worth taking.

Do you agree?

Wednesday, Chad Jennings wrote an article about Brett Gardner and how he has the “inside track” for the centerfield job. We’ve already discussed that quite a bit, so I wanted to talk about something else that caught my eye.

But those numbers hide two things Gardner has done better than any other outfield candidate in Tampa: He’s walked twice as often as he’s struck out, and two of his three hits were bunt singles. Dropping bunts and avoiding strikeouts have been two of the necessary adjustments to Gardner’s game.

I will not argue with the latter part. Gardner avoiding strikeouts is crucial. In both his Major League (.352 SLG, .096 IsoP) and Minor League (.383 SLG, .094 IsoP), Brett Gardner has not hit for nearly enough power to justify the amount of strikeouts he’s had. He made up for it in the minors with a walk rate that pushed 14%, but that wild success hasn’t followed to the majors. His walk rate is still okay at 8% in the bigs, but with his lack of power, we shouldn’t be expecting the walks to keep coming.

Gardner has not shown any power ability at the Major League level and once pitchers start getting hip to that, they will challenge him in the zone. They may think, “What’s the worst that could happen? This guy’s not going to take me deep. And, he may even get himself out with a strikeout.” The less power Gardner has, the more he’s going to be challenged. If he’s going to be challenged in the zone more, the walks will definitely decrease. There are two ways he can combat this. Well, there’s really only one. Developing power just isn’t going to happen for Gardner, so instead, he must improve his eye and put more swings on balls in the zone.

In 2009, he displayed a good eye. He swung at only only 17.2% of pitches outside of the strike zone, while the average hitter swung at 25.1% of balls out of the zone. Laying off of bad pitches isn’t Gardner’s problem. His problem is laying off of pitches in the zone. His zone swing percentage was only 50.7, 15.2 points behind the league average of 65.9%. This is something that could have contributed to Gardner’s relatively high strikeout numbers. While his K% (16.1) was lower than the league average (20.3), it’s a bit much for a guy who hits for as little power as Gardner does. Brett has to do a better job of recognizing good pitches and turning them into singles, with the occasional double.

The part of Jennings’ article I disagree with is the part about Gardner improving his bunting. While it’s good for a bottom of the order hitter to be skilled at bunting, I’m not sure how much sense it makes for Gardner. While he does have the speed to beat out good drag bunts, how often will that happen? A good part of Gardner’s offensive contribution is his speed on the basepaths. If he’s giving himself up through bunts, he won’t be able to get on base as much as when he’s swinging away or working a walk. A sporadic sac bunt out of Gardner will be a good thing since he’s not exactly a big bopper, but the more he works on bunting, the less he works on actual hitting (see above paragraphs). I’d much rather Gardner work on turning good pitches into singles than see him work on turning good pitches into bunts–be they sacrifices, drags, or foul balls.

While we all have bitched about the absurdity of a spring training competition for the #5 spot for all sorts of valid reasons, I want to take a step back for one minute and look at it from an organizational and developmental standpoint. All of the pitchers involved (including the top 2) have parts of their game that they needed to work on and focus on correcting:

-Joba has had trouble finding his fastball early in games, and hasn’t been very efficient as a Starter. His pitch selection makes you scratch your head at times as well. He has also had weight issues in the past, and at times last year looked soft and out of shape.

-Hughes has been working on that changeup since he was in AA. His splits facing lefties as a MLB starter are awful. Even with adding a Cutter last year he still showed a substantial split. He needs an effective change to take it to the next level as a starter.

-Alfredo Aceves needs to show he’s more than just a 6th starter/long man.

-Mitre needs to show that he’s fully recovered from TJ and that he’s better than the pitcher we saw last year.

Each of these guys have something to prove this Spring. Setting up a competition with the carrot of the #5 spot as the prize will get all of the participants to bear down and try to figure out how to do what they know the Yanks are looking for. It can help them take that next developmental step forward. Reports of Hughes’ improved change shouldn’t just be taken for granted, I think the Yanks know of his desire to start and have used that motivation to make him a better pitcher. It’s smart to do it now, in the heat and fog of the regular season it’s much harder for a player to focus on these things.

The Yanks deserve praise for how they’ve run this camp. Many other teams are just going through the motions, getting in shape for the season. The Yanks are using this time to maximize every asset they have, and the 5th starter competition is part of that process.  Girardi loves to set up these competitions each spring, and has often said “it brings out the best in everyone”. It sounds trite (and it is) but that doesn’t mean it isn’t true. To me, this is just another example of why they’re a well-run organization.

From Tom Verducci:

I know this to be true because Curt Schilling told me years ago. His theory was that the Red Sox and Yankees are so evenly matched that the team that gets the most starts out of its top five starters will be the better team. It’s amazing how right he has been….

Let’s look at the past seven years, the era in which Boston and New York essentially have been near-equal rivals, and examine the correlation between which team got the most starts from its top five and which team had the most wins….

Schilling has been right four straight years. Only once in the past seven years did the team with more starts have fewer wins, but even that occasion needs an explanation. It happened in 2004, when the Red Sox — who got an incredible 157 starts from five starters — may have had three fewer regular season wins than New York but beat the Yankees in the ALCS and won the World Series.
So determining who is better this year, the Red Sox or Yankees, becomes a very simple exercise: just forecast which team will get more starts out of its top five starters. And when you do that, the answer becomes obvious: the Yankees will be the better team.

I think Verducci is correct here. While you can argue about which rotation is more talented, it is clear that the Yankee rotation is more reliable. In the Red Sox rotation, Verducci dubs only Beckett and Lester as reliable, and even Beckett has some question marks regarding his health crop up occasionally. Conversely, CC Sabathia and Javier Vazquez are two of the more durable pitchers in the game, Andy Pettitte has remained healthy with consistency despite his advancing age, and AJ Burnett seems to have found a way to stay off the DL after years of struggling with injuries. Furthermore, the Yankees have greater depth, with 8 solid starting options, while the Red Sox have a larger drop-off after their top 6.

This study is obviously not dispositive, and the club that gets fewer starts from their top 5 starters can compensate in other areas. However, considering two similar bullpens and the Yankees superior lineup, the fact that the Yankees project to be more reliable in the rotation bodes well for their chances in the AL East.

(Just a thought: this sort of concept might be self-fulfilling. With teams like the Yankees and Red Sox, poor starters will not be given much of a chance, and the 5 guys with the most starts will usually be 5 fairly good options. In this way, counting the number of starts from the top 5 is just as much about effectiveness as health (whereas with lesser teams, the top 5 might simply be the 5 healthiest guys, because they do not have many effective options). As such, the team with the most starts from the top 5 is likely to be most effective and will rack up a larger number of wins.)

On Tuesday and Wednesday, TYU will be running four guest posts from four excellent writers. The third comes from Mark Allen, who some of you might recognize from twitter as @markelderallen. He looked at the current economic system in baseball, and the Yankees’ place within it. It is an entertaining read that I am sure you will enjoy.

Since 2003 the New York Yankees have paid over $180 million to Major League Baseball in luxury taxes. The luxury tax bills have not been sufficient to prevent the Yankees from putting a quality product on the field of play, but one has to wonder why every 7+ years the Yankees should have to offer a full year’s payroll to the “poorer” or “smaller-market” teams in the game.

The most common justification for the luxury tax threshold stems from a belief that the goal is somehow to achieve a level financial playing field among all of the teams. Words like “fairness” are often used and comparisons to football are made to seem logical and relevant. Before we can address the issue of how to create a level playing field, how to be “fair,” and how to obtain competitive balance, we must first address the greater question of why these should be league objectives.

Is there something inherently wrong with one team, be it the Yankees or any other team, generating more revenue than any other team? If the Yankees, over the course of time, as their spending power increases both in total real dollars (meaning adjusted for inflation) and relative to other teams, find a way to use their superior resources to win a disproportionate number of regular season, postseason and World Series games, is that wrong, and if so, how? Is it bad for business? Is it bad for the purity of the sport? Is it immoral?

First, let us consider whether this financial advantage is inherent or achieved. In my lifetime, and likely yours if you are reading this post, the Yankees were outspent by the Royals. Yes, twenty years ago it was the Kansas City Royals who led Major League Baseball in payroll. It bears repeating. Kansas. City. Royals. I don’t have the figures in front of me, but I find it hard to believe that both teams were putting an equal share of revenue toward payroll in the early 1990s. Since then, the Yankees have dramatically improved their revenue stream with the creation of the new Yankee Stadium (aka YSIII and NYS), and more importantly, the YES network. Today the radio rights to broadcast New York Yankees games cost more than the television rights to Kansas City Royals games, so it is unlikely the Royals will be outspending the Yankees any time soon.

This minimizes the criticism of many small-market teams that they could compete better if they were to actually reinvest their revenue into product development (such as signing draft picks, foreign prospects, and proven free agents). It does not eliminate the criticism, but the truth is that under the current system, even if they were to ramp up efforts to bring fans to the ballpark with, say, ballpark renovations or fan promotions, their revenue stream would not suddenly jump to a level at which they could financially compete with the New York Yankees.

If we agree that the financial advantage is inherent to the market due to population density, then we can agree that the financial advantage is “unfair,” but not whether fairness is relevant. Understand that Major League Baseball in its current iteration is, in real terms, more profitable than it has ever been for players, owners and team management. It is hard for any business to grow the way baseball has grown and simultaneously condemn itself. If unfair baseball is more profitable, then as a business, it is illogical to make fairness the goal.

However, when we expand our scope, we see that all sports are more profitable today, and so baseball’s growth, when understood in the context of the broader sports landscape, is less impressive. It is plausible that baseball’s growth is being slowed by the public perception of a lack of fairness or competitive balance. I say perception because the financial disadvantages of smaller market teams does not necessarily have an anti-competitive impact that would be considered unfair, even if we agree that those financial disadvantages are, within the present-day system, inevitable.

So for the purposes of discussion, we are considering the current landscape of Major League Baseball to be unfair and unbalanced, but even if we agree that this problem is intrinsic to the system in place, we may still disagree whether the problem needs correcting. I am assuming, for the purposes of discussion, that correcting this problem would result in increased demand for Major League Baseball.

Now, any economics student can tell you that, if baseball were subject to market forces, and one team, such as the Yankees, were able to produce an amount of revenue so relatively high that it prohibited another team’s ability to compete, that team would either be folded or forced to relocate to a stronger market, and in the words of Shakespeare, there’s the rub.

No matter what the product, market forces prevent competitive imbalance and dictate that, over the course of time, no profit is earned. The only way to ensure that is to allow the businesses manufacturing the product to compete against each other, and Major League Baseball does not, except when they do.

In the case of the Oakland Athletics, a move from Oakland to San Jose has been blocked because San Jose baseball fans primarily root for the San Francisco Giants, and so Oakland – a team that already competes in essentially the same geographical market – has been prevented continually from moving into an area populated primarily by fans of another team.

However, in the case of the Washington Nationals, just the opposite is true. The Nationals were previously the Montreal Expos – a team with no proximity to Washington, DC. Washington, DC and its suburbs in Virginia and Maryland were filled with fans of the Baltimore Orioles prior to 2007 when the Nationals came to DC. Orioles’ management protested the move, but was overruled by Major League Baseball, as commissioner Bud Selig was in favor of the move.

The rules that prevent most teams from moving into the geographic jurisdiction of existing teams are precisely the reason we have competitive imbalance today. If Florida could move to Manhattan, they would not only be increasing the size of their natural market, but they would be reducing the market size of two competitors who are presently dominant in the marketplace of professional baseball. Unfortunately, if the Yankees and Mets even had to blink to block such a maneuver, I’d be shocked. Both teams are too influential for the issue to subject to even be seriously broached with the owners.

Getting rid of this rule has the potential to permanently and summarily solve the problem of intrinsic financial advantages of a specific team. The luxury tax system, on the other hand, is not even a band-aid, nor is it a real acknowledgment of a problem. The Yankees are seen as having an intrinsic advantage because of the population density of their city and the lack of other teams in their geographic region, and yet the luxury tax does nothing to address this concern. If the Yankees made $10 billion in 2010, but spent only $100 million on payroll, they would pay not pay a cent of luxury tax this year. This tax is therefore effectively a safeguard for profit.

Baseball is exempt from antitrust regulations and therefore permitted by US law to operate in an anticompetitive business environment. The continued insistence on an anticompetitive marketplace has resulted in the ability of every team to make a profit – not just the teams from New York and Los Angeles. The Florida Marlins, for example, represent a metropolitan area of over 5 million people, so how is it that they recently had a team payroll that is considerably lower than John Lackey’s current salary? Ownership took money from the Yankees luxury tax payments, from ticket sales, from television and radio contracts, and they pocketed it.

If the fans of Major League Baseball are comfortable with ownership groups profiting and not reinvesting their revenue into improving their product (as EVERY other business must do to compete in the marketplace), then we should continue to operate in a system with salary restrictions, be they taxation-based or cap-based. If fans want teams to do everything they can to always put the best possible product on the field, then it is time to abandon the antitrust exemption and eliminate the geographic relocation boundaries presently in place. Let the market determine how many teams can compete, where they should situate themselves geographically, and individual teams can operate as they please in a free and open market. Then the success of each team will be the result of its merit, and that is what people are clamoring for. If that solution is unappealing to fans, then perhaps they should reconsider their stance on “fairness.”

On Tuesday and Wednesday, TYU will be running four guest posts from four excellent writers. The third comes from Steve H, who some of you might recognize from his blog, Mystique and Aura. He looked back at the 1994 season, and wondered whether there was a conspiracy to increase offense. It is an entertaining read that I am sure you will enjoy.

Did baseball’s owners have baseballs juiced in anticipation of the 1994 players strike? Stay with me while I lay some claims to back up this (admittedly off the wall) theory.

If a player was making a run at Roger Maris, Hack Wilson, Ted Williams or George Sisler, wouldn’t they be less likely to go along with the union and strike? What if it were several players? And imagine, the owners may have thought, where the backlash from the fans would land if the strike came in the middle of a potentially historic season? What better way to keep the players from striking than by dividing their motivation? The players made a ton of money anyways, especially the stars. Would you want to fight for a few extra dollars, or try to cement yourself in history? As an individual player, they’d likely choose history, which would lead to increased off the field income anyway.

From 1977 to 1993, only 2 players hit 50 HR’s in a season, George Foster with 52 in 1977, and Cecil Fielder in 1990. Even in an extreme year like 1987 (Wade Boggs hit 20% of his career HR’s that year), no one managed 50, though a few came close. In 1994 6 people were on pace for 50 HR’s, based on their HR’s per game, and assuming they played in 155 games. Again, even in 1987 nobody hit 50, and now 6 guys were on pace, and another 3 were on pace for at least 47, so they obviously had a chance at 50 as well. As far as chasing Maris, again assuming 155 games, Matt Williams was on pace for 60, Griffey 56, Bagwell 55, Belle 53, and Thomas 52. They all had legitimate chances at the record. Look through those names again and notice the outliers to the rest of their careers. Williams was on pace for 60, yet besides 1994 never even hit 40. Bagwell’s career high was 47, Thomas’ was 43. Even if you assumed all of these guys were juicers, did they only juice in 1994? Of course not, there had to be something else in the water.

While Maris’ record did fall (and we know the controversy surrounding that), none of these guys were the ones to break the record. I can imagine the bitterness they must feel for not having been given a true chance, especially Griffey and Thomas, who have come through this steroid mess as two of the presumed cleanest sluggers of the era. While they’ll both be in the Hall of Fame anyway, they could have been considered the true homerun champion, in the same way that many fans now assign that title back to Maris.

We also remember Tony Gwynn’s attempt at .400 that was aborted by the strike. Did you also know he was just about on pace to break George Sisler’s (since broken) 74 year old record for hits in a season? He was, though I think his road to .400 would have been easier. Getting back to .400, did he have a real shot? Well the strike unfortunately came while he was on fire. He was hitting .423 in the 2nd half, and in an obviously small sample size, he was hitting .475 for the month of August. Just 38 more at bats at that pace would have put him at .400 for the year. The Padres that year, ironically enough, had a winning percentage of .401. In other words, they had nothing to play for. Knowing that, would they have rested Gwynn down the stretch against tough lefties? He “only” hit .374 against LHP that year, while hitting 30 points higher vs. RHP. Would they have rested him more on the road, where he hit .387 vs. .403 at home? He was just 1-5 as a pinch hitter, which dropped his overall average 3 points, so I’m sure they wouldn’t have him pinch hit again. The deeper you look, the more they could have done. He hit .434 hitting 2nd that year in 33 games, and .380 in 73 games, so they could have put him in the 2 hole only. Gwynn only hit .304 against “power pitchers” (as per B-Ref) that year. Solution, bench him against power pitchers. Gwynn hit .403 on open fields and only .319 in domes. While several examples above are small samples, to get to .400 would have only taken a handful of at-bats. Considering they were terrible, they could have easily helped Gwynn on his way to .400 without upsetting the fans, and likely would have done all they could have to get him there.

Retroactively, who else would look back now and do more to avoid the strike? How about Fred McGriff, he of the 493 career HR’s? Did that strike cost him his chance at the Hall? He was on pace for a career high 47 HR’s, which would have put him at 506 for his career. In the minds of the BBWAA, 506 HR’s and a career high of 47 is much more Hall-worthy than 493 with a career high of 37, right? In 1994, Harold Baines was averaging 1 hit per game. With no strike, he could have added approximately 40 hits to his career total, putting him at 2906. Throw in another 15 hits or so from the missed games in 2005, and with less than 100 to go, would he have stuck around for another year to get to 3000, and almost automatic (though debatable) enshrinement? Whether a team would have given him a chance is also debatable, but a run of the mill team may have signed him on just for the much shorter chase to 3000 and the attention and extra revenues those historical chases bring.

Though it is less interesting than looking at the individual statistical outliers of 1994, both the AL and NL obviously saw huge increases in HR/G and R/G in 1994. In the 5 years before 1994, American League homeruns fluctuated from 1.52/game to 1.83/game. In 1994 it was 2.23/game, 136% higher than the average over the previous 5 years. In the NL the increase in homeruns over the previous 5 seasons was 128%. For one player a 28% or 36% increase in HR’s is questionable enough, but for entire leagues to shift like that, something else had to be in play.

While I think there is enough evidence that the balls were juiced in 1994, what are the odds that MLB ownership had something to do with it? I don’t know, probably a reach, but certainly worth thinking about.

After Phil Hughes turned in an impressive effort against the Astros last night, Joe Girardi had the following to say:

“He threw the ball extremely well tonight,” Girardi said. “Attacked the strike zone. Had a good curveball. Threw some good changeups tonight. He let his fielders do the work, too. He looked good tonight. It seems like his fastball command gets better and better each outing, and that’s important.”

Being that spring training results are largely irrelevant (Hughes pitched 4 innings against scrubs from the worst lineup in the sport), it is important to see that Girardi felt Hughes was throwing well. This has rightfully lead many to proclaim Hughes as the obvious frontrunner for the 5th starter job. However, it has also lead to some posts that have imparted an air of finality to Joba Chamberlain’s career as a starter. Most notable is the following article by Joel Sherman, that I will run through in order to dispel some of the myths included therein.

Joba Chamberlain is scheduled to pitch four innings today. This is possibly the last time we will ever see him stretched out this long. He is still considered a candidate for the fifth starter’s spot and Joe Girardi is saying he will get at least one more chance after today to work in extended fashion.

But, at this point he would have to change an awful lot of minds – and quickly – that he is best suited for that job. Or else there will be no next long outing or the next long outing will merely be a formality. Today is his starting Waterloo.

I find it hard to believe that the Yankees will give up on three years of development based on 10 spring training innings. Joba had an ERA of 3.58 entering August last season, an admirable number for a pitcher in his first full year as a starter. At that point, he began to approach his career innings high and his performance suffered mightily. Basically, we are talking about two bad months as being the impetus for the Yankees sacrificing an immense amount of value for the future. I highly doubt that Brian Cashman would be that shortsighted, and I firmly believe that the loser of this competition will get another chance at the rotation. Expect both Joba and Hughes to be in the rotation in 2011. (On that note, see Fack Youk for an explanation of why sending Joba to AAA rather than the bullpen might make sense).

As I reported on Feb. 3 in this column , many Yankee officials were heading into spring already believing that Phil Hughes was going to be the fifth starter and that Chamberlain was going to be Mariano Rivera’s set-up man. That was based on how Chamberlain’s best fastball returned in the postseason as a starter and so did his confident strut – both elements mostly missing when Joba worked as a starter last year.

This is a myth. Joba’s fastball improved out of the bullpen because that is what happens to most pitchers, but his “best fastball” did not return at all. He was throwing 95-96, which is actually the velocity that he was averaging as a starter in 2008. In fact, that “best” fastball has been mostly absent from Joba’s repertoire since his shoulder injury in late 2008. Regarding the silliness of Joba’s “confident strut,” I did not see it when he nearly cost the Yankees Game 3 against the Angels (triple, sac fly, double in a tie game) and Game 4 against the Phillies (Feliz homer to tie game). He allowed 10 baserunners in 6.1 innings in the postseason. I’m not saying that he cannot be an effective reliever going forward, but the 2009 postseason is certainly not evidence that supports such a conclusion.

The Yanks truly wanted to believe his repertoire screamed front-of-the-rotation starter and they did an awful lot of work – most of it controversial based on the Joba Rules – to try to shoehorn him into that role. But actions speak louder than words. And Joba’s actions – no matter what he says – are those of someone who wants to relieve and, more important, is mentally built to relieve.

I like Joel Sherman, but this is the typical revisionist history that is only spewed by people who never heard of Chamberlain until he toed the rubber in New York. Joba was a starter in college, a starter in the minors, and became a mega-prospect based on his work in the minor league rotation. The Yankees did no shoehorning, and it was not a matter of the Yankees “truly wanting to believe” that he was a fit as a starter. On the contrary, there was not a scout in all of baseball that would have pegged Chamberlain for the bullpen before the Yankees put him there in August of 2007. He was seen as a power arm with four above average pitches, and projected as an ace. If Joba had never been put in the bullpen for that stretch run, we would be discussing whether he should be in the rotation or in Scranton, because the bullpen would not be an option.

He gets, perhaps, a final chance to change minds today. But if it is more of what we have seen so far in spring, a combination of lack of endurance and refinement, then Joba might not get another shot in five days to work extended innings. Instead, he might be heading to his old new job out of the pen; this time permanently.

I certainly hope not. If Joba Chamberlain never sees the rotation again, the Yankees will have made a massive mistake.

On Monday, Moshe mused on Nick Swisher, his excellent 2009 season, and whether or not Swish is a candidate for regression in 2010. While there was some number crunching in Moshe’s post, I’m gonna take it a step further like I have for a few different players and project, based on other projections, what we might reasonably expect Swisher to do in 2010.

Before starting, I’ll say what I always say about Nick Swisher and players like him: if you’re looking for a guy to hit for a high batting average and make a lot of contact, Nick isn’t you’re man. He strikes out quite a bit and is not a good contact hitter. However, he does other things that offset those negatives. He’s got a great eye and when he does make contact, he hits for very good power. The same thing true here is true of Adam Dunn, but that’s really neither her nor there. Anyway, onto the forecasts.

Combining the CHONE, Bill James, Marcels, and Fans projections for Swisher, I came up with a line of .247/.357/.464/.821 for Swisher in 2010. Those numbers represent a bit of a drop off from Nick’s 2009, but they’re still right up there with his career numbers (.245/.357/.460/.818). The projections see Nick hitting 26 homers, rather than the 29 he hit in 2009, but that drop off isn’t really anything significant.

Basically, I have a lot of faith in Swisher to put up at least this projection. He’s a good hitter and I think he’s proved that 2008 was the exception whereas 2009 (and ‘05-’07) was more of the rule.

And though I should’ve started with this, I’ll end with it: I’m an unabashed Swisher lover. Over at River Ave. Blues last year, I declared myself president of the Nick Swisher Fan Club. Nick’s a solid player who fits the Yankees in more than one way. Not only is he a great presence in the clubhouse and a good guy for the fans, he’s also a guy whose skill set is perfect for the Yankees. Nick is patient and powerful and can hold his own on defense. The trade for him was an absolute steal and his contract is not too pricey. I’m very glad that Nick Swisher is a New York Yankee.

Daily News sportswriter and TYU fave Mark Feinsand has an update on the 5th starters race. After yesterday’s masterful performance by Hughes, one which he was able to use his long-rumored but rarely seen changeup, it appears Phil is the clear front runner to land the #5 spot. He writes:

If you didn’t consider Phil Hughes to be the frontrunner in the fifth starter’s race before Tuesday night, it’s hard not to think of him that way now.

Hughes did precisely what he needed to, tossing four scoreless innings against the Astros for a save in the 4-1 win.

(Mariano Rivera pitched the fifth inning, prompting Hughes to tell reporters, “That’s a hold for Mo” as he walked into the clubhouse.)

In three outings this spring, Hughes now has a 2.08 ERA, giving up two earned runs in 8 2/3 innings. More impressive, he’s done so while fine-tuning his changeup into a pitch he can trust in big situations.

“I was really happy with my changeup tonight,” Hughes said. “I threw some in counts where normally I would never, ever do it and I got good results.”

That’s absolutely great news, and could transform him as a starting pitcher. In his early work as a starter, many hitters were able to fight off the fastball and pick up on the curve, leading to long at-bats and poor results. He has had much more trouble facing Lefty batters in 2007 and 2008, and even last year he showed a good sized split, though much of that work came out of the bullpen.  The change is designed to give him an out pitch facing Lefties, since it tends to fade and drift away from them, inducing poor contact or a swing and miss. With his ability to command and control his fastball, along his plus-plus Curve, a change could take him to the next level as a starter.

Up today is Joba Chamberlain, who needs  to show the Yanks something if he is to stay in consideration. According to manager Joe Girardi, time is running out if Joba wants to start.

“You’ve got to pick it up,” Yankees manager Joe Girardi said. “We’ve told him that you’ve got to pitch now. We gave you those first couple of starts to get under your belt, and now you’ve got to show us. You’ve got to pitch.“

Who says Spring Training is dull?